Capability, governance and collaboration : understanding the supplier perspective by Kumar, Niraj
 Capability, Governance and Collaboration: 





A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Bath 
School of Management 
 




Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author. A 
copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that they must 
not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the prior 
written consent of the author. 
 
 Restrictions 
This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library 























Dedicated to,  
my beloved sister, Saumya Rani (1985 - 2008)  
and  
my grandfather, Ram Prasad Singh (1922 - 2010).  





First and foremost I would like to thank the Almighty for giving me courage, 
strength and support to complete this research. My sincere gratitude goes to my 
mentors and supervisors Dr. Mickey Howard, Professor Mike Lewis and Dr. 
Sinéad Carey for their excellent guidance and unconditional support. Their advice 
and encouragement during the research process are invaluable to me and in absence 
of that this piece of work could never been possible. Their profound knowledge, 
positive attitude during some tough times and constructive feedback throughout 
this research journey have been instrumental in my personal and professional 
development. 
 
Many academicians and practitioners have helped me in shaping my thoughts and 
ideas, and provided invaluable suggestions during doctoral research period. I am 
indebted to them for their effort and commitment. Special thanks go to the West of 
England Aerospace Forum for the help and support during data collection stage of 
this research. I also express my gratitude to all the respondents who agreed to 
participate in this research.   
 
I would like to thank my colleagues at the University of Bath School of 
Management for constructive discussions and knowledge sharing sessions over the 
period of doctoral research. I appreciate the help of administrative and technical 
staffs at the school for kind assistance at different occasions during the course of 
my study. I would also like to extend my thanks to colleagues at my current 
workplace at University of Sheffield Management School for providing a 
favourable environment to complete the last phase of thesis.  
 
I am very much thankful to my friends in United Kingdom and across the world for 
the support and humour in my life. Their unconditional love and friendship have 
made this journey an enjoyable, pleasant and memorable experience.  
 
Finally, I am grateful to my family – Mom and Dad for their endless support and 
encouragement. The love and care, I received from my brother Pankaj and sisters 
Sudha, and Priyanka always make me feel very special. I will remain indebted to 




This research investigates the relationship between supplier capabilities, inter-firm 
governance and buyer-supplier collaboration. The research focuses on three 
functional capabilities (Research and Development (R&D), Production and Support 
services capability), two governance mechanisms (Contractual and Relational 
governance) and three types of buyer-supplier collaboration (Information sharing, 
Collaborative product/service development and Collaborative problem solving). A 
theoretical framework is developed which first examines the multiple mediation 
effect of contractual and relational governance on the relationship between 
capability and collaboration type, and second, explores the relative strength of the 
indirect effect through contractual and relational governance.   
 
Survey based research methodology is used to empirically test the hypotheses in 
this research. Data are collected from a total of 120 SMEs in the UK aerospace 
industry. Bootstrapping based techniques are used to analyse the data and to 
examine the proposed relationship between capability, governance and 
collaboration. The empirical findings indicate that although both contractual and 
relational governance are important in order to link the supplier capability with 
collaboration, the individual effect of contractual and relational governance varies 
in different combinations of capabilities and collaboration types.   
 
The potential contribution of this research is twofold: first, in terms of academic 
contribution, this study combines the arguments of Resource Based View and 
Transaction Cost Economics to provide a holistic view in explaining the inter-
relation between capability, governance and buyer-supplier collaboration; Second, 
in terms of practical contribution, this study improves the understanding of 
practitioners in both buying and supplying firm regarding the alignment of inter-
firm exchange processes with capabilities to achieve better performance in 
collaboration.  
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1.1 Introduction  
In an increased competitive environment across the globe, the importance of buyer 
– supplier collaboration in the supply chain is realised to generate sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage. For the past 20 years, studies related to buyer-
supplier collaboration have gained significant attention of academicians and 
practitioners (Nobbs 2008). Buyer – supplier collaboration involves the interaction 
between buyer and supplier in a supply chain to share both tangible (machines, 
staff etc.) and intangible (knowledge, information, skills etc.) resources across firm 
boundaries to maximise value for the customer (Wood and Gray 1991, Kanter 
1994, Powell et al. 1996). Collaboration provides the opportunity to leverage a 
firm’s strength with the help of partnering firms and to spread the risks related to 
capital investment, costs of innovation and shrinking product lifecycles (Inkpen 
2000, Mowery et al. 1996). It is commonly held that inter-firm exchanges across 
firm boundary entail both contractual and relational form of governance 
mechanism (Anand and Khanna 2000, Luo 2002, Zhang et al. 2003). Although 
formal agreement provides safeguards against inappropriate or opportunistic 
behaviour in collaboration, buyers and suppliers are increasingly involved in trust 
building activities to achieve greater benefit from collaboration, and to avoid the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour due to future uncertainties (Zaheer and 
Venkataraman 1995, Kale et al. 2000).   
 
In the current business environment of increased uncertainty and competition, firms 
seldom survive and prosper solely through their individual efforts alone. As a 
result, firms increasingly promote collaboration in supply chain. Collaboration 
however does not merely involve the development, communication and 
reinforcement of shared goals and objectives, but also emphasize the alignment of 
the capability with the particular form of transaction process to facilitate 
knowledge exchange and information sharing. Each firm’s performance in 
collaboration depends upon the nature and quality of the direct and indirect 
relationships a firm develops with its SC partner (Wilkinson and Young 2002). 
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While focus on core capabilities is necessary, firms also need to look into the inter-
firm transaction process before engaging in collaborative activities. This is 
particularly important in order to effectively gain access to complimentary skills or 
resources of the partnering firm or developing combinative capabilities. This study 
focuses on the dyadic collaborative arrangement between buyer and supplier, and 
asks; which form of inter-firm governance mechanism (contractual, relational or 
both) would be appropriate for suppliers in managing the buyer – supplier 
collaboration effectively, especially in view of the capabilities they possess? 
Contractual governance typically relies more on the written formal agreement, 
whereas relational governance promotes transactions based on mutual trust and 
inter-firm relations.   
 
Collaboration promotes working together with the aim to maintain a win-win 
situation for both buyer and supplier. Yet, initiating, maintaining and growing the 
collaborative relationship are cumbersome. Nobbs (2008) argues that the whole 
process of collaboration is more complex than it appears. In the process of 
addressing this complexity, firms need to identify first its core capabilities and then 
decide on the transaction process with an idea of the risks involved in collaboration 
and the extent to which firms want to engage in resource sharing. Misalignment of 
capability and inter-firm governance results in ineffective management of 
collaboration and thus affects the collaboration performance (Hamel et al. 1989). 
Oh and Rhee (2008) argue that limited attempts are made in management 
literatures to understand the interaction between supplier capability and different 
types of buyer-supplier collaboration. In this context the Resource Based View 
(RBV) (Barney 1986, 1991, Priem and Butler 2001) of the firm is key, which 
stresses the importance of firm specific capabilities to generate sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage. RBV is particularly useful in understanding the 
supplier’s capability perspective in terms of accessing the buyer-supplier 
collaborative relationships.  
 
Mayer and Salomon (2006) argue that although RBV provides insights into the 
capabilities, which can generate value, little attention has been devoted to 
understand how capabilities impact on governance. They further suggest that 
supplier capability plays an important role in governance decision-making. 
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Although firm heterogeneity does not explicitly enter transaction costs logic, 
literature by Argyres (1996), Leiblein and Miller (2003), Mayer (2006),  Nickerson 
and Silverman (2003), Nickerson and Zenger (2002) and Silverman (1999) has 
emerged which explores the potential for the firm’s capabilities to influence 
governance structure. Williamson (1999) also considers that more research is 
needed to explore the relation between firm’s existing capabilities and how this 
influences governance structure. This study therefore investigates the role of 
contractual and relational governance on the relationship between supplier 
capabilities and type of buyer-supplier collaboration.  
 
This chapter introduces the fundamental concepts of the research and sets the 
structure of the study. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows; Section 
1.2 describes the problem statement in context of the aerospace industry, Section 
1.3 discusses the academic and practical significance, and the motivation for this 
research. Consequently, Section 1.4 describes the aims and objectives of this 
research and finally, Section 1.5 presents the structure of the transfer document.      
 
1.2 Research motivation  
Although, buyer-supplier collaboration is important for the success of the supply 
chain, supplier specific capabilities, which manage collaboration, are crucial (Oh 
and Rhee 2008). The aerospace industry has experienced an intense competition 
and rapid technological changes in the past decade. As a result, buyer-supplier 
interdependency has increased, which demands the supplier’s active involvement to 
add value to final products and services. Recently a nationwide collaborative action 
plan for 21st Century Supply Chains (SC21) is developed to promote collaboration 
in aerospace and defence supply chains in the UK to tackle threats of global 
competition (SBAC 2008).  Major aerospace companies like Airbus, GE aviation, 
BAE systems, Rolls-Royce etc., and the UK Ministry of Defence have committed 
to follow the guidelines of SC21 to improve efficiency and lower overheads in the 
supply chain. The SC21 programme stresses more on the importance of supplier 
capability and relationship with the buyer to enhance the performance of the supply 
chain. It promotes a collaborative business culture built through open and 
transparent communication among supply chain partners. While past studies 
(Nobbs 2008) have showed the long-term benefits of buyer-supplier cooperation, 
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there is a lack of clarity in current business practice over the impact of contractual 
agreement and mutual relationship on the collaborative performance in the supply 
chain. This study recognises the value of initiatives such as SC21 (e.g. supply chain 
beyond prime or engaging suppliers), and explores how supplier capabilities are 
linked with different types of collaboration in the UK aerospace industry.  
 
The UK aerospace industry is largest in the world outside USA (SBAC 2008).  The 
accelerating technological change and growing international competition have 
realised the potential benefits of the greater degree of collaboration between 
aerospace firms. Bennett (1997) argues that collaborative partnerships in aerospace 
ranges from formal to the informal. In this context the author discusses a range of 
benefits of collaboration such as mutual learning, reduced risk of uncertainty, 
speedy delivery to the customer and survival in the competitive business 
environment. In a capital-intensive industry such as aerospace where the demand 
uncertainly is less likely to occur, the vertical integration effect can help in 
performance efficiency. While the need of collaboration and its potential benefits 
are apparent, there is a lack of clarity in current business practice over how the 
market uncertainty affects the relation between supplier capability and 
collaboration. There is a growing recognition that companies no longer compete as 
single entities, and works as a part of the SC to deliver value to the customer. Crute 
et al. (2008) argue that the need for greater collaboration in the aerospace supply 
chain is evident from a number of sources. However, they also identify the need for 
more research in exploring the SC collaboration in aerospace industry. The 
boundary of the firm is becoming more permeable to provide an opportunity for 
greater degree of collaboration in this industry. Furthermore, Smith (2003) 
discusses that strategic alliances are an important feature of aerospace industry and 
more studies are sought to evaluate their performance. While it is apparent that 
collaboration between buyer and supplier is crucial for future success in the 
industry, the capability-based perspective of collaboration from supplier point of 
view is also important in understanding the dynamics of buyer-supplier 
collaboration (‘BSC’) in terms of challenges and threats.  
 
The UK government sponsored Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team (AeIGT 
2003) reports that the firm-level thinking in the aerospace industry has shifted from 
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an individual company focus to a multi-company perspective. It is argued that the 
growing expectation of high performance at low cost cannot be achieved and 
sustained by simply focusing on an individual company in isolation. The 
competitive business environment is driving ever-increasing interest in different 
forms of collaborations and business partnerships (e.g. Sako 1990, Lamming 1993). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in UK, the aerospace industry has gone 
through severe trauma such as increases in project cost and a declining reputation 
from being the major supplier in the world (Nobbs 2008). Considerable time is 
invested to realise the potential of collaboration as one of the effective solutions to 
maintain the growth. The aerospace industry is undergoing major changes and the 
last few decades have seen extensive mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, 
AeIGT’s 20-year vision for the UK aerospace industry states the need of 
competition at value chain level comprising a network of inter-connected firms, 
rather than firm level.    
 
Supplier functional capabilities such as Research and Development (R&D), 
production and support services are important in deciding the particular form of 
governance structure to guide the transaction process in BSC. The core functional 
capabilities are central to resource-based theories of firm-specific advantage 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Martin and Salomon, 
2003) and in context of the aerospace industry it is particularly important (Mayer, 
2006; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Martin & Salomon, 2003). Despite a growing 
interest in collaborative activities, the nature of the relationship required between 
capabilities and governance are not adequately discussed. Spekman et al. (2002) 
argue that companies, who value a culture of collaboration and learning across the 
supply chain, need to be more responsive, adaptive and flexible. The process to 
identify and develop the capabilities or skills required for better performance in 
buyer-supplier collaboration is complex and therefore a great deal of attention is 
indispensable to address it. Research at dyadic level of SC is essential in order to 
understand the challenges and risks of the mutual commitment and cooperation. 
Empirical studies examining the linkage between focal firm’s capability and SC 
collaboration performance are rare in the literature (Oh and Rhee 2008). 
Furthermore, the literature also acknowledges the importance of firm capabilities in 
governance decisions (Leiblein and Miller 2003). By studying the effect of 
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governance mechanisms on the relationship between supplier capability and buyer 
supplier collaboration, this investigation seeks to explain the synergy between 
supplier capability, governance and collaboration.  
   
1.3 Research significance  
This research is significant in light of the limited understanding of the linkage 
between capability, governance structure and type of buyer supplier collaboration 
to achieve greater performance. The potential contribution of this research is 
twofold: first, in terms of academic contribution, this study: (a) combines the 
argument of the RBV (Penrose 1959, Barney 2001b, Prahalad and Hamel 1990, 
Grant 1991) and TCE (Williamson 1979) to explain the role of governance in the 
relation between capability and collaboration, and (b) supports the recent ongoing 
argument of extended RBV (Mathews 2003a, b; Lavie 2006) which includes the 
incorporation of the capability related to inter-organisation exchange as the sources 
of competitive advantage. Second, in terms of practical contribution, this study: (a) 
assists managers in understanding the synergy between supplier capability, 
governance mechanism and buyer-supplier collaboration, (b) helps the supplying 
firm in taking decisions related to adopting a particular form of governance 
mechanism according to the capabilities it possesses, and (c) will also be beneficial 
for the buying firm in understanding the supplier’s willingness to prefer the 
contractual agreement or building the relationship in collaborative engagement. As 
a result, the buying firm will be more open to either of the inter-firm governance 
structures while engaging in collaborative arrangements with the supplier.   
 
Buyer supplier collaboration has been established as an active area of management 
research for several decades or more. Most of the research (Inkpen 2000, Luo 2002, 
Zhang et al. 2003) discusses different aspects of collaboration focussing on inter-
firm information sharing, inter-firm power balance, inter-firm relations, governance 
mechanisms and related issues in the literature. Some research (Bennett 1997, 
Cousins 2002, Pender 2008) identifies several forms/types/levels of collaboration 
and discusses that a focussed approach is vital for their successful implementation. 
While several research themes have examined the importance of collaboration in 
the supply chain, there is a gap in the literature regarding the interaction between 
supplier capability and collaboration performance (Oh and Rhee 2008). Most 
 7!
research has ignored the interaction among supplier capabilities, governance 
mechanism and buyer supplier collaboration types. This research investigates the 
role of contractual and relational governance on the relationship between supplier 
capabilities and collaboration.  The influence of technological uncertainty and 
competitive business environment on the relation between capability and 
governance type is also explored. Governance mechanisms based on contracts or 
inter-firm relations are important guiding forces for collaborative activities and its 
performance. This study develops the understanding of the capability dynamics, the 
complementarily of the contractual and relational governance and performance in 
buyer-supplier cooperation.  
 
Global competitive business environment have seen an increasing trend of 
collaboration in order to create sources for sustainable competitive advantage 
(SBAC 2008, WEAF 2008). Moreover, the SC21 initiative highlights the 
importance of SC collaboration and suggests that increased competition can be 
effectively tackled by firms working together at all levels of the SC. Consequently, 
firms are involved in expanding their boundaries to share and acquire resources to 
create value for customers. Macpherson and Wilson (2003) argue that organisations 
need to consider the advantages of collaboration as a route to disseminating 
learning throughout their supply chains. From an SME perspective, they further 
argue that the move towards more collaborative arrangements will cause difficulty 
unless the appropriate capabilities already exist or are developed in-house by the 
organisation.  
 
Although collaboration is widely discussed in management literature, its real-life 
implementation still poses a great challenge for managers. In spite of government 
initiatives and the research conducted, the lack of synergy among organisations is 
still being highlighted as one of the contributory factors for less growth. There is a 
lack of understanding in SMEs on the part of understanding the skills and 
competence level required to respond in the changing business context (Lange et al. 
2000). While past studies have showed the long-term benefits of inter-
organizational cooperation, there is a lack of clarity in current business practice 
over the relationship between supplier capability and performance in the supply 
chain. Although the partner selection process is an important step in collaboration, 
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one also needs to understand the capability required to further strengthen the 
collaborative relationship. Combining the capability-based perspective with 
transaction cost economics will be helpful in developing the understanding for 
aligning the governance structure with the skills and expertise of the supplier. 
Major aerospace companies in UK agree that the SC21 initiative is making 
progress towards developing a competitive supply chain, but also stresses that more 
supplier contribution is required at each level of the supply chain (SBAC 2008).   
 
 
1.4 Research aims and objectives  
While previous literature (Blomqvist and Levy 2006, Hardy et al. 2003) has 
discussed the impact of collaboration on firm performance, literature in 
management research have neglected the importance of firm-specific factors, which 
influence collaborative performance. Moreover, buyer supplier collaboration from 
the buyer perspective is discussed in literature, whereas studies reflecting supplier 
perspective are rare (Oh and Rhee 2008). This research seeks to explore the 
relationship between supplier capability and the type of buyer-supplier 
collaboration. Based on past literature such as Chen and Chen (2003), Jacobides 
and Winter (2005) and Oh and Rhee (2008), three types of the most prominent 
functional capabilities are identified as R&D, production and support capability. 
Two types of the most common governance mechanisms discussed in this research 
are contractual and relational governance (Poppo and Zenger 2002, Lee and 
Cavusgil 2006). Contractual governance relies on contracts and legal stipulations to 
govern buyer-supplier collaboration. On the other hand, relational governance 
emphasises on building the trust and relationship to control the buyer-supplier 
exchange process. Three types of BSC are considered in this study: information 
sharing, collaborative product development, and collaborative problem solving.  
 
Literatures (Barclays and Brock 1997, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Wuyts and 
Geyskens 2005) have discussed that contractual and relational both forms of 
governance mechanisms are important in mitigating opportunism and improving 
collaboration. However, the relationship of supplier capability with BSC in the 
context of governance mechanism still needs to be addressed. Moreover, the 
relative effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in supplier capability 
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and buyer-supplier collaboration relationship also needs attention. Literature has 
opposing views on whether contractual and relational governance act as 
complementary or substitutive mechanism. The theoretical underpinning of this 
research is influenced by the arguments proposed by RBV of the firm and TCE 
approach to governance. The key objects of this research are: first, to understand 
the effect of contractual and relational governance on the relation between supplier 
capability (R&D, production and support) and type of buyer supplier collaboration 
(information sharing, collaborative product development and collaborative problem 
solving); second, to examine and gain insight in the relative influence of 
contractual and relational governance on the supplier capability and collaboration 
relationship. This study, therefore, seeks to address the following research 
questions: 
 
1. What is the role of contractual and relational governance in linking 
supplier capability with buyer-supplier collaboration?  
 
2. How does the contractual and relational governance individually affect 
the relationship between supplier capability and collaboration type?   
 
These research questions are investigated in the context of buyer - supplier dyad. 
More specifically, the research aims to understand the nature of governance 
mechanisms and its relative importance in supplier capability and buyer supplier 
collaboration relation. The choice of governance mechanism is influenced by the 
degree of asset specificity (Williamson 1985), appropriability (Oxley 1997, Pisano 
1990) and observability (Holmstrom, 1979) in an exchange. Asset specificity refers 
to the transferability of assets to alternative uses (Williamson 1985). 
Appropriability refers to contracting hazards that expose valuable intellectual 
property to expropriation (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1990). The 
observability refers to exchange hazard when the quality of collaborative output is 
difficult to observe and measure ex post (Holmstrom, 1979).  
 
In summary, this study asks, how the governance mechanism supports supplier 
capability to gain the benefits of collaboration in buyer-supplier dyad and why the 
synergy between capability and governance mechanism is important in order to 
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maximise the benefits of collaboration. The following section presents the structure 
of the thesis. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This section provides a brief description of the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
The structure of the thesis is presented in Figure 1.1. Brief information about all the 
chapters is presented as follows:   
 
Chapter 1: Introduction - outlines the research idea and motivation in aerospace 
industry. It presents the academic and practical contribution of the research. 
Research aims and objectives are also presented in this chapter. The chapter ends 
with providing a structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – reviews the literature under three categories: 
Buyer-supplier collaboration, capability based perspective and inter-firm 
governance. Extensive literature in buyer-supplier collaboration, buyer-supplier 
relationship, capability based view, and contractual and relational governance are 
discussed in this chapter. The chapter ends with summarising the key themes and 
issues.  
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework – presents the theoretical framework of this 
research. A number of hypotheses are proposed based on the interaction among 
internal capability, governance mechanism and buyer-supplier collaboration. The 
chapter discusses the effect of governance mechanism on the relationship between 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology – discusses the research philosophy and 
methods used to address the research questions and objectives. The chapter 
provides information regarding the selection of the research strategy and design. 
Furthermore, data collection techniques are investigated in association with the 
research problem. At the end, the operational measures of dependent, independent 
and control variables are presented.  
 
Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis – presents the statistical analysis of the data 
collected during the research process. The chapter discusses the techniques used for 
preliminary data preparation. Exploratory factor analysis and bivariate correlation 
are also presented. Finally, the findings of the multiple mediation analysis are 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 6: Discussion – presents the arguments behind the results obtained during 
the data analysis phase. Multiple mediation effect of contractual and relational 
governance is supported with the previous literatures. The relative importance of 
contractual and relational governance in context of capability – collaboration 
relationship is also discussed in this chapter. The effect of control variables on the 
results obtained is also presented at the end.  
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and reflection – presents the theoretical and practical 
contribution of this research. The research limitations and future research direction 
are also discussed.  
 
1.6 Summary 
This chapter introduces the research problem and defines the boundary of the 
research. The research gap is identified, and discussed in terms of the supplier 
perspective of buyer-supplier collaboration. It has been argued that accelerating 
technological change and uncertainty in the aerospace industry identify the 
opportunity to engage in collaborative activities along the supply chain. The need 
to understand the interaction among suppliers’ capability and collaboration 
performance is recognised in management literature. Current research focuses in 
the aerospace industry to explore the relationship between supplier capability, 
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governance mechanism and collaboration type. The academic and practical 
significance of the research is discussed in this chapter. Proposed research is 
significant in terms of providing an understanding of synergy between capability, 
governance and collaboration. This research can provide guidance for the selection 
of appropriate blend of contractual and relational governance in collaboration based 







2.1 Introduction  
This research explores the relationship between supplier capability and buyer 
supplier collaboration (BSC). This chapter reviews literatures in three broad areas 
of BSC, capability based perspective and governance mechanism of inter-firm 
exchanges. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the BSC and 
its characteristics; Section 2.3 discusses the firm specific capabilities and presents 
the capability-based perspective of collaboration. Section 2.4 describes the inter-
firm governance based on contractual and relational mechanism to administer the 
inter-firm exchange process. Finally, section 2.5 summarises the key topics 
discussed in this chapter.     
 
2.2 Collaboration 
In this global business environment, as the competition among firms becomes 
fiercer, it is not possible to do everything inside the firm for better performance 
(Limerick et al. 2002). Firms need to adapt an inter-organisational perspective to 
look into collaborative resources and capabilities to search for sources of 
competitive advantage. Giunipero et al. (2008) present a review of the literatures in 
supply chain management (SCM) and placed the collaboration/alliance as one of 
the top 3 key areas of research in past decade. They argue that the concept of SCM 
was first mentioned in the study of Forrester (1961) who talks about the importance 
of interactions between flows of information, materials, manpower and capital 
equipment for successful business. However, the term SCM didn’t come in picture 
till early 1980s and most of the theoretical and empirical investigation started in 
1997 (Giunipero et al. 2008).  
 
Powell et al. (1996) describe collaboration as the medium that provides entry to a 
field where relevant knowledge is widely distributed which can’t be easily 
produced inside the boundaries of the firm, but can be easily obtained through 
market transactions. Moreover, Collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous 
stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared 
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rules, norms, and structures to act or decide on issues related to that domain (Gray 
1989, Wood and Gray 1991). The research publication in the area of buyer-supplier 
collaboration has been increasing since last decade (Giunipero et al. 2008). Tanner 
(1999) shows that the development of long-term strategic collaboration between 
buyers and sellers within the SC offers opportunities to create considerable 
competitive advantage. Giunipero et al. (2008) further identify the lack of research 
in SCM literature in systematic and empirical examination of the collaboration 
between SC partners. After reviewing 405 articles in this area, they find out that the 
empirical analysis at dyadic level is more prominent in SCM literatures. Johnston 
et al. (2004) also argue that building and managing buyer-supplier collaborative 
arrangement is one of the most important aspects of the SCM.     
 
2.2.1 Characteristics of collaboration  
Collaboration plays an important role in the process of sharing and acquiring 
complementary resources to create value for customers. It is studied at dyadic, 
supply chain and supply network levels. In current competitive business scenario, 
companies want to concentrate more on their core area of expertise and thereby 
increasing the need of collaborating with other organisations to gain access to 
complimentary capabilities (Nesheim 2001, Crute et al. 2008). SC collaboration is 
treated as cooperative activity beyond the simple transaction, undertaken by two or 
more parties with planned positive outcomes for the participants (Pender 2008). 
Kanter (1994) identifies collaboration as a living and evolving system, not just a 
deal or transaction. She also points out that a good partner can become a key 
corporate asset, which can become a “Collaborative advantage”. In this research, 
collaboration, alliance, and joint ventures are treated as a part of the common 
theme of co-operation among two or more firms.  
 
Child and Faulkner (1998) argue that collaboration is essentially about learning 
where two organisations learn from each other’s experience and creativity. Sharing 
of information and knowledge exchange among partners are the key activities in 
SC collaboration. Learning is easier when the level of transparency and openness is 
high. Moreover, Dyer and Noboeka (2000) talk about learning through 
collaboration and discuss the example of Toyota production network, where regular 
patterns of interactions among individuals facilitate the transfer, recombination and 
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creation of specialised knowledge. In addition, some research argues that 
collaboration is the mechanism to create and share knowledge among partners. 
Nonaka and Nishiguchi (2001) argue that knowledge is intangible, boundary less 
and dynamic and it should be exploited where and when it is needed to create 
value. Hardy et al. (2003) state that while collaboration can facilitate the sharing of 
extant knowledge from one organisation to another, it can also create new 
knowledge that neither of the collaborative partners previously possessed. A firm’s 
ability to access external knowledge has the potential to affect its long-term 
competitive position in the market. In case of rapid product development, external 
suppliers have to give greater importance to share knowledge with the prime 
manufacturer (Kogut 2000). Powell et al. (1996) argue that collaboration becomes 
more reputable and successful where firms are sustaining the ability to learn via 
interdependent relationships through vertical integration. In an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive theory of collaboration, Wood and Gray (1991) discuss six 
theoretical perspectives that may be used to examine and explain collaborative 
behaviour as; resource dependence, corporate social performance/institutional 
economics, strategic management/social ecology, microeconomics, institutional / 
negotiated order, and political.    
 
On the basis of the collaboration objective, firms shape its strategy to involve in 
collaborative activities with particular partners. For instance, firms collaborate with 
customers to accurately define their needs and with suppliers to fulfil customers’ 
needs accurately. Collaboration provides a unique opportunity to leverage firms’ 
strength with the help of partners and spread the risks of capital investment, 
innovation and shrinking product life cycles due to the inability to predict an 
uncertain future (Mowery et al. 1996, Inkpen 2000). Moreover, collaboration 
results in providing both tangible and intangible benefits (Simonin 1997). Tangible 
benefits include financial advancement, improved market share and sustained 
competitive advantage. On the other hand, intangible benefits include learning and 
knowledge-based advantages like learning specific skills and competencies from 
partners. In addition, Kale et al. (2000) argue that intangible benefits for the 
collaborative partners can be categorised into three types of learning: (i) partners 
can access and internalise some of the specialised knowledge of their collaborative 
partners, (ii) collaborative partners can learn about managing the collaboration 
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process and (iii) collaborative partners can learn how to better manage the inter-
firm relationship. 
  
Coughlin et al. (2003) argue that despite having many benefits of collaboration, it 
is a complex form of inter-organisational relationship. It should only be adopted 
after a careful consideration of the pre-collaboration activities. Some of the 
important pre-collaboration activities are summarised as follows (Inkpen 1998, 
Inkpen and Li 1999): 
 
• Assess the value of the partner’s knowledge, its accessibility and ease of 
transfer  
• Understand the potential inter-firm activities to share knowledge and 
innovation 
• Assess the feasibility of alignment of resources with the collaborative 
partners 
• Clearly understand the partner’s capabilities and whether the initial 
relationship is adversely affected by past events 
• Understand the issues that are negotiable and then negotiate for mutual 
value creation 
• Understand the possible risks involved and place safeguards to minimise it 
• Establish a mechanism to review the collaboration outcomes  
 
Inkpen (2005) discusses some of the key problems in collaboration, which need to 
be understood properly. Firms often fail to understand the capabilities of partners 
and alignment of resources with the collaborative firm. Firms with greater power 
are often obsessed with collaboration ownership and discount the learning 
opportunity (Hamel et al. 1989). Often firms are unwilling to incur the cost of 
collaboration set-up and learning-oriented systems and treat these issues as costs 
rather than investments. Learning and knowledge often dissipate through 
individuals involved in the collaborative activities, which often seems hard to get 
across to the top level of management. Intellectual property right is one of the key 
barriers to SC collaboration. Dyer and Noboeka (2000) argue that intellectual 
property rights may well reside within the collaboration level (either dyadic or 
network) rather than at the firm level. Toyota provides an interesting example of 
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collaboration in the supply network. Toyota assists members along the supply chain 
to develop rules for knowledge protection and value appropriation. Individual 
members of the network share a collective sense of purpose, goals and values for 
the collaboration. Firms collaborate with each other to acquire or share a range of 
complementary tangible or intangible resources to create value for customers. 
Recent literature on collaboration (Inkpen and Crossan 1995, Gerwin 2004, Crute 
et al. 2008, Gutierrez and Serrano 2008, Pender 2008) argues that nature and 
specific objectives of collaboration need to be properly addressed to have better 
performance in collaborative arrangements.  
 
Studies conducted by Sagawa and Segal (2000), Iyer (2003), and Wymer and Samu 
(2003) argue that motivations for entering into collaboration might be linked with 
the strategic or tactical outcomes. Some of the researchers such as, Polonsky and 
Speed (2001) and Polonsky et al. (2008) describe two forms of collaboration based 
on the nature of its objectives as, tactical and strategic collaboration. Literatures 
such as, Bucklin and Sengupta (1993), Huxham and Vangen (1996), Milne et al. 
(1996), Sengupta and Perry (1997) and Rondinelli and London (2003) have 
discussed a range of collaborative arrangements between organisations. Bennett 
(1997) describes the collaboration in airline industry as two types of partnership, 
which can be categorised as informal and formal. According to him, informal 
partnerships are loose forms of collaboration, which do not usually involve major 
resource commitments, and as a result, they are not high risk in nature, whereas 
formal collaboration is a particular mode of inter-organisational relationship in 
which partners commit to make substantial investments in developing a long-term 
collaborative effort and common orientation. Collaboration is also classified in 
tactical and strategic terms in uncertain business environment (Cousins 2002).  
Menon and Menon (1997) discuss that strategic collaboration involves sharing of 
extensive resources and skills that may have the capability to decide the focus of 
the organisation; whereas tactical collaboration focuses mostly on functional 
activities and requires less substantial change in the organisation. Moreover, 
strategic collaboration includes complex sets of activities and in contrast, tactical 
collaboration involves minimal information sharing where organisations operate at 
arms length with focused programmes (Rondinelli and London 2003).  
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Crute et al. (2008) discuss the industry-wide vision for SC collaboration and 
identify different forms of collaboration in aerospace sector. They develop a 
collaboration model to describe the purpose, nature and likely participants in a 
variety of collaborative arrangements across the industry. At the supply chain level, 
Barratt (2004) also identifies three levels of inter-organisation integration as 
operational, tactical and strategic. Despite a growing awareness of tactical and 
strategic collaboration, this research tends to emphasize on strategic aspect more 
than its tactical importance. Discussion in this section has highlighted the 
characteristics of collaboration. A better understanding of the relational between 
capability and governance is needed to explain the performance in collaboration.  
 
2.2.2 Buyer-supplier collaboration  
The intention behind Buyer-supplier collaboration is argued as the focus on the 
core area of expertise and gain access of complementary resources/capabilities 
from potential collaborative partner to maintain sustainable competitive advantage 
(Nesheim 2001, Crute et al. 2008). Buyer-supplier Collaboration (BSC) provides a 
unique opportunity to leverage each other’s strength and spread the risks of capital 
investment, innovation and shrinking product life cycles due to uncertain future 
(Mowery et al. 1996, Inkpen 2000). 
 
The supplier’s perspective of collaboration is discussed in this research, which is 
comparatively less discussed in previous literature on collaboration (Oh and Rhee 
2008). Previous literatures have highlighted the importance of BSC in context of 
growing competition (Gray 1989, Wood and Gray 1991), but the holistic view of 
collaboration including the firm capability and governance mechanism has received 
limited attention in literature. This study argues that, although supplier capability is 
influential in deciding the level of BSC, the exchange process is also critical in 
efficient sharing of resources between buyer and supplier. Similar arguments have 
also been proposed in the studies of Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009) and Li et al. 
(2010). Successful collaboration is based on the optimal combination of productive 
resources across partners and the mitigation of risk due to opportunistic behaviour 
(Mitchell et al. 2002, Nickerson and Zenger 2004, Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009).  
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Literatures investigating buyer-supplier collaboration has grown consistently over 
past few decades (Terpend et al. 2008). This increased interest has expanded 
towards studying various aspects of BSC in response to the perceived need for a 
careful consideration of the changes that have been taking place across the business 
world. Kanter (1989, 1994) argues that buyer-supplier relations must give the 
utmost important to the formation of collaboration. Close and intense interactions 
between individual members act as an effective tool to transfer tacit knowledge 
across the firm boundary. Moreover, Bensaou and Anderson (1999) discuss that 
firms find difficulty in doing everything alone in the era of increased uncertainties, 
rapid technological progress and growing global competition. As a result, BSC may 
represent an important source of competitive advantage. For instance, guest 
engineer programmes initiated by some of the companies are based on the 
interdependence to create value for customers. This provides an opportunity for 
suppliers to work closely with the manufacturers to understand and learn product 
development processes (Liker and Choi 2004).  
 
A few studies (Gouldner 1960, Macneil 1978, Axelrod 1984, Zaheer et al. 1998) 
discuss BSC as characterised by information sharing, frequent interactions, mutual 
trust and cooperation for mutual gain. In contrast, arms-length behaviour is 
described in terms of minimal interaction, multiple suppliers, spot contracts and 
opportunism (Williamson 1985, Sako 1992). Although these are two extremes of 
buyer supplier collaboration, normally it widely varies from partnership approaches 
to vertical integration (Williamson 1985). Allocation of resources and strength of 
the relationships could be important measures for the successful collaboration and 
it needs to be focussed at product, service or commodity level (Olsen and Ellram 
1997) . The type of collaboration depends on the level of output desired, that is 
based on the amount of resources needed and level of return anticipated (Lamming 
1993, Cousins 2000). BSC collaboration is a very broad and encompassing term 
(Barratt 2004). In order to maximise the performance of such collaboration, there is 
a need for deeper understanding of different aspects of it.  
 
Based on the prior studies of Chen and Paulraj (2004), Das et al. (2006), Kaufman 
et al. (2000), Narasimhan and Kim (2002), Oh and Rhee (2008) and Cai et al. 
(2009), three categories of BSC are identified for the purpose of this research as, 
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Information Sharing (IS), Collaborative Product/service Development (CPD) and 
Collaborative Problem Solving (CPS). These three categories of BSC are based on 
the purpose, nature, time scale and the type of resources involved in the exchange 
process. IS is important in the entire life cycle of the product, CPD is particularly 
important during the new product development stage and CPS is important during 
the production stage when there is a need to solve routine problems with regard to 
cost, quality and delivery. The nature of resource exchange in all of these BSC 
types varies from physical to knowledge resources. The purpose of the 
collaboration types are mutual understanding of each other due to effective 
information sharing, ensuring the quality of the product at the early stage and 
providing immediate solutions to problem occur during the production process. The 
collaboration types selected in this research are comprehensive to cover the most 
critical activities in BSC and provide a snapshot of the variety of activities involved 
in BSC.       
 
Activities in IS include the timely, efficient and regular exchange of information 
related to products and services, price and market conditions, production process 
and delivery schedule for mutual benefits. CPD includes activities related to active 
involvement of supplier in new product development from the early stage with the 
aim to improve the product quality, development time and, share the cost and risks 
associated with the product development. The objective of CPS activities is to look 
for possible ways to solve routine problems related to product cost, quality, 
delivery schedule and uncertain demand pattern without having any ill impact on 
both buyer and supplier. Theses problems can include frequent change in the cost 
of the components, low quality products, and delivery failure in mass production 
stage.  
   
2.3 Capability based perspective  
As BSC gain more importance, the capability of the partner firms exerts crucial 
influence in determining the success of that collaboration. Although a number of 
studies can be found in the area of buyer-supplier collaboration (Wood and Gray 
1991, Olsen and Ellram 1997), there are limited studies focusing on the relationship 
between supplier’s capability and BSC types (Oh and Rhee 2008). While 
boundaries of the firm are unquestionably influenced by inter-firm collaborative 
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activities, the capability-based perspective facilitates the understanding of why 
organisations differ in their performance in the collaboration (Kogut and Zander 
1992, Flowers 2007). The capability-based approach has received increased 
attention in recent times, which focuses on the firm’s tangible and intangible 
resources as the basis for sustainable competitive advantage (Hamel and Prahalad 
1994). According to Penrose (1959), only possessing resources may not be 
sufficient and firms also need to develop the capabilities to make valuable use of 
their resources.  
 
While firm’s expertise in functional process like production, marketing, services 
and R&D are discussed as the internal capability of the firm, there is limited 
discussion over capabilities related to the efficient management of inter-firm 
transactions. In this research, the internal functional capabilities and the impact of 
the type of the resources on inter-firm exchange process are explored. It is evident 
in the practice that firms having better inter-firm exchange management skills have 
shown better performance in collaboration (Bidwell 2010). Gulati (1999) also 
argues that firm’s capability can influence the process of alliance formation. The 
decision to maintain and develop specific capabilities is influenced by the firm’s 
intent to involve in collaborative arrangements and expectation of economic gain 
from it. In this section the distinctive capability and capability-based view of 
collaboration is discussed. 
 
2.3.1 Distinctive capability 
Distinctive capability describes the activities, resources or skills of an organisation 
that refers towards its special strengths and expertise (Selznick 1957, Penrose 
1959). Management literatures (Andrews 1971, Hofer and Schendel 1977) often 
relate distinct capability with the competitive advantage of the firm. Andrews 
(1971) argues that distinct capability captures the ability of the organisation to do 
well relative to competitors. Hart (1995) explains that firm’s capability results from 
bundle of resources brought together to create value in the business processes such 
as designing, production etc. Teece et al. (1997) define resources as the firm 
specific assets that are difficult (if not impossible) to imitate such as trade secrets 
and engineering experiences and argue that such assets are difficult to transfer as 
they may contain tacit knowledge. Similarly, Wernerfelt (1984) defines resources 
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as the tangible and intangible assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm. A 
resource can belong to a firm or be accessed by it. Mills et al. (2003) classify 
resources in six different categories as (i) tangible resources, (ii) knowledge, skills 
and experience, (iii) system and procedural, (iv) cultural resources and values, (v) 
network resources, and (vi) resources with potential dynamic capabilities. 
Furthermore, Loasby (1998) defines capability as a particular kind of knowledge 
and skills, which generates sources of competitive advantage. It describes the 
firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences 
(Teece et al. 1997). Moreover, Leonard-Barton (1992) defines dynamic capability 
as an organisation’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive 
advantage according to market position. Taking a comprehensive view, capability 
is defined here as the ability of the firm to manage the resources to create sources 
of competitive advantage. It can be physical, human or organisational capability 
(Becker 1964, Williamson 1975, Hofer and Schendel 1977, Tomer, 1987). 
 
Literatures in operations strategy identify a wide range of capabilities, which can 
provide sources of competitive advantage (Asanuma 1985, Kogut and Zander 1992, 
Neely et al. 1995, Stalk et al. 1996, Noble 1997, Boyer 1998, Liker et al. 1998, 
Hoetker 2005, Goffin et al. 2006, Jacobides 2006). Oh and Rhee (2008) provide a 
long list of different types of supplier’s capabilities, such as; process capability, 
dependability improvement capability, cost reduction capability, quality 
improvement capability, flexibility capability, technology capability, design 
capability, engineering capability, supplier evaluation capability, module 
capability, coordination capability, supplier development capability, customer 
proliferation capability, responsive capability and combinative capability. 
Subsequently, Chen and Chen (2003) and Jacobides and Winter (2005) subdivide 
resources/capabilities into four categories: production, R&D, marketing, and 
purchasing capabilities. Goffin et al. (2006) argue that buyers select suppliers who 
have greater R&D capabilities. It is found in the automobile industry that the 
greater the R&D capability of the supplier the more active their collaboration in 
new car development (LaBahn and Krapfel 1999, Liker et al. 1998) and 
information sharing with the car maker (Hsuan 1999, 2003). Further, Mayer and 
Salomon (2006) argue that capabilities come in many forms and variations based 
on technological, managerial, operational, marketing etc. In summary, it can be 
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argued that capabilities of the firm can be categorised based on the physical and 
knowledge resources/assets (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). 
 
George (1994) argues that every business develops its own configuration of 
capabilities on the basis of its competitive market, past commitments and 
anticipated requirements; therefore it is not possible to identify all possible 
capabilities. However he further points out that certain type of capabilities related 
to core processes of the firm such as production, services, R&D can be recognised 
in all businesses. If a firm lacks the capability required to build sources of 
competitive advantage, it will promote collaboration to secure those capabilities 
from other firms (Erramilli and Rao 1990, Ingham and Thompson 1994). There are 
ample reasons available in the literature to assume that the strategic core of the firm 
is not exclusively governed internally. Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that firms who 
combine resources in a unique way may be able to outperform firms that are unable 
to do so. Collaborative capability is considered as the prerequisite for partners if 
they wish to leverage complementary knowledge and innovation in collaboration 
(Blomqvist and Levy 2006). It can be considered as a subset of dynamic (Teece et 
al. 1997) and combinative capability (Kogut and Zander 1993). Moreover, 
collaborative capability is useful in understanding and analysing the relational 
interaction on multiple levels of organisation-wide collaboration (Blomqvist and 
Levy 2006). In addition, Helfat and Peteraf (2003) introduce the concept of 
capability lifecycle, which articulates general patterns and paths in the evolution of 
organisational capabilities over time. Their analysis incorporates the founding, 
development and maturity of capabilities in a manner that helps to explain the 
sources of heterogeneity in organisational capabilities. Based on the orientation and 
focus of the defining processes, George (1994) classifies capabilities in three 
categories as inside-out capability, outside-in capability and spanning capability. 
Inside-out capability is activated by market requirements, competitive challenges 
and external opportunities and some of the examples of this category are 
manufacturing, logistics etc. Outside-in capability enables the business to compete 
by anticipating market requirements ahead of competitors and create durable 
relationships with customers and suppliers. Spanning capability is required to 
integrate the inside-out and outside-in capabilities.    
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Although, BSC involves development, communication and reinforcement of shared 
goals and objectives, it also involves emphasising capability development to 
facilitate rather than hinder knowledge exchange and information sharing. 
Development of firm-based capabilities must occur before learning outcome can be 
identified through collaboration and it can not be ignored by having a sole focus on 
the content of the collaboration (Pender 2008). Although, experience may be 
thought as a predictor of future success in collaboration, there is no direct link 
between collaboration experience and collaboration outcomes (Simonin 1997). 
Simonin finds that experience alone is insufficient for greater benefits in 
collaboration. Firms that align the capability with the type of collaboration 
activities effectively outperform others, but a rigid set of managerial beliefs 
associated with unwillingness to align the capabilities can severely limit the 
collaboration outcomes. In addition, Szulanski (1996) also argues that development 
of absorptive capacity through a shared mindset of ‘enquiring minds’ provides 
conducive environment for knowledge transfer and shared creativity. The 
innovative nature of suppliers may provide fertile ground for creating value from 
the collaboration.  
 
In this study, three key functional capabilities of the supplier are identified based 
on the most widely discussed capabilities in previous literatures. These are 
Research and Development (R&D), production and, support services capability. 
Supplier’s R&D capability refers to proven ability to involve in research and 
development (R&D) activities and consistently applying this to enhance the 
performance of product and services.  Production capability corresponds to the 
proven ability of the firm, to consistently provide components or finished products 
to the buying firm according to buyer specifications; to reduce production cycle 
time; to deliver products on time; to cope with uncertain demand; to provide low 
rate of product failure due to quality problems; and to reduce production cost. The 
supplier ability to be flexible and dependable to provide the quality product to the 
buyer at low cost is also included in the production capability. Support services 
capability refers to the proven ability of the firm to provide effective support 
services related to the product according to buyer’s requirements such as 
maintenance services, technical support services etc. Reducing the waiting time for 
support services, consistently provide quality support services at promised time and 
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dealing with the urgent support requests are some of the important parameters of 
the support services capability (Lai 2004, Parasuraman et al. 1994).  
 
R&D, production and support capabilities in this study are selected based on the 
nature of resources (Physical and Knowledge) involved in developing these 
capabilities and its wider presence in SMEs. These three capabilities also represent 
the continuum of the product life cycle (Chen and Chen 2003). R&D capability can 
be most useful during the product development stage, production capability can be 
more effective during the production process, and the support services capabilities 
can be desired after the sale of the product, during the maintenance and after-sales 
support. The choice of R&D, production and support capabilities in this study is 
also supported by previous literatures in operations strategy, which have 
formulated the capability around the common theme of R&D, production and 
support activities (Boyer 1998, Neely et al. 1995, Noble 1997).  
 
In summary, this section has highlighted the different classification of capabilities 
in literatures and justified the selection of functional capabilities (R&D, production 
and support capabilities) for the purpose of this study.  
 
2.3.2 Capability based view 
The capability-based view of the firm is widely discussed in operations strategy 
literatures. It focuses on the role of strategic resources and capabilities as sources of 
economic rents and sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991, Grant 1991).  
The argument of the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm can be traced back to 
the primary idea of Penrose (1959). Penrose argues that the unique character of 
each firm depends on the productive services available or potentially available 
from its resources. Penrose (1959) further discusses that only possessing resources 
may not be sufficient and firms also need to develop the capabilities to make 
valuable use of their resources. A number of scholars in the 1980s (such as 
Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1986, Dierickx and Cool 1989) argue that past literature 
in strategic management focuses too narrowly on the product-based view of the 
firm, which relies on privileged product market positions as the basis for 
competitive advantage of the firm. They argue that most of the literature overlooks 
the importance of resources which are required to produce the privileged products. 
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Based on the argument that products are transformed forms of the bundle of 
resources, RBV later emerged as one of the most prominent theories in strategy 
management literature.  
 
Similarly, Barney (1991) provides a detailed and formalised representation of the 
business level resource-based perspective (Priem and Butler 2001). RBV primarily 
focuses on possessing valuable and rare resources, which should be hard to imitate 
and substitute in order to sustain competitive advantage. The traditional idea of 
owning and creating the resources to develop competitive advantage has now been 
argued as not very favourable for the global competitive business environment. It 
has been widely observed that firms do not need to own the resources to assure an 
efficient flow of goods and services. Merely possessing the valuable and rare 
resources do not guarantee a firm the creation of value (Barney and Arikan 2001). 
Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989 a) presents an empirical study to illustrate the 
importance of firms’ capabilities. Core-competence (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) 
and critical capability (Grant 1991) studies also discuss the importance of RBV. 
Core-competencies are considered as the collective learning in the organisation, 
especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple 
streams of technologies. It is also about communication, involvement and a deep 
commitment to working across many levels of people and functions in the 
organisation. Competencies can be enhanced as they are applied and shared in the 
organisation, however sharing of ideas and resources are limited to the organisation 
only (Prahalad and Hamel 1990).  
 
Although, RBV has often been criticized on two basic points: (a) its inward view 
and (b) its assumption of firm as an independent entity (Wang and Ahmed 2007), it 
is still one of the most prominent and established theories for understanding 
organisations (Barney et al. 2011). Lavie (2006) addresses the limitation of RBV in 
terms of its incapability to understand the competitive advantage of the inter-
connected firms. He argues that the focus on resources that are owned or controlled 
by the firm undermines the essential contribution of the inter-firm resources. Hunt 
and Davis (2012) provide a defence for RBV of the firm to understand the issues in 
supply chain area. A review of the studies on capability-based view of the firm can 
be found in Wang and Ahmed (2007). They identify that inter-firm resources and 
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capabilities are one of the important areas to explore. As argued by Barney et al. 
(2001 a, b), the ability to change quickly in the market is costly for others to copy 
and thus can be a source of sustained competitive advantage. Leiblein (2011) 
reviews the basic definitions, assumptions, and propositions offered by the RBV 
literatures, and provides a comprehensive discussion over the resource-based 
theories. Lockett et al. (2009) and Kraaijenbrink et al. (2010) also review and 
assess the principal critiques of RBV evident in the literature, and provide 
suggestion for combining the RBV theory with other theories like TCE etc. to 
explain the nature of the functions of firm in current environment. Hunt and Davis 
(2012)  
 
In last few years, researchers have argued that the capability of the firm need to 
viewed in the perspective of inter-firm resource exchange and the recent 
phenomenon of large scale inter-firm collaboration. Gulati (1999) first introduces 
the notion of networked resources and examines the importance of alliance 
formation decisions. Recently, literature in operations strategy has initiated a 
discussion over extending the resource-based view (Mathews 2003a, b; Lavie 2006, 
Lewis et al. 2010), which includes the issue of sharing the resources to create 
sources of competitive advantage. Lavie (2006) extends the RBV to explain and 
understand the strategic behaviour and performance of inter-connected firms. He 
further identifies the importance of integrated contribution of internal and external 
sources of competitive advantage towards firm performance. Lavie concludes his 
discussion of the extended resource-based view with the notion that ‘nature of 
relationships may matter more than the nature of resources in networked 
environments’. Squire and Cousins (2006), and Arya and Lin (2007) provide 
empirical studies supporting the idea of extended resource-based view. However, 
the idea of extended RBV is still debatable and more research is needed to establish 
extended RBV as a new theory. 
 
The discussion in this section has highlighted the importance of resource-based 
view in the perspective of understanding the impact of supplier capability on the 
buyer-supplier collaboration. Supplier capability is crucial to understand the nature 
of collaboration and the level of resource commitment required for that 
collaboration (Asanuman 1985, McMillan 1990 and Goffin et al. 2006). Literature 
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such as Oh and Rhee (2008) has identified the importance of supplier capability in 
improving BSC performance.  
 
2.4 Inter-firm Governance 
Inter-firm exchange process/governance mechanism is widely discussed in 
previous literatures (Nooteboom 2004, Mayer and Saloman 2006, Poppo and 
Zenger 2002, Roath et al. 2002, Ness and Haugland 2005, Lee and Cavusgil 2006, 
Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009, Li et al. 2010).  Williamson (1985, 1991) argues that 
the transaction cost varies with the type of governance mechanism adapted. Some 
of the researchers such as Nooteboom (2004) and Mayer and Saloman (2006) put 
forward the argument of the relationship between capability and governance, and 
argue that firms also need to adapt a particular governance mechanism for effective 
inter-firm transaction. Apart from the capabilities related to production, technology, 
distribution, services, marketing and procurement, firms also need to align these 
capabilities with governance mechanism to achieve greater collaboration 
performance. Alignment of resources with the transaction attributes is importance 
in inter-firm collaboration decisions and studies like Verwaal et al. (2009) argue 
that combining the concepts of RBV and TCE is effective in explaining the 
phenomenon.  
 
While prior literatures have focussed more on developing the internal or core 
capabilities of the firm, there are limited research available in linking the capability 
with BSC in presence of particular governance mechanism. During our preliminary 
study, practitioners also seem to agree that there is a relationship between skills 
required to manage inter-firm collaboration and co-operation performance. George 
(1994) discusses the process of integrating internal and external capability of the 
firm to facilitate close interaction between firms. It is argued that collaboration 
cannot be initiated without the realisation of the firm’s own capabilities and the 
idea of what the firm may need from the collaborative partner. Even after the 
understanding of capabilities, firms need to adopt an effective governance 
mechanism to guide and facilitate the process of knowledge exchange and resource 
sharing. Successful collaboration is based on the optimal combination of 
productive resources across partners and the mitigation of risk due to opportunistic 
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behaviour (Mitchell et al. 2002, Nickerson and Zenger 2004, Hoetker and 
Mellewigt 2009).  
 
In this research the plural form of governance i.e. contractual and relational 
governance is considered to explain the interaction between capability, governance 
and collaboration. These governance mechanisms are important to guide the inter-
organisational exchange process through formal written agreement or inter-firm 
relationships. Contractual and relational governance are widely discussed in 
previous research (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Contractual governance refers to 
administering the inter-firm exchange process through a formalized, legally binding 
written agreements/ contracts. It monitors the exchange process and enforces the 
roles and responsibility of each parties according to the contracts. On the other 
hand, relational governance refers to administering the inter-firm exchange process 
through commitment and inter-firm relations. It emphasizes on the role of mutual 
trust and commitment in the collaborative exchange process. Nooteboom (2004) 
argues that while capability based view focuses on the boundary of the firm, it 
cannot ignore the issue of inter-firm governance, especially in case of 
collaboration. He mentions that there are limited researches that connect capability 
and governance perspectives and further identifies the need for development of 
empirical research in this area. Moreover, Pender (2008) summarizes the literature 
in collaboration and governance structures and some of his key findings are: (i) 
degree of information sharing and extent of knowledge accessibility increases with 
the greater trust between collaborative partners, (ii) clarity in collaborative 
objectives facilitates the initial trust between partners, (iii) if initial trust level is 
greater, the initial monitoring and control costs due to collaboration decreases and 
initial reliance on social control increases, (iv) more extensive use of formal 
contracts diminishes the opportunity for development of inter-firm trust, and (v) 
repeated successful transactions between partners leads towards an increased level 
of inter-firm trust. Jiang (2009) "#$#%&'!()%(!*+!,-.#"/'!01$#"2%23#!#++1"('!41$#!%5%.! +"14! ()"#%(! %26! (15%"6! 3117#"%(*128! '-77&*#"/'! 3147&*%23#! 5*()! ()#!312("%3(-%&!(#"4'!%26!3126*(*12'!31-&6!,#!41"#!'-'(%*2%,&#9 
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Challenges in initiating, maintaining and developing SC collaboration expect 
managers to articulate the collaborative vision and communicate it strongly inside 
and outside the firm. Trust and carefully understood relationships can help to 
overcome these challenges. A collaborative alliance is usually viewed as 
incomplete contracts with successful outcomes dependent on the ability to 
anticipate and respond to contingencies that cannot be pre-specified in a formal 
contract (Anand and Khanna 2000). Governance structure literatures (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman 1995, Lusch and Brown 1996, Kale et al. 2000, Luo 2002, Lee et al. 
2003, Zhang et al. 2003, Delmas and Tokat 2005) describe contractual and 
relational both governance mechanisms as important factors which affect 
collaboration performance. Williamson (1985) explains that, in the absence of 
some forms of governance mechanism, agreements between organisations can 
suffer from the risks of opportunistic behaviour (Tirole 1993). In retrospect, 
governance mechanisms tend to be a function of asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
the willingness of the transaction partners to assume some level of risk (Walker and 
Poppo 1991, Chiles and McMackin 1996). However, it is still debatable whether a 
formal contract or mutual trust provides an appropriate environment to facilitate 
sharing of resources, stabilize the relationships and strengthen the collaborative 
arrangement.  
 
2.4.1 Contractual governance 
Contracting has been getting more importance in inter-organisational collaborative 
arrangements through which firms exchange products, services and knowledge 
(Mowery et al. 1996, Pisano 1989). Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
(Williamson 1979, 1991) is one of the most prominent theories, which explains the 
governance mechanisms for transaction-based exchanges. TCE argues that the 
buyer can easily dissolve the relationship in the competitive market with low asset 
specificity, if the supplier fails to meet the obligations or if the resource is no 
longer needed (Tirole 1993). These relationships tend to suggest contractual 
agreement between firms with minimal information exchange and low or no 
investment in assets. Contractual governance based on contracts emphasizes the 
formation of written agreements between partners for inter-firm transactions. It 
reduces the risk of co-operation to facilitate knowledge transfer and as a result, 
enhances the collaboration performance. Formal contracts represent promises or 
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obligations to perform particular actions to deal with future contingencies (Macneil 
1978). It is seen as a safeguard for opportunistic behaviour and helps to stabilize 
the relationship (Osborn and Baughn 1990, Kale et al. 2000).  
 
While many researchers like Ghosal and Moran (1996) and Gulati (1995) argue the 
negative impact of the detailed contract on the co-operative relations, Argyres and 
Mayer (2007) observe that many firms especially within high-technology industries 
such as aerospace, computer software & services and biotechnology make efforts to 
design detailed contracts to mange many kinds of inter-organisational collaborative 
arrangements (Crocker and Reynolds 1993, Kalnins and Mayer 2004, Lerner and 
Merges 1998). Lui and Ngo (2004) argue that contracts can reduce transactional 
ambiguity by listing the issues, which are allowed or not in partnership. Cox (1996) 
discusses that by emphasizing the importance of transactions as a determining 
feature of the structure of the firm, Williamson has shifted the focus towards the 
notion that firms are best viewed as a nexus of contracts (Aoki 1990). Moreover, 
Ring and Van de Ven (1992) argue that an explicit contract ensures that the terms 
and conditions of transactions should be followed in the event of any uncertainty. 
Classical contracts provide an efficient safeguard by which firms protect 
themselves from partners’ opportunism (Macneil 1978, Williamson 1985). As a 
result, firms may prefer arms-length contractual agreements to control the type and 
amount of information shared to reduce the risks involved.  
 
Lusch and Brown (1996) further argue that a legal contract may state how various 
future situations can be handled, thereby decreasing uncertainty about behaviours 
and outcomes by providing formal rules and procedures to maintain the 
partnership. The legal and economic consequences of violating a contract make it 
difficult for partners to take advantage of each other and thereby improve the 
stability of the collaboration. Parkhe (1993) also discusses that contracts may 
stipulate penalties that may increase the cost of opportunism. Although partners 
may not fully follow their contracts word by word, it can still provide a set of 
normative guidelines if conflict arises. Moreover, Klein-Woolthuis et al. (2002) 
argue that firms should employ safeguards against the hazards of opportunistic 
behaviours because one would have never been sure whether and when 
opportunism will occur. TCE suggests tradeoffs between various tools of formal 
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control, depending on the degree of asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction 
frequency (Williamson 1985). Classical contract theory (Lyons and Mehta 1997, 
Klein-Woolthuis et al. 2002) discusses the guidelines for complete and optimal 
contracts and assumes that it should be legally binding and should incur lower 
transaction costs relative to outcome efficiency. Contracts facilitate the exchange 
process and prevent opportunistic behaviour.  
 
Nevertheless, some of the literatures also argue that contracts act as the foundation 
for developing inter-firm relationships. It is argued that initially firms design 
contracts to start the collaborative process, but in the long term, it can be seen as a 
means of building business relationships and trust between firms (Arrighetti et al. 
1997). Deakin et al. (1997) discuss the differences between time-based contracts 
and argue that long term contracts are more detailed than short term contracts. 
Some of the firms are obsessed with forming contracts with suppliers, which seems 
to be not entirely beneficial. For instance, General Motors develops contracts that 
allow it to shift to a less expensive supplier at a moment’s notice, which creates 
suspicion about its behaviour with suppliers (Liker and Choi 2004). Argyres and 
Mayer (2007) suggest that contractual governance is more important in 
safeguarding the assets and knowledge in knowledge intensive industry. However, 
a better understanding of the roles of trust and commitment is undermining the 
importance of contractual governance (Hoyt and Huq 2000). Some recent 
literatures argue that governance mechanism based on inter-firm relations and 
mutual trust can improve manufacturing firm performance (Handfield and Nichols 
1999, Wetherbe 1995, Liedtka 1996, Jones et al. 1997).  
 
In this study, Contractual governance refers to administering the inter-
organisational exchange through written formal agreements or contracts. It shows 
the intent to include the guidelines and possible action plan of the exchange process 
in the form of the written agreement while working with the buyer. It involves 
designing of contract, monitoring of contract and handling the unexpected events in 
future. The contractual governance outlines the roles and responsibilities of each 
party, expected collaborative outcome, procedures for monitoring the development, 
procedures for non-compliance and premature termination of the contract.  
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2.4.2 Relational governance 
Relational governance refers to administering the inter-organisational exchange 
through trust and inter-firm relations. Relational governance emphasizes inter-firm 
understanding and bonding through socialisation and open communication. 
Although contractual governance may be effective in collaborations where asset 
specificity is low, more often it may have the tendency to create conflicts and 
confusion (Gaski 1984, Hirschman 1984). Several theories like social exchange 
theories, relational capital theory (Kale et al. 2000) and relational contracting 
theory argue that mutual trust and commitment are essential coordinating 
mechanisms to determine the quality of inter-firm collaboration. Some studies 
(Granovetter 1985, Gulati 1995, Dyer and Singh 1998, Ingham and Mothe 1998) 
argue that trust between collaborative partners is a partial substitute for contracts. It 
contributes in lowering the transaction cost and limiting the risks. Mutual trust and 
commitments are seen as safeguards to avoid opportunistic behaviour in 
collaboration (Uzzi 1997, Zaheer and Venkataraman 1995, Kale et al. 2000).  
 
Literature in inter-firm relations can be divided into two broad perspectives: the 
behavioural perspective and the economic perspective (Cousins 2002). The 
behavioural perspective presents relationships between firms as human-
interpersonal relationships, which are based on trust, mutual understanding and co-
operation. On the other hand, economic perspective views inter-firm relationships 
as economic power exchanges between firms within the marketplace. The age of 
the relationships may impact the effectiveness of the collaboration (Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993, Polonsky et al. 2008). The central concept of inter-firm 
relationships is concerned with the collaboration and sharing of resources, either 
tangible (such as machinery) or intangible (such as intellectual know-how and 
technological processes).  
 
Relational governance literatures argue that mutual trust fosters learning and 
knowledge transfer between firms (Kale et al. 2000). Anderson and Narus (1990) 
define trust as the belief that the partner performs actions that will result in positive 
outcomes for the firm and does not take unexpected actions that may result in 
negative outcomes. Similarly, Ganesan (1994) specifies it as the extent to which the 
focal firm believes that its partner has intentions and motives beneficial to it. Trust 
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in the collaborative arrangement is based on the set of understandings between the 
partners about the expected behaviour in future (Limerick et al. 2002). It is seen as 
the critical factor for good relations and successful collaboration (Dwyer et al. 
1987, Child and Faulkner 1998). In addition, trust facilitates intensive interaction 
between partners involved, which enables them to transfer and learn complex and 
tacit knowledge across the firm boundaries. As a result, trust-based relational 
capital can reduce or eliminate the fear of opportunistic behaviour (Zaheer et al. 
1998). Doz and Hamel (1998) argue that ease and smoothness of knowledge 
exchange depend on the degree of openness and transparency between 
collaborative partners. Similarly, Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that mutual trust 
encourages partners to set-up idiosyncratic knowledge sharing routines to facilitate 
the learning of information and know-how, which can accelerate knowledge 
transfer. Distrust encourages opportunistic behaviour due to lack of loyalty 
between partners and deterrence-based trust revolves around the available sanctions 
for opportunistic behaviours (Macaulay 1963, Gulati 1995, Ghosal and Moran 
1996) 
 
Moreover, Morgan and Hunt (1994), and Hewett and Bearden (2001) argue that 
trust is an important mechanism for persuasion and encouragement of future 
exchanges and it leads to cooperative behaviour and decreases uncertainty. Sako 
(1990) categorises trust in three forms: contractual trust, goodwill trust and 
competence trust. Contractual trust is defined as the trust that partners will adhere 
to the points of the contract as agreed. Goodwill trust is the trust that the partners 
will perform tasks in excess of the agreed terms and conditions, if required. 
Competence trust is the trust that the partner has the ability to produce what the 
contract requires. Furthermore, Madhok (1995) argues that inter-firm trust has two 
components: first, the structural component based on the mutual hostage position; 
and second, the behavioural component based on the degree of confidence partners 
have in each others’ reliability and integrity.  
 
Power is also an essential characteristic of social organisation and an inevitable 
instrument for inter-organisational coordination (Batt and Purchase 2004). More a 
single firm seeks to control the collaboration, the less effective and less innovative 
collaboration becomes (Hakanson and Ford 2002). Greater inter-firm relations may 
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discourage firms to exercise and impose legitimate power on collaborative partners 
(Macneil 1981).  Charan (1991) argues that interaction between firms should be 
open and visible that builds trust, empathy and secures relationship. Kale et al. 
(2000) discuss that inter-firm relations help to curb opportunistic behaviour by 
collaboration partners due to its social control. In case of conflicts, skilful managers 
apply integrative conflict management procedures rather than just compromising or 
addressing disputes in a distributive manner. Trust develops in both active and 
passive forms to balance stability and variety within business relationships. Passive 
trust allows partners to think and act as they learn, while active trust develops the 
conditions under which learning takes place (Batt and Purchase 2004). 
 
Madhok and Tallman (1998) suggest that relations between organisations have 
been seen as a productive resource for value-creation and realization. Better 
performance in the value chain is possible when trading partners are willing to 
make relation-specific investments and combine resources in unique ways 
(Asanuma 1989). In summary, the relational governance positively relates to less 
functional conflict, less stagnation and a desire to resolve disagreements in the 
process of increasing long term collaboration. Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that a 
high degree of asset specificity may be a source of competitive advantage if 
governed through certain types of inter-organisational relations rather than by use 
of the market mechanism. Despite ample benefits of inter-firm relationships 
reported in the literature, authors (Larson 1992, Uzzi 1997) argue that development 
of relational governance involves time and resource-consuming social activities 
and it may restrict firms to acquire information and search for new opportunities 
outside the existing collaborative network. As a result, proper caution should be in 
place before adopting relational governance (Poppo and Zenger 2001).  
 
Similarly, Dyer (1996) argues that specialised supplier network can also create the 
sources of competitive advantage. Relations between organisations have been seen 
not simply as a governance structure of a hybrid nature but, more importantly, as a 
productive resource for value-creation and realization (Madhok and Tallman 1998). 
Asanuma (1989) suggests that better performance in the value chain is possible 
when trading partners are willing to make relation-specific investments and 
combine resources in unique ways. 
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In this study, relational governance refers to administering the inter-organisational 
exchange through trust and inter-firm relations. The relational governance actively 
promotes close personal interaction at multiple levels with the buying firm and 
engagement on informal basis. It promotes flexibility on contractual terms and 
conditions while working on collaborative projects as it progresses. Relational 
governance comprises the informal rules that manage buyer-supplier relationships.  
 
2.4.3 Inter-play of contractual and relational governance  
Despite some contrasting arguments, the literature tends to suggest that contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms are interrelated and both have important 
roles to play in collaborative arrangement (Luhmann 1979, Zucker 1986, Larson 
1992, Ring and Van de Ven 1994, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Hoetker and Mellewigt 
2009, Yuan et al. 2010). The adoption of a particular governance structure depends 
on the types of exchanges involved between partnering firms (Lee and Cavusgil 
2006). Relational governance administers exchanges involving a high degree of 
asset specificity whereas contractual governance administers low levels of asset 
specificity. Contractual governance provides clearly articulated contractual terms, 
remedies and processes of dispute resolution, whereas relational governance 
promotes trust, relational norms of flexibility, solidarity, bilateralism and 
continuance (Lee and Cavusgil 2006). For instance, short-term limited transactions 
may not need complex social processes of relationship development and therefore, 
a well drafted contract is likely to serve the purpose of mitigating opportunistic 
behaviour. On the other hand, in the long term many unexpected changes and vast 
dimensions of exchanges cannot be contractually specified (Poppo and Zenger 
2002). In this case, relational governance operates as a self enforcing safeguard that 
is effective and less costly than contractual governance.  
 
Nevertheless, literature argues that collaboration involves not only the simple 
transactional exchanges but also helps in creating value for the customer. Hence, 
collaboration cannot be controlled only by formal contracts and it requires a dense 
web of interpersonal connections (Kanter 1994). Faems et al. (2006) argue that 
governance based on relationships lowers transaction costs and facilitates adaptive 
responses, requiring less effort than formal contractual governance. Subsequently, 
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Inkpen and Li (1999) argue that establishing a governance mechanism with the 
necessary flexibility is important for successful collaboration. 
 
Developing a balance between relational and contractual governance and treating 
them as complements rather than substitutes is a challenge. Although contracts 
provide a set of mechanisms to avoid risks involved in partnerships, it might not 
always be possible to draft a complete contract due to time and cost constraints. As 
a result, firms normally design an incomplete contract including some aspect of 
inter-firm relations to increase the flexibility. Deakin and Wilkinson (1998) discuss 
that incomplete contracts include non-legally enforceable and poorly specified 
intentions, promises and conditions for transactions, which offer less certainty but 
more flexibility in the execution of agreements. Moreover, Anand and Khanna 
(2000) argue that although collaborations are best described as incomplete 
contracts, managers have a tendency to cover all potential uncertainties in a written 
document.  
 
Moreover, empirical study of Lee and Cavusgil (2006) suggests that contracts may 
serve as the basis or an initiation of a partnership, but it is the relational governance 
that could leverage alliance performance in its strength, stability and degree of 
knowledge transfer. Their study also finds the need for future research assessing 
the influence of governance mechanisms on collaboration structure. Contractual 
governance may support relational governance by specifying contingencies, 
adaptive processes and controls (Poppo and Zenger 2002) and relational 
governance complements contractual governance by generating contractual 
refinements when change and conflict arise (Macneil 1978). Consequently, inter-
play between contractual and relational governance can be described as complex 
and of a temporal nature. While reviewing extensive literatures in collaboration and 
governance mechanism, it seems that various forms of collaboration are either 
governed by contractual, relational or a mix of both. However, most of the 
collaborative arrangements tend to be dominated by either of the governance 
mechanism. Degree of intent to protect the intellectual property of the firm, fear of 
knowledge spill over and benefits of sharing are some of the important factors, 
which decide which forms of governance mechanism could be more effective in 
exchange process.  
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Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009) argue that the comparative effectiveness of 
contractual and relational governance depends on the amount of physical and 
knowledge resources present in the exchange process. Physical resources could be 
effectively exchanged in presence of contractual governance, whereas, knowledge 
resources in presence of relational governance. Caniels et al. (2012) clearly 
illustrates the interrelationships between governance mechanisms and their effect 
on project outcomes. Their findings suggest that relational governance is only 
beneficial for project outcomes when it is accompanied by contractual control. 
Further, Fischer et al. (2011) investigate the question whether contractual and 
relational governance are substitutes or complements, and reveal the existence of 
dynamic patterns of interaction between the foundation dimension (contract, trust) 
and the corresponding action dimension (formal control, informal control) of 
contractual and relational governance. In contrast to previous research, they explain 
complementary and substitution as the outcome of dynamic interactions between 
the two governance dimensions. Zheng et al. (2008) analyse the interplay of 
governance mechanisms and confirm that relational and contractual mechanisms 
are indeed complementary forms of exchange governance. They further argue that 
different development characteristics of relational and contractual mechanisms 
suggest that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent patterns and 
concludes with suggestions for more longitudinal studies. Olander et al. (2010) 
explore the dynamics of relational and contractual governance mechanisms in 
buyer-supplier collaboration in R&D projects and indicate that both contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms play a role in buyer–supplier R&D collaboration 
but their relative importance varies according to the collaboration phase. Both types 
of mechanisms should be considered simultaneously throughout the collaboration 
process. Moreover, Mahapatra et al. (2010) also observe that firms deviate from the 
conventional choices of either transactional or relational governance to a 
combination of contractual and relational aspects to make the governance structure 
effective.! 
 
The inter-firm governance structure facilitates the effective engagement in the 
collaborative arrangement. The need of both contractual and relational governance 
is desired according to the specific form of collaborative arrangement and the skills 
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and capabilities possessed by the supplier. However, the decision to adopt a 
particular form of governance structure depends on the balance between 
safeguarding the capabilities of the firm and the intensity of collaborative 
engagement. Nature of supplier capability leads the way suppliers integrates with 
buying organisations and even improves the ability to decide on the mechanism to 
govern inter-firm market transactions. Suppliers with specific functional 
capabilities can effectively monitor the progress in the collaboration with buyer and 
share knowledge with them (Mayer and Salomon 2006). Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
have examined the complementary and substitutable nature of contractual and 
relational governance. Literatures like Cannon et al. (2000) and Yu et al. (2006) 
supports the argument behind the complementarities of contractual and relational 
governance. Transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson 1991) frames 
governance as a cost minimizing and discriminating alignment between uncertainty 
and control. As the uncertainty about partner opportunism increases the control 
provided by different governance form helps to work effectively in collaborative 
arrangements. Governance forms are efficient when it minimises the combined 
costs of opportunism and administration arising from uncertainty and asset 
specialisation (Santoro and Mcgill 2005).  
 
TCE focuses on the individual transaction as the unit of analysis and demonstrates 
how the attributes of a transaction influence governance decisions (Mayer and 
Salomon 2006, Gibbons 2010). Grover and Malhotra (2003) provide the synthesis 
of TCE, its assumptions, constructs, and propositions in the area of operations and 
SCM to examine relationships in manufacturing organizations. TCE can provide a 
valuable lens with which to view and interpret inter-organizational information 
sharing (:*0*(,%'*10&-!;<=<). The extent of the contractual hazard in transactional 
exchange is decided by the degree of asset specificity (Williamson 1985), 
appropriability (Oxley 1997, Pisano 1990) and observability (Holmstrom, 1979) in 
an exchange. Asset specificity refers to the transferability of assets to alternative 
uses (Williamson 1985). When assets are specific to a transaction, they have very 
little value outside of a given context. In situations where dedicated assets are 
required, buyer would have the fear that suppliers may behave opportunistically to 
extract excessive rents from them. Detailed contracts or other safeguards may be 
used to avoid this fear of holding up the buying firm. However, drafting detailed 
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contracts and implementing safeguards can be costly and therefore a mix of 
contractual and relational governance could be the most appropriate for 
administering the buyer-supplier collaboration. Appropriability refers to 
contracting hazards that expose valuable intellectual property to expropriation 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1990). When suppliers contract in an 
external market, they may exchange proprietary information and knowledge. Such 
an exchange leads to the possibility that the buying firm will expropriate valuable 
knowledge and may deny the supplier’s sole rights to a rent-generating asset. 
Contracts are limited in their effectiveness at mitigating such expropriation and 
therefore the relational governance may complement the approach to handle the 
situations where assets are at risk of misappropriation (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
The observability of the outcomes of transactional exchange is an important 
exchange hazard (Holmstrom, 1979). When the quality of collaborative output is 
difficult to observe and measure ex post, the contract-based governance can be 
problematic. Under such conditions, a firm may prefer administrative oversight so 
as to focus on controlling the input process rather than on metering the output 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Mayer and Nickerson 2005). TCE is a well-
established theory to explain inter-firm exchange phenomena. A number of prior 
literatures (Williamson 1991,Cusumano and Takeishi 1991, Helper 1991 Poppo 
and Zenger 2002, Lee and Cavusgil 2006, Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009, Li et al. 
2010, Yuan et al. 2010) have discussed the importance of TCE in understanding the 
nature of governance mechanism in inter-firm transaction. Hoetker and Mellewigt 
(2009) argue that although TCE is greatly overshadowed by the study of 
contractual governance mechanism, in fact the elements of relational governance 
have been discussed in the transaction cost framework at the early days of theory 
development in Williamson (1979). TCE explains the control and coordinating 
mechanism of governance in collaboration. Therefore TCE is considered as the key 
theory to explain the governance mechanism in this study. 
 
In summary, the review of the literature indicates that both capability-based view 
and governance mechanism would be suitable to understand buyer-supplier 
collaboration (McIvor 2009, Meyer et al. 2009). Jiang (2011) argues that the inter-
firm alliance is a complex phenomenon and integrative framework combining the 
concept of RBV and TCE is required to explain the alliance formation and 
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management. Moreover, Argyres and Zenger (2012) argue that the RBV and TCE 
are in fact so intertwined dynamically that treating them as independent in 
explaining the exchanges beyond firm boundary is fundamentally misleading. They 
also offer a theoretical synthesis of transaction cost and capabilities approaches to 
firm boundaries that seeks to overcome each approach’s limitations, and provides a 
unified and logically consistent understanding of boundary decisions. Although 
previously TCE has offered an acceptable explanation of governance mechanisms 
in buyer-supplier transactions, it appears to be losing its explanatory power in 
today’s evolving concept of buyer-supplier collaboration (Ghoshal and Moran 
1996, Hoyt and Huq 2000). The potential combination of RBV and TCE is desired 
to explain the relationship between capabilities, governance and collaboration. 
Although, there are many studies in the area of governance and its influence on 
joint working mechanism, there are limited studies linking the capability, 
governance mechanism and collaboration. Hence, it is important to investigate the 
interaction among internal capability, governance and buyer-supplier collaboration 
performance from supplier’s perspective.     
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter focuses on reviewing previous literatures to capture the research idea, 
basic themes and relevant theories. The three key themes related to this research are 
buyer-supplier collaboration, capability-based perspective and governance 
mechanism. The most common internal capabilities of suppliers are categories as 
R&D, production, and support-services. Similarly, contractual and relational 
governance are discussed as the mechanism to administer inter-firm exchange 
process. Contractual governance signifies the importance of formation of complex 
contracts, whereas relational governance signifies the importance of building 
mutual trust and relationships.  
 
This chapter also discusses the capability-based perspective to understand 
supplier’s capability in promoting buyer-supplier cooperation. It is evident in past 
literatures that internal resources and inter-firm relations both have the ability to 
generate rents. This study offers insights into the relationship between the 
capabilities, governance and the type of buyer-supplier collaboration. In practice 
this will help to establish proper decision regarding alignment of firm internal 
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capability and governance to effectively collaborate with buying firm. The 
literature review indicates that collaborative parties should establish well-structured 
mechanism to blend proper mix of contractual and relational governance to protect 
their interests and also work together for mutual benefits. The connection between 
firm specific capability and collaboration success in presence of contractual and 
relational mechanism for managing inter-firm exchange is crucial. Next chapter 






















The chapter introduces the theoretical model developed through this research.  A 
number of hypotheses are presented which explore the relationship between 
supplier capability, governance mechanisms and buyer-supplier collaboration. The 
chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents the theoretical framework 
followed by Section 3.3 which examines the multiple mediation effect of 
contractual and relational governance on the relationship between supplier R&D 
capability and buyer-supplier collaboration. Section 3.4 and 3.5 discuss the effect 
of contractual and relational governance on the relationship between supplier 
production capability and support capability with different types of buyer-supplier 
collaboration (Information sharing, collaborative product development and 
collaborative problem solving) respectively. Finally, Section 3.6 summarises this 
chapter.       
 
3.2 An overview of the theoretical framework 
The primary focus of this study is to investigate the relationship between supplier 
capabilities, governance mechanisms and buyer-supplier collaboration (BSC).  It is 
asserted that collaboration (operationalized as information sharing, collaborative 
product development and collaborative problem solving) between buyer and 
supplier is aided when there is alignment between supplier capability and the 
governance mechanisms used to coordinate the exchange.  Figure 3.1 presents the 
theoretical model. 
Three key functional capabilities of the supplier are examined in the model: R&D, 
production, and support services capability. These capabilities are considered as the 
most generic capabilities of the supplier and represent the continuum of the product 
life cycle (Chen and Chen 2003).  They correspond to supplier’s ability to get 
engaged in R&D activities, production activities and provide 
supporting/complementary services (Jacobides and Winter 2005, Goffin et al. 
2006). These three capabilities are widely recognised as the key value adding 
capabilities found in most of the organisations. The choice of R&D, production and 
support capabilities is also supported by previous literatures in operations strategy 
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which have formulated the capability around the common theme of R&D, 
production and support activities (Boyer 1998, Neely et al. 1995, Noble 1997), and 
therefore this study considers these capabilities as the focus of this research.    
 
Collaboration builds on the identification of the capability inside the firm boundary 
and the need to assimilate complementary capability of the other firm. The 
importance of the supplier capability in buyer-supplier collaboration performance 
is established in previous studies (Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Liker et al. 1998). 
Successful collaboration depends on the optimal combination of productive 
resources/assets across the firm boundary without the fear of over-exploitation 
(Mitchell et al. 2002, Nickerson and Zenger 2004, Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). 
The theoretical model argues that the type of collaboration depends on the supplier 
capability. This argument is consistent with the studies such as Oh and Rhee (2008) 
and Goffin et al. (2006), where they have recognised the importance of supplier 
capabilities in improving the BSC performance. Gulati (1999) also supports the 
argument that supplier capabilities can influence the level of alliance formation in a 
supply network environment. Lin and Lin (2009) argue that the economic goal of 
firms entering alliances is to combine their complementary resources to create 
synergies. This goal cannot be achieved without allocating value-added activities 
correctly, establishing efficient inter-organizational routines and introducing proper 
governance structures.! 
 
Building on RBV and TCE, the theoretical model then explores how governance 
mechanisms can help unlock the value of these supplier capabilities to drive more 
effective collaboration between buyer and supplier. Argyres and Zenger (2012) 
argue that RBV and TCE are in fact so intertwined dynamically that treating them 
as independent in explaining the exchanges beyond firm boundary is fundamentally 
misleading. They also offer a theoretical synthesis of transaction cost and 
capabilities approaches to firm boundaries that seeks to overcome each approach’s 
limitations, and provides a unified and logically consistent understanding of 
boundary decisions. Studies have shown (Poppo and Zenger 2002, Lee and 
Cavusgil 2006, Liu et al. 2009) that contractual and relational governance function 
as complements and both are influential in affecting the exchange performance in 
the collaboration. Further, it is also argued that one cannot take the role of other. 
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However, the relation between the governance choice and the nature of 
resources/assets involved in collaboration has found limited attention in the 
literature (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). There is little understanding about the 
comparative effectiveness of one governance mechanism over other in context of 
exchange performance in collaboration. This research thus examines the 
independent effect of both relational and contractual governance on the capability – 
collaboration relationship. The theoretical model is based on the argument that the 
effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in the buyer-supplier 
collaboration is based on the nature of the resources/assets involved in inter-firm 
transaction. The superiority of one governance mechanism over other in inter-firm 
transaction depends on the degree of physical assets (which are easy to codify and 
transmit across the firm boundary) and knowledge assets (which are based on 
intangible know-how and skills, and difficult to transfer) in the firm capability. 
This argument is consistent with the study of Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009), which 
argues that the physical assets are more suited to contractual governance, whereas 
knowledge assets are best suited to the use of relational governance. They further 
argue that a misalignment between the governance mechanisms and the nature of 
the resources/capability can affect the collaboration performance. In this research, 
the contractual and relational governance are considered as the bridge to link 
supplier capability with different forms of collaboration. Buyer-supplier 
collaboration activities involve the exchange of varying degree of extensive 
resources from both physical and knowledge-based category. Depending on the 
involvement of physical and knowledge based resources in particular supplier 
capability, relational governance may improve the collaboration performance for 
the knowledge based resources but impairs performance for the physical resources 
(Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009).  
The prediction of multiple mediation effect of contractual and relational 
governance on the relationship between capability and collaboration is based on 
combining the arguments proposed in previous literatures (Oh and Rhee 2008, 
Goffin et al. 2006, Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Lee and 
Cavusgil 2006, Liu et al. 2009, Li et al. 2010) linking the relationships between (a) 
capability and collaboration, (b) inter-firm exchange and governance mechanism, 
and (c) the nature of resources and governance mechanism. Previous studies such 
as, Nielsen (2010) also focuses on mediating effects of different governance 
 47!
mechanisms on the relationship between conditions for alliance formation and 
outcome.  
Different supplier capabilities such as R&D, production and support contain a 
varying mix of physical and knowledge based resources. Therefore, it presents 
different governance problems for inter-firm exchange, which contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms address with varying degree of effectiveness. 
Contractual and relational governance mechanisms differ in their ability to support 
the coordination of inter-firm activities in presence of different capabilities.      
 
The theoretical model proposes a series of hypothetical relations based on the 
multiple mediation effects of contractual and relational governance on the 
relationship between supplier capability and BSC (Information sharing: IS, 
Collaborative product development: CPD, Collaborative problem solving: CPS). 





Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework 
 
3.3 R&D capability and Buyer-supplier collaboration 
This section discusses the multiple mediation effect of contractual and relational 
governance on the relationship between supplier R&D capability and BSC types 
(IS, CPD and CPS). Figure 3.2 presents the hypothetical relationship between R&D 






















Figure 3.2: R&D capability and Buyer-supplier collaboration 
 
3.3.1 R&D capability and Information Sharing 
The information sharing related to product and services between buyers and 
suppliers is acknowledged as an important aspect of buyer-supplier collaboration. 
Effective information sharing between buyer and supplier is required to understand 
market information, reduce supply uncertainty and improve delivery schedule 
(Humphreys et al. 2004, Dyer 1996). Understanding the impact of supplier’s R&D 
capability on the information sharing is important for improving the collaboration 
performance with buyer. The impact of governance mechanism on effective 
information sharing is recognised in previous literature (Zirpoli and Caputo 2002). 
Moreover, the relation between the type of capability and the governance 
mechanism (contractual and relational) is also established in the literature (Hoetker 
and Mellewigt 2009). Oh and Rhee (2008) has established the relationship between 
supplier capability and buyer – supplier collaboration. Building on previous studies 
(Oh and Rhee, 2008, Poppo and Zenger, 2002) this study asserts that contractual 
and relational governance have an important role to play in directing the R&D 
capabilities of the supplier towards more effective collaboration in the form of 
information sharing. There is always a concern over the content and extent of the 
information to share. Decisions over what to share and how much to share are 
particularly difficult in presence of the capability developed based on the 
knowledge based resources. Overexposing the resources/capabilities can have an ill 
effect on the future of the supplier. Suppliers need to safeguard their knowledge to 










R&D capability is developed based on the knowledge and skills of scientists and 
engineers of the firm. Although, the contribution of physical resources (Shamsie 
1996, Das and Teng 2000) such as buildings, infrastructure, machines etc is 
required in developing the R&D capability, the knowledge-based resources has 
more contribution in generating the R&D capability.  Some of the researchers 
define the R&D capability as the ability to create a good or service that meets 
customer’s requirements for functionality, quality, cost and schedule (Pisano 1990, 
Hoetker 2005). Oh and Rhee (2008) operationalise it as design, engineering and 
module capabilities. An R&D capability is considered as one of the key assets a 
supplier can possess that will help to provide competitive edge in the market. 
Suppliers with strong R&D capability can help to improve the quality of the 
product/services or the cost of the product/services being offered (A%"-3)-"*!%26!G*'#24%2! ;<=;). R&D capability is critical in terms of understanding the 
technological know-how and integrating it at the product end (Pisano 1990). As the 
nature of R&D capability is knowledge intensive, the first governance issue posed 
by the exchange of knowledge assets is a variation of the well-known 
appropriability problem (Oxley 1997).  Once the supplier discloses the knowledge 
to the potential buyer, that buyer is in a position to apply that knowledge without 
paying for it (Arrow 1962). This situation is difficult to avoid because the potential 
buyer may not agree to pay for the knowledge until it has the opportunity to 
evaluate it. This dilemma creates the opportunity to look for an appropriate form of 
governance mechanism to share information with buyer. This is also consistent 
with the study of Poppo and Zenger (2001, 2002), which asserts that governance 
decisions are contingent on the resources involved in the exchange process.  
  
Contractual governance signifies the extent of reliance on formal 
agreement/contracts, which guide the inter-firm exchange process. It can be seen as 
the facilitating mechanism to monitor the process of resource and information 
sharing in collaboration. The contractual agreement can act as an ex-ante 
mechanism to safeguard against any unwanted behaviour of buyer. Contracts can 
play a vital role in enabling transactions that require investments in particular assets 
(Klein et al. 1978). It can impose credible enforceable limits on the actions of buyer 
and can constrain the its ability to extract additional rents by failing to perform as 
agreed (Williamson 1985). Buyers and suppliers are often uncertain about their 
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expectations, goal differences and extent of cooperation in dynamic market 
situations. Difference in operational routines and cynicism over partner’s behaviour 
in unexpected situation are some of the factors that hamper the performance in 
information sharing.   
 
The development of R&D capability represents a long-term commitment in terms 
of resource investment for suppliers. Following this investment it follows that 
suppliers should seek to protect this intellectual property when collaborating with 
strategic buyers. The legal protection offered through contractual governance will 
serve to support the collaboration, offering security for suppliers and engendering 
information transfer in a more secure contractual environment. Suppliers can use 
the written contracts embedded in contractual governance as a safeguard against 
knowledge spill over and thus prevents the exposition of its intellectual property to 
buying firm.  
 
On the other hand, relational governance refers to the importance of informal 
interaction in guiding the collaboration process. Relational governance offers an 
alternative method of protection in the relationship. An R&D capability can be 
described as knowledge intensive whereby the knowledge is possessed by, and 
embedded in relationships between engineers and scientists (Hoetker and 
Mellewigt 2009). We build on this principle in developing the assertion that 
relational governance can be a very effective mechanism in translating the value of 
R&D capabilities. Relational governance, as embodied through the social exchange 
mechanisms of formal and informal socialisation, reciprocation and trust, can serve 
to not only protect the intellectual capital (Liu et al. 2009) but help to enhance the 
effect of R&D capability on information sharing between both buyer and supplier. , 
Previous evidence (Lee and Cavusgil 2006, Lawson et al. 2009) has shown that 
relational governance fosters confidence in buyer-supplier relationships and 
encourages actors to engage more actively and openly in collaboration.  
 
Social exchange theory argues that relational governance basically focuses on the 
social interaction and socially embedded relationship in economic activities. It is 
also identified as the tool to control opportunism and improve cooperation in 
buyer-supplier dyad. On the other hand contracts are identified as an important 
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instrument to monitor buyer-supplier collaboration. Therefore, both contractual and 
relational governance are expected to undercut opportunism and enhance 
information sharing.  
 
Relational governance mechanism in collaboration encompasses relational norms 
and trust. In buyer-supplier dyad, relational norms are related with the behavioural 
expectations that are partially shared by a group of decision makers and directed 
towards collective goals (Liu et al. 2009). Moreover, relational norms restrict 
partners’ opportunism through shared norms and values and guide reciprocal 
exchanges and individual conduct (Brown et al. 2000, Gundlach et al. 1995). 
Informal engagement between buyer and supplier could help to better understand 
the supplier R&D capability and look for ways to exchange information acceptable 
to both buyer and supplier. For such relationally –governed exchanges, the 
enforcement of obligations, promises and expectations occurs through social 
processes that promote norms of flexibility and solidarity (Poppo and Zenger 
2002), which is important for effective sharing of desired information in the 
collaboration.  Information sharing in an informal and transparent environment is 
more effective with an increased level of confidence between buyer and supplier. 
Active involvement maintaining close personal interaction at multiple levels in firm 
and willingness to share information beyond the contractual agreement promotes 
greater level of bonding between buyer and supplier which further enhances the 
quality of information being shared (Dyer 1998).  
 
Literatures argue that contractual and relational governance both are crucial in 
mitigating risk involved with information sharing and improving the quality of 
information (Barclay and Brock 1997, Cannon et al. 2000, Poppo and Zenger 2002, 
Wuyts and Geyskens 2005). Research on inter-firm exchange (Liu et al. 2009) 
maintains that buyer and supplier should employ multiple form of exchange 
process to guide the collaboration activities. Both contractual and relational 
governance are important to safeguard against any uncertain eventuality while 
maintaining the smooth exchange of knowledge and resources.  
 
Knowledge based resources involved in R&D capability are difficult to transfer 
across firm boundary because they tend to be embedded in the routines and culture 
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of the firm, composed largely of tacit knowledge and coded in firm’s specialised 
technical language (Spender 1996). Therefore, it is predicted that relational 
governance may be more effective for exchange of knowledge-based information 
in buyer-supplier collaboration. Teece (1988) argues that it is much harder to 
develop concrete criteria for knowledge that one party to supply, specifically if the 
asset owner is not willing to disclose detailed information about the knowledge.       
 
Relational governance will reduce the fear of opportunism and build up the 
necessary confidence for supplier with R&D capability to regularly share the 
information related to product/service, market, process and forecasting. Although 
formal written legal agreement can inhibit open exchange between buyer and 
supplier, and therefore, relational will be more effective than contractual 
governance in information sharing (Ghosal and Moran 1996). When contractual 
and relational governance mechanism used jointly in buyer-supplier collaboration, 
researchers anticipate greater benefits than if used separately. The contractual 
governance may effectively exchange the physical resources associated with the 
collaboration activity and the relational part of governance will help in effective 
transfer of knowledge-based resources. However, the knowledge intensive nature 
of R&D capability indicates that the information sharing will be more effective in 
case of relational governance. This prediction is consistent with the study of 
Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009). Based on the above discussion, it is anticipated that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier R&D capability and information sharing, 
Hypothesis 1b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 
the R&D capability and information sharing relationship.  
 
3.3.2 R&D capability and Collaborative Product Development 
A supplier with R&D capability helps to promote the development of innovative 
ideas in anticipation of future market conditions (H%)4116! #(! %&9! ;<==). 
Collaborative product development (CPD) is an important type of buyer-supplier 
coordination especially for suppliers who have an ability to link research outputs 
with current market requirements (Büyüközkan and Arsenyan 2012). CPD 
activities involve sharing of skills of buyer and supplier to develop new 
products/services, actively involvement at the early stage of project development 
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and, share the cost and risks of product development. Given that intensive 
engagement with buyers may be required at multiple levels it is important to 
consider how the relationship can be effectively governed to maximise the value of 
R&D capability on product development. A"16-3( 6#$#&174#2( is a knowledge-
intensive activity and various forms of knowledge-based resources/assets are 
exchanged in the CPD activities. The importance of sharing knowledge between 
buyer and supplier in CPD has been well recognized (Zhen et al. 2011). 
 
The product life cycle is rapidly shortened in today’s business environment and 
therefore new 7"16-3( 6#$#&174#2( has become essential for both growth and 
survival of organisations. The process of 7"16-3( 6#$#&174#2( is governed by the 
mechanism, which facilitates effective sharing of knowledge across firm boundary. 
However, recognising, managing and preventing knowledge loss during the 
exchange process can be a key determinant of success of the organisation (Shankar 
2012). Although, contractual governance mechanism can be effective in protecting 
the knowledge and intellectual rights, it is hard to design a contract incorporating 
all the criteria for knowledge exchange in CPD activities. As a result if there is 
disagreement during the product development stage, it is harder to judge whether or 
not the knowledge delivered by one party meets the agreed upon criteria (Arrow 
1974, Masten 1993). Contractual governance may limit the parties to respond to 
new knowledge revealed during the process of product development and therefore 
contractual governance mechanism may not be suitable for coordinating the use of 
knowledge assets (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009).     
 
In presence of knowledge intensive capabilities such as R&D, relational 
governance can facilitate the process of knowledge sharing between supplier and 
buyer to decide the level of commitments required for jointly developing the 
products/services. Even in case of uncertain circumstances, both parties can be 
willing to work out the possible ways to complete the project without holding each 
other on contractual agreement. Developing a transparent and confident 
environment for knowledge exchange could not be possible without informal social 
interaction between buyer and supplier. Lawson et al. (2009) argue that informal 
socialization mechanisms play an important role in facilitating inter-organizational 
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knowledge sharing, whereas formal socialization mechanisms act indirectly 
through informal socialization to influence knowledge sharing. They also report 
that the interorganizational knowledge sharing is positively associated with 
supplier contribution to development outcomes, which, in turn, improves buyer 
product development performance.  
 
Relational governance allows both buyer and supplier to have symmetric 
information through multiple level of communication, promotes harmonization of 
conflict and honesty within the exchange process. More buyer and supplier trust 
each other, more they feel assured that the other firm will cooperate in good faith 
and care for their collaboration rather than behave opportunistically to exploit the 
knowledge received from the other party (Dyer and Chu 2003). Rapid 
technological change adds to the unpredictability for the closer coordination due to 
the increase in the part complexity and fear for becoming the current technology 
obsolete sooner (Chen and Paulraj 2004, Hoetker 2005, Petersen et al. 2003, Wasti 
and Liker 1999). It is much harder to develop concrete criteria for knowledge that 
one party is to supply, particularly in light of the reluctance on disclosing detailed 
information about the knowledge and sharing the incentives after implementing the 
knowledge (Gulati et al. 2005). Although both contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms are important for supplier with R&D capability in order to 
effectively work on CPD projects without compromising its intellectual property 
rights (IPR), relational governance may be more effective in achieving the desired 
success. 
 
Bstieler (2005) argues that in order to reduce risk, time delay and expenses due to 
increased technological uncertainty, supplier with greater R&D capability will 
engage in building relationships with buyer to increase its technological 
proficiency. Buyers are also more interested in adopting relational mechanism for 
exchange process with suppliers, which have proven capability in R&D activities 
(Richardson 1996). Once the relationship is built-up between buyer and supplier, 
they may be reluctant to behave opportunistically even if they recognize the 
benefits from violating contracts because this can seriously damage the reputation 
of the focal firm. Technological uncertainty promotes a fair distribution of 
relational quasi-rent to work towards mutual benefits. In this situation, suppliers 
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with greater R&D capability can even surrender some of its market power to 
strengthen the relationship with the buying firm (Asanuma and Kikutani 1992). 
Kogut (2000) has realised that in case of CPD activities, external suppliers have to 
give greater importance to share knowledge with the prime manufacturer. Jointly 
developing a product with buying firm requires sharing the knowledge and idea 
over a long period of time due to slow diffusion of knowledge across the firm 
boundary. Sharing innovation related to the product and process design means 
sharing more tacit information at firm level between buyers and suppliers 
(Blomqvist and levy 2006) and therefore, in this context relational governance 
plays a more influential role in guiding the CPD process in presence of R&D 
capability. In light of the above discussion, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier R&D capability and collaborative product 
development. 
Hypothesis 2b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 
the R&D capability and Collaborative product development relationship.  
 
3.3.3 R&D capability and Collaborative Problem Solving 
Collaborative problem solving (CPS) involves activities related to jointly working 
towards the problems related cost, quality, delivery schedule and uncertain demand 
patterns of the product and services. Suppliers with greater R&D capability are 
more specialised in developing the product and services according to market 
requirement (Lin et al. 2011). However, based on the knowledge gained while 
working on new product/service development projects, supplier can be willing to 
collaborate with buyer in problem solving activities if appropriate. This 
collaboration can be possible in the light of good relationship with buyer based on 
the past working experience. Relationship built on close personal interaction at 
multiple levels will promote the nature of helping out the buyer during emergency 
situations. The informal interaction with the buyer through relational governance 
provides the ideal environment for improving CPS activities. Sharing the specialist 
knowledge/skills in short term problem solving activities may not be preferred 
choice of supplier with R&D capability and therefore, relational governance is 
important in engaging in CPS activities.  
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On the other hand contractual governance can serve as an important coordinating 
role in CPS in terms of incorporating clauses regarding communication of 
problems related to delivery and maintenance to enable efficient tackling of 
problem (Gulati and Singh 1998, Mayer and Argyres 2004). It can further enable 
the predictability of each party’s actions when the problem occurs (Gulati et al. 
2005).  Nevertheless, supplier with R&D capability need to protect its IPR and 
place proper safeguards against the opportunistic behaviours of buyer. Contractual 
governance could also be good for controlling the physical assets involved in R&D 
capability for CPS activities. Contracts are helpful in mitigating the self-interest, 
and thus the opportunistic behavior, which otherwise seriously undermines the 
performance of inter-organizational exchanges (Williamson 1996). Formal 
contracts record the obligations and roles of both buyer and supplier in the 
collaboration, arrange for enforcement and specify objectives, rules, and 
procedures for resolving disputes (Cannon and Perreault 1999, Reuer and Arin "o, 
2002, 2007). By clarifying task and performance expectations, incorporating 
information provisions and requirements, and instituting penalties for 
noncompliance, contracts mitigate uncertainty and risks associated with 
opportunistic behavior. Thus, contracts enhance control and reduce the problem 
associated with the exchange in BSC (Malhotra and Murnighan 2002). However, 
the role of formal contracts in knowledge acquisition and sharing is minimal if the 
resources involved in exchange are knowledge intensive and involved tacit 
information (Adler 2001, Madhok and Tallman 1998).  
 
In a collaboration setting where business hazards are severe, the combination of 
contractual and relational safeguards may deliver greater exchange payoffs than in 
isolation (Liu et al. 2009). When contractual and relational governance mechanism 
used jointly in buyer-supplier collaboration, researchers anticipate greater benefits 
than if used separately. However, relational governance can have more influential 
when the buyer and supplier are clear about their respective responsibilities in 
collaborative problem solving activities. Relational governance promotes a bilateral 
approach to problem solving and creates a commitment to joint action through 
mutual adjustment (Poppo and Zenger 2002).  Relationship based exchange process 
in buyer-supplier dyad have important value creation properties in the form of 
efficiency improvement, cost saving and profit enhancement (Liu et al. 2009). With 
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the development of relational mechanism, buyer and supplier will be better able to 
formulate their reciprocal expectations and enhance mutual adaptability for CPS. 
Especially in uncertain situation, this will help to quickly achieve at agreement 
between buyer and supplier, effectively collaborate on problem solving and 
accomplish performance targets. Relationship between buyer and supplier 
encourages adaptation and understanding of each other, and also helps to pool and 
utilise the resources, talent and skills to jointly solve problems. The contractual 
governance may effectively exchange the physical resources associated with the 
collaboration activity and the relational governance will help in effective transfer of 
knowledge-based resources. However, the knowledge intensive nature of R&D 
capability indicates that the resource sharing in CPS will be more effective in case 
of relational governance. This prediction is consistent with the study of Hoetker 
and Mellewigt (2009). Therefore, it is anticipated that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier R&D capability and collaborative problem 
solving. 
Hypothesis 3b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 
the R&D capability and collaborative problem solving relationship. 
 





















This section discusses the multiple mediation effect of contractual and relational 
governance on the relationship between supplier production capability and BSC 
types. Production capability corresponds to the ability of the firm to provide 
components or finished products to the buying firm. It is measured in terms of 
supplier proven ability to consistently offer products according to buyer 
specifications, to reduce production cycle time, to deliver products on time, to cope 
with uncertain demand, low rate of product failure due to quality problems and to 
reduce production cost. The production capability has four components: cost, 
quality, flexibility and dependability (Neely et al. 1995, Noble 1997, Boyer 1998). 
The role of contractual and relational governance is important in understanding the 
impact of supplier production capability on BSC. In context of exploring the 
linkage between supplier production capability and BSC types, the role of both 
contractual (Mayer and Salomon 2006) and relational governance (Dyer and Singh 
1998) is important. Production capability is developed with a mix of physical and 
knowledge resources/assets, therefore it is anticipated (based on the study of 
Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009) that a mix of contractual and relational governance 
will be needed for buyer-supplier exchange process. Although both contractual and 
relational governance are important in linking supplier production capability with 
BSC, the relative preference of one over another can differ based on the type of 
resources (physical or knowledge) involved in the particular collaboration process.  
 
3.4.1 Production capability and Information Sharing 
Suppliers that provide quality products at low cost and at desired time are preferred 
choice for the buyers (Asanuma 1985, Goffin et al. 2006). In current competitive 
environment, buying firm cannot afford to take risks in collaborating with supplier 
with weaker production capability. Contractual and relational governance 
facilitates the exchange process in collaboration in presence of supplier production 
capability. Formal contracts play a complementary role in knowledge acquisition 
by enhancing the acquisition of explicit knowledge and further strengthen the 
effects of relational mechanisms on tacit and explicit knowledge acquisition (Li et 
al. 2010). Suppliers having greater production capability may need to be in frequent 
consultation with buying firm to understand the nature of the product, the delivery 
schedule, the urgency of the demand etc. Suppliers having expertise in production 
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activities will promote frequent information exchange related to product/services 
such as product design, delivery schedule, product volume etc (Oh and Rhee 2008).  
 
Contractual governance is effective in protecting the information shared by the 
supplier, but it may also limit the ability of buyer and supplier to respond to new 
information revealed over the life of the collaboration and may prevent the 
collaborative partners from pursuing unforeseen opportunities (Masten and Crocker 
1985). Contracts encourage explicit information flows through their specific 
provisions and enforcement. They are necessarily incomplete and cannot specify all 
types of useful and needed information required to optimize exchange 
performance. At the inter-firm level, the informal interaction helps to build trust 
between the parties and eases frequent communication among parties. It is viewed 
as a critical driver of quality information transfer and willingness to respond 
quickly to inter-firm request (Inkpen and Tsang 2005, Uzzi 1997, Das and 
Teng1998). Close interactions can reveal explicit information gaps, and parties may 
work together to bridge it. Inter-firm relationship encourages the exchange of 
contractually unspecified but valuable information. Buyer and supplier can go 
beyond contractual stipulations because of normative conventions underlying 
informal relationships, such as feeling obliged to provide accurate, timely 
information, or norms of reciprocity (McEvily et al. 2003).  
 
Literatures have identified the benefits of sharing real time information with the 
aim of reducing the inventory cost, production cost, distribution cost and the time 
to market. Real time information exchange cannot be possible until buyer and 
supplier build a considerable level of trust to share common decisions without 
behaving opportunistically. Close personal interaction at multiple levels in both 
firms is critical to build that confidence. Relational governance facilitates informal 
communication between buyer and supplier and encourages the supplier to work 
out joint action plan to deal with buyer’s requirements. Frequent information 
exchange related to product, service and market is crucial in order to provide the 
goods/services as per their specifications. During production process, the supplier 
may seek multiple consultations to clarify any confusion or doubts over desired 
specifications and delivery schedule. Frequency of exchange and degree of 
information sharing related to products depend on the extent of relational 
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governance for the exchange process. Under the superior level of relational 
governance, suppliers will take more initiative in cooperating out of contracts to 
seize emerging market opportunities (Liu et al. 2009). Informal interaction helps to 
effectively understand the buyer needs and assist in fulfilling the demand with ease. 
Even supplier responsiveness to the buyer’s demand depends on the degree of 
information sharing between buyer and supplier. Relational governance norms such 
as trust may increase the quality and level of information exchange between parties 
(Tsai and Ghosal 1998). Thus, it is expected that relational governance will have 
more influential effect on mediating the relationship between supplier production 
capability and IS.  
Hypothesis 4a: Contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier production capability and information 
sharing. 
Hypothesis 4b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 
the production capability and information sharing relationship. 
 
3.4.2 Production capability and Collaborative product development 
Collaborative product/service development (CPD) process involves sharing the 
skills/capabilities of both buyers and suppliers to develop new product/services. It 
also involves working together from the early stage of the project development and 
sharing the cost and risks associated with the new product development. Prior work 
shows that the buyer-supplier collaboration or joint ventures are more likely to 
survive and prosper when parties effectively transfer their managerial, technical, 
and marketing know- how to each other. (Lane et al. 2001, Steensma and Lyles 
2000). CPD is viewed as a long-term commitment to align the resources of both 
buyer and supplier for new product development. Supplier with production 
capability can contribute in product development process and can even help in 
reducing cost and manufacturing cycle of the product. As time to introduce the 
product in the market is critical for the success of the product, supplier with 
superior production capability can certainly help the buyer to quickly release the 
new product in market and cope with uncertain demand pattern. Paiva et al. (2008) 
argue that the cross-functional activities integrate manufacturing knowledge and 
contribute to the creation of valuable and rare product characteristics. However, 
cooperation on new product development demands sharing both the physical and 
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knowledge based assets/resources, but the degree of requirement of theses 
resources may vary according to the particular project. Therefore, based on the 
nature of resources exchanged in CPD activities in presence of supplier production 
capability may need a mix of contractual and relational governance to manage that 
exchange process.   
 
CPD process involves knowledge sharing across firm boundary. Suppliers with 
greater production capability can provide an important source of knowledge related 
to the product design, efficient manufacturing process etc. for new product 
development. Contractual governance offers a formal framework to make joint 
decisions, plan collective actions and solve possible conflicts. However, it is likely 
to be a suboptimal response to transactions involving extensive knowledge assets. 
The difficulty and cost of negotiating an adequate contract will be higher for 
knowledge than physical assets and the ultimate utility of the contract in the event 
of disputes will be lower (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009).  In case of disagreement 
over the knowledge transfer criteria in collaboration, firms can be forced to return 
physical resources/assets, but it is difficult to force a firm’s employees to unlearn 
the knowledge once transferred (Arora et al. 2001). Therefore, it is difficult to draft 
contracts to govern knowledge assets.    
 
A major obstacle to inter-firm knowledge transfer in CPD is the potential leakage 
of valuable knowledge (Dyer and Singh 1998, Inkpen, 2000). Relational norms 
such as trust helps overcome this obstacle by establishing a level of behavioral 
predictability and reliability through the accumulation of exchange experiences (Li 
et al. 2010). Moreover, trust enables greater cooperation between the recipient and 
the knowledge source by creating the mutual understanding that both parties will 
consider the interests of the other (Lane et al. 2001). Trust may foster knowledge 
transfer in CPD by establishing idiosyncratic sharing routines to facilitate learning 
of specified information and know-how (Dyer and Singh 1998). 
 
Relational governance will facilitate more open communication between buyer and 
supplier on product development. CPD is a long term process, which requires a 
collaborative action plan with the appropriate level of resource commitment and 
relational governance will be more effective in guiding the resource sharing 
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process. It is challenging to convince the buyer without having any previous 
relationship to get involve in the product development at the early stage, when it is 
tough to decide the future marketability of the product/services. Suppliers having 
better relationship with the buyers tend to be more actively involved in CPD (Clark 
and Fujimoto 1991). When relational governance guides BSC, more sensitive 
information is likely to be shared between buyers and suppliers (Cousins 2002). 
The repeated interactions across partners that accompanies the use of relational 
governance mechanism assists in developing the coordinating routines, a common 
language for discussing technical issues and provide a sense of social cohesion 
which increases the chance of open exchange of knowledge (Reagans and Mcevily 
2003, Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). In presence of relational governance buyer 
and supplier can communicate more effectively in the product development process 
and can be able to deal with unforeseen problems collectively. Therefore, it is 
anticipated that in presence of relational governance supplier with greater 
production capability will share the knowledge more effectively. Once the 
relationship is established, suppliers may provide buyers with cost benefits, invest 
more in production technology and innovation and prioritize delivery to these 
buyers.  
Hypothesis 5a: Contractual and relational governance both mediate the 
relationship between supplier production capability and collaborative 
product development.  
Hypothesis 5b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 
the production capability and collaborative product development 
relationship. 
 
3.4.3 Production capability and Collaborative problem solving 
Collaboratively working on the problems related to product cost, quality, delivery 
schedule and uncertain demand pattern are challenging in buyer-supplier 
collaboration. These problems are encountered at different stages of product life 
cycle and may demand a variable level of resource commitment between partners. 
Suppliers with production capability can be helpful in supporting the buyers to 
reduce the production cost, enhance the product quality, improve the delivery 
schedule and tackle the uncertain demand in market. The nature of physical and 
knowledge resources involved in the problems solving activity decides the varying 
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degree of contractual and relational governance in managing the exchange process. 
Supplier with production capability can be effective in solving the problems 
encountered during the operation. 
 
Although, contractual governance can offer a legal and institutional framework to 
guide the responsibilities for problem solving and monitor the ongoing progress, it 
is impossible to have a complete contract in uncertain market conditions. In this 
context buyer-supplier relationship is important to get quick response on problems, 
which may need urgent attention from supplier. Supplier with the skills required to 
solve these problems can accommodate the buyer’s request for help in unforeseen 
events. Established relationship between buyer and supplier will help to quickly 
achieve the desired results in CPS. Relational governance mechanisms minimize 
contracting costs by allowing the parties to move forward with a less fully specified 
contract under the assumption that contingencies will be addressed in good faith 
and shirking will not occur (Cusumano 1985). Beyond the mitigation of potential 
opportunism, a successful inter-firm relationship requires coordination of 
productive efforts and assets across firms. In addition to their role in governance, 
the activities associated with relational governance mechanisms also support this 
coordination in a way that contractual mechanisms do not. 
 
In relational governance environment, resource commitment and incentives sharing 
in CPS activities can be discussed beyond the contractual agreement if need arises. 
Buyer can even share the real time demand information to pre-empt the production 
process at the supplier site to avoid the stock out situation. Suppliers who are 
involved in producing these products may deal with these problems comparatively 
easier than the suppliers who do not. Understanding these problems requires 
multiple consultations with buyer in order to effectively search for potential 
solutions. On the other hand relational governance mechanism is not automatic 
because it is not in the interest of both buyer and supplier to behave cooperatively 
without any guarantee that the other partner will reciprocate the same behaviour 
(Parkhe 1993). Therefore the relational governance cannot work in isolation and 
the value of relational governance can be maximised when it is supported by proper 
contractual agreement such that the individual benefits in collaboration also 
maximizes the joint payoffs (Liu et al. 2009). However, Relational governance 
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mechanism offers advantage over contractual governance in coordinating the use of 
knowledge-based resources in collaboration (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). In sum, 
it is proposed that both contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier production capability and CPS. However, relational 
governance will be more effective in establishing the relationship between 
production capability and CPS. Thus,  
Hypothesis 6a: Contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier production capability and collaborative 
problem solving.   
Hypothesis 6b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 
the production capability and collaborative problem solving relationship. 
 










Figure 3.4: Support capability and Buyer-supplier collaboration 
 
This section discusses the multiple mediation effect of contractual and relational 
governance on the relationship between supplier support services capability and 
BSC types. Support services capability refers to the proven ability of firm to 
provide effective support services related to the product according to buyer’s 
requirements such as maintenance, technical support etc. Reducing the waiting time 
for support services, consistently provide quality support services at promised time 
and dealing with the urgent support requests are some of the important parameters 
of the support services capability (Lai 2004, Parasuraman et al. 1994). Support 
capability is generated with a mix of physical (eg. spare parts, machines etc.) and 








exchange of these resources depends on the governance mechanism and the type of 
collaboration activities suppliers engaged in (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009)  
 
3.5.1 Support capability and Information sharing 
There is a growing trend in aerospace industry to provide lifetime support for the 
products being sold to the customer (buyer). Some suppliers have adopted the price 
mechanism based on per hour use of the product rather than charging the fixed 
cost. Rolls-Royce has introduced the term, ‘power by the hour (PbtH)’ which is 
based on the principle of fixed cost maintenance, and an after-sale fleet support 
option providing, line maintenance, replacement parts, scheduled and unscheduled 
engine maintenance, life limited part replacement, incorporation of service bulletin 
requirements, availability of unit exchange line replaceable units, and continuous 
spare parts replenishment. The main feature of PbtH is that it undertakes to provide 
the customer with a fixed engine maintenance cost over an extended period of time. 
Customers are assured of an accurate cost projection and avoid the costs associated 
with unscheduled maintenance actions. Lufthansa has also coined the term ‘TCM’ - 
total component maintenance) for full maintenance and repair support for the 
product sold.  
 
The type of information sharing required for the supplier with support capability in 
collaboration can be categorised into information, which is easy to transmit without 
the loss of integrity and the information, which is hard to articulate and difficult to 
transfer (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi, 1967, Nobeoka et al.  2002). 
Different forms of governance mechanism are required to effectively share 
different types of information. Contractual governance can be more effective in 
sharing the information, which is easy to codify, whereas relational governance 
will be more effective in sharing the complex information hard to transfer beyond 
the boundary of the firm  (Li et al. 2010). However, contractual governance is 
important to decide the domain and boundary of information exchange as agreed by 
the buyer and supplier together.  
 
Providing customised services to the buyer involve information exchange regarding 
the operating conditions of the product, life-cycle of the product and potential 
problems encountered in action (Lai 2004, Parasuraman et al. 1994). Buyers 
 66!
increasingly prefer suppliers who provide complete solutions for the problems 
encountered while using the product, especially in the case of high investment 
products. It has been evident in aerospace industry that buyers cooperate with 
supplier to get efficient support-services and by doing that buyers avoid the hassles 
of maintenance and repair in case of malfunctioning of the product. Delivering 
efficient support services require multiple level of information exchange with 
buyer.  
 
A strategic relationship is required with the buying firm to get the information 
about the product/services in long run, so that the supplier could be more 
responsive to the emergency repairs and maintenance. Superior relation with the 
buying firm will promote speedy information sharing and will further assist in 
establishing the synergy in allocation of resources. Relational governance 
mechanism facilitates open exchange of information to understand the nature of 
support required and search the effective way to deliver it. Building on greater level 
of trust, the buyer will have more information about the capability of the suppliers 
and it will improve the confidence of the buyer that the supplier is able to fulfil the 
commitments (Kale et al. 2000).  Therefore, it is anticipated that although 
contractual and relational both form of governance jointly mediate the relationship 
between supplier support capability and information sharing with buyer, relational 
governance has stronger effect in mediation. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 7a: Contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier support capability and information sharing. 
Hypothesis 7b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 
the support capability and information sharing relationship. 
 
3.5.2 Support capability and Collaborative product development 
CPD generally involves a greater level of resource commitment between buyer and 
supplier since the early stage of the product development. It involves the activities 
related to sharing of resources and skills to jointly develop new products. In the 
process, buyer and supplier jointly bear the cost and risk of developing the new 
product. CPD is a long-term commitment between buyer and supplier with a 
number of ups and downs while progressing on the projects (Hoegl and Wagner 
2005). The successful completion of the project depends on the intention of both 
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parties to make adjustments to cope with unexpected circumstances if need arises. 
CPD activities involve sharing knowledge intensive resources.  Studies 
demonstrate that factors that influence knowledge acquisition and learning include 
the use of formal governance mechanism (Inkpen 2008, Lane and Lubatkin 1998, 
Li et al. 2010), relational mechanisms (Dhanaraj et al. 2004, Szulanski, 1996), and 
knowledge characteristics such as relatedness, ambiguity, and complexity (Lane et 
al. 2001, Zander and Kogut 1995). 
 
Contractual and relational governance mechanism responds differently to different 
forms of resources involved in exchange process in CPD. Activities related with 
product development need the transfer of both physical and knowledge based 
resources. Prior studies (Lane and Lubatkin1998) argue that formal controls and 
procedures generally facilitate the transfer of knowledge, which is easy to codify, 
however more complex knowledge can be more effectively transferred with the 
relational governance mechanism. Although, suppliers with support capability may 
have limited contribution in CPD activities, any skill sharing will be facilitated by 
informal interactions between buyer and supplier. 
 
As Uzzi (1997) points out that trust is associated with close, intimate relationships 
and it can build the confidence to share knowledge deeply embedded in the human 
resources of the firm. Transferring tacit knowledge across organizational 
boundaries is generally difficult because of its sticky and hard-to-codify nature. 
Close and intense interactions between exchange partners constitute an effective 
mechanism to transfer such knowledge. The socialization process greatly 
encourages the transfer of tacit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The 
willingness to spend significant time together and maintain stable relationships also 
facilitates tacit knowledge transfer (Kotabe et al. 2003, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). Therefore, relational governance will be the preferred form of mechanism 
for the supplier with support capability to engage in CPD activities. If the 
relationship is stronger, supplier can even go beyond the contractual terms and 
conditions to help out the buyer. For example, suppliers can send their test 
engineers to test the product on behalf of the buying firm in their factory. Some of 
the common examples of support services include maintenance of the product and 
giving training to the personnel at buying firm to quickly adopt the new technology 
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or system. For example, if new information system platforms such as ERP etc. are 
being introduced at buying firm site.  
 
Uncertainty surrounding the market condition results in firms overpaying for the 
assets when trying to acquire them in the open market (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
When technological uncertainty increases, unanticipated problems involving cost 
and demand also increase (Auster 1992). Suppliers with greater support capability 
will have an advantage to cope with these problems. If neither the buyer nor the 
supplier has the pertinent capability to deal with these situations, the BSC will 
likely incur greater coordination costs and development delay, which may cause 
damage to both the supplier and buyer (Oh and Rhee 2008). Trust developed with 
informal interaction can increase the confidence of both buyer and supplier to work 
for mutual benefits. As a result, it may reduce the transaction costs associated with 
the exchange process (Dyer and Singh 1998). While contracts are considered as the 
safeguards against opportunistic behaviours of partnering firms, it may hamper free 
and open discussion between firms and so reduces the chances of enhancing the 
relationship. Inclusion of greater details in a contract and strictly following the 
contractual guidelines may hold back the firms for working with each other on 
CPD.  
 
Relational governance mechanism offers advantages over contractual mechanisms 
in governing and coordinating the use of knowledge assets, therefore more use of 
relational governance mechanisms is expected when substantial knowledge assets 
are involved in an alliance (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). Although, both 
contractual and relational governance is important for effective collaborative 
arrangement (Li et al. 2010), in case of CPD, where the knowledge based resource 
exchange is more frequent, it is expected that relational governance will be more 
effective.  
Hypothesis 8a: Contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier support capability and collaborative 
product development.  
Hypothesis 8b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 




3.5.3 Support capability and Collaborative problem solving 
Problems related to cost and quality of the product/services is tough to predict 
during the product development stage (Dyer 2000, Cusumano and Takeishi 1991, 
Hartley 2000, Oh and Rhee 2008). Theses problems can include frequent change in 
the cost of the components, low quality products, and delivery failure in mass 
production stage. Suppliers with expertise in providing support services will prefer 
to engage in CPS due to the unique nature of their capability. Informal interaction 
will be certainly useful in CPS in order to understand the capability and skills of 
each other and build the confidence to work in the collaborative arrangements.  
 
In CPS activities, contracts can specify each party’s roles, performance 
expectations and dispute resolution mechanisms. By placing credibly enforceable 
limits on the actions of each party, contracts constrain the subsequent ability of one 
party to extract additional rents from the other by failing to perform as agreed 
(Williamson 1985). When little is at risk in a relationship, simple contracts will be 
sufficient to govern the exchange performance in collaboration. In contrast to 
contractual governance mechanism, the scope of relational governance mechanism 
is more open and largely based on social interaction (Martinez and Jarillo 1989, 
Dyer and Singh 1998).  These mechanisms enable the parties to resolve conflicts 
based on open communication and a preference for non-opportunistic win-win 
solutions (Kale et al. 2000). However, activities involved in relational governance 
can carry considerable cost in terms of time and resource allocation and therefore 
firms should invest in the development of relational governance only when 
significant exchange hazards are present (Larson 1992, Das and Teng 1998, Poppo 
and Zenger 2002). Although, the mix of contractual and relational governance is 
required for the effective collaboration performance, the effectiveness of one over 
another depends on the nature of the resources (Physical or knowledge) involved in 
the exchange process (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009).  
 
Understanding the product related problems needs open interaction between 
engineers of buyer and supplier to reach at an appropriate solution in shorter time 
period. The problems encountered may be occasional or short –lived and more 
generic in sense and therefore long-term relationship may not be desired in some 
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cases. In these cases, due to the shear short – term nature of business involved in 
CPS activities, supplier with the expertise in providing support services may prefer 
to sign the contractual agreement. However, frequently earning the business from 
the buyer certainly depends on the performance of supplier and working 
relationship between buyer and supplier. Contractual agreement helps to decide the 
roles and obligations of each party and provide guidelines for the complaints and 
disputes during the collaboration. This provides confidence for suppliers that their 
interests are well protected in the event of exploitation or opportunism.  
 
In the event of CPS, it may be possible that the current supplier with greater 
support capability is not involved in earlier CPD activities. Due to the expertise in 
support activities, suppliers can negotiate and renegotiate on the service cost and 
include the related provisions in the formal agreement. Competition in market 
creates the fear among the suppliers for potential replacement with new supplier 
that can provide the support services at further low cost. Signing the long-term 
contracts with the buying firm helps to minimise the uncertainty over the future 
business. On the other hand, relational governance can help to build the trust for 
long-term business and give the confidence to the buyer that this supplier will work 
for maximizing the joint payoffs and will not walk out in adverse situations. 
Uncertainty over the buyer’s behaviour in competitive environment promotes the 
negotiation and renegotiation over the terms and condition for collaborative 
working arrangements. Uncertainty creates problems related to delivery schedule 
and cost of the products and services, and therefore supplier with greater support 
capability will be more effective for collaborative problem solving activities.  
 
The repeated interaction with partners that accompanies the use of relational 
governance mechanisms helps overcome the problems through the development of 
coordinating routines (Mitchell and Singh 1996, Zollo et al. 2002), a common 
language for discussing technical issues (Arrow 1974) and a sense of social 
cohesion increases the open exchange of knowledge (Reagans and Mcevily 2003). 
Based on the above discussion, it is expected that although both forms of 
governance (contractual and relational) are needed to engaging in CPS activities for 
supplier with support capabilities, relational governance will be more effective. 
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This prediction is consistent with the studies of Das and Teng (1998), Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) and Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009).  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 9a: Contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier support capability and collaborative 
problem solving.  
Hypothesis 9b: Relational governance will be more effective in mediating 
the support capability and collaborative problem solving relationship.  
 
3.6 Summary 
The chapter has presented the theoretical framework of this research and detailed 
hypotheses based on the interaction between supplier capability, governance and 
buyer-supplier collaboration types. In this study, supplier capability is 
operationalised on the basis of the functional activities such as, R&D, production 
and support-services.  The buyer-supplier exchange governance is considered as 
contractual and relational governance. Contractual governance signifies the 
importance of formal contracts to deal with the transactions between buyer and 
supplier whereas, relational governance stresses on building buyer-supplier 
relationship. Three forms of BSC are considered for discussion here:  IS, CPD and 
CPS. It is proposed that the contractual and relational governance have multiple 
mediation effects on the relationship between supplier capabilities and BSC types. 
However, relational governance is more effective than contractual governance in 
each capability-collaboration relationship. The next chapter discusses the research 
methodology adopted for empirical investigation of the hypothetical relationships 








The chapter explains the research methodology adopted in this study and is 
organised as follows: Section 4.2 explores the different research philosophies and 
perspectives in management research; Section 4.3 outlines the research strategy 
followed by section 4.4 which presents the survey design; Section 4.5 details the 
data collection techniques used for investigating the research questions in this 
study; the constructs are operationalised in Section 4.6; Section 4.7 outlines the 
steps taken to address reliability and validity issues and  finally, section 4.8 
summarises the chapter.    
 
4.2 Research philosophy 
Meredith et al. (1989) define a research paradigm as a set of methods that exhibits 
some pattern or element in common. Research paradigms are also defined as a set 
of linked assumptions, rules, and perceptions about the world, which is shared by a 
community of scientists investigating the world (Deshpande, 1983 as cited in Healy 
and Perry 2000, Gummesson, 2000). Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) describe the 
importance of philosophical view of the research and argue that it should be 
understood properly as: (i) it can help to clarify research designs by considering 
what kind of evidence is required and how it can be gathered and analysed to 
provide answers to the questions being investigated; (ii) it can also help to 
recognize the appropriate design and its limitations; and, (iii) it can help to identify, 
adapt or develop designs that may be outside the researcher’s past experience. 
Philosophical view provides a foundation for the research and it is an important 
step in the research process (Guba and Lincoln 2005, Denzin and Lincoln 1998, 







4.2.1 Classification of different research philosophies  
Meredith et al. (1989) highlight two key dimensions that shape the philosophical 
basis for research activity as rational/existential and natural/artificial. 
Rational/existential concerns the nature of reality, and whether there is just one 
reality, which is logical and independent of the researcher, or that reality is 
subjective and socially constructed. The natural/artificial dimension is related to 
the source and kind of information used in the research. 
 
Literature in management research classifies several philosophical views and 
describes their characteristics. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) identify two contrasting 
views of management research as positivism and social constructionism. Positivism 
includes the view that social world exists externally and its properties should be 
measured through objective methods rather than being inferred subjectively. In 
contrast, social constructionism views reality as socially constructed rather than 
determined by objective measures and external factors (Watzlawick 1984, Shotter 
1993 as cited in Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). However, it is argued that it is not 
possible to identify any philosopher who subscribes to all aspects of one particular 
view. Vitale (1985) criticises the exclusive dependence on the positivist model of 
research and argues that it limits the exploration of methodological alternatives. 
Moreover, this severely restricts the ability of the researcher to understand the 
phenomenon being studied and therefore Meredith et al. 1989 argue that 
methodological pluralism is much more attractive. Some of the other philosophical 
views discussed in literature are Interpretivism (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, 
Meredith et al. 1989) and critical theory (Meredith et al. 1989, Healy and Perry 
2000).  
 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) discuss four philosophical views based on the past 
literatures (Slife and Williams 1995, Lincoln and Guba 2000, Creswell 2003, Guba 
and Lincoln 2005, Paul 2005) as: post-positivism, constructivism, advocacy and 
participatory, and pragmatism. Post positivism is the alternative research 
philosophy that moves away from the positivist view and stresses on critical 
realism. A critical realist believes that there is a reality independent of our thinking 
about it. It recognises that all observation is fallible and all theories are revisable 
(Kwan and Tsang 2001, Outhwaite 1987, Cook and Campbell 1979). This research 
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focuses on the post-positivism philosophy to understand and analyse the research 
problems discussed. The critical realism view is adapted to understand the 
relationship between supplier’s distinct capabilities and its effects on the buyer-
supplier collaboration performance. Critical realism holds the view that ‘we will 
only be able to understand and so change the social world if we identify the 
structures at work that generates those events and discourses’ (Bryman and Bell 
2007). Easton (1998) also poses arguments against the idea that reality is socially 
constructed and argues that a critical and objective investigation is required to 
uncover the reality rather than assuming that it is entirely a social construction. 
Bhaskar (1975) argues that critical realism refers to understanding the reality based 
on the pattern of activity of the real life mechanism. Theories, observations and 
methods are all fallible as reality exists independent of our minds and critical realist 
believes in accounting the possibility of understanding the true phenomena (Kwan 
and Tsang 2001). Critical realism believes that the knowledge obtained by 
observation is considered as real but it is fallible and theory laden (Guba and 
Lincoln 2005). In summary, critical realism philosophy adopted for this research 
has two key features as follows (Bryman and Bell 2007): (a) It opposes the view of 
conceptualization of reality as it directly reflects the reality and argues that it is 
simply a way of knowing that reality rather than directly reflecting it, and (b) It 
provides a scope to adopt hypothetical entities that are not directly related to 
observation but helps to understand the natural settings.  
 
The choice of the philosophical view is justified in terms of the nature of the 
problem and research methodology adapted in this research. Although, quantitative 
research methods are used in this research, limited qualitative data is also collected 
at the initial stage through multiple interviews with the managers in the industry. 
The primary aim of the interviews was to understand the practical issues and 
experiences related to suppliers’ capabilities, inter-firm governance mechanisms 
and Buyer-supplier collaboration. The triangulation of data is helpful to avoid the 
potential bias and sterility of a single method approach (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).  
 
4.2.2 Basic philosophical assumptions 
In this section, assumptions related to the research philosophies are discussed to 
understand the differences among them. The basic philosophical assumptions are 
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categorised as ontology, epistemology, axiology and methodology (Easterby-Smith 
et al. 2002, Creswell 1994, Guba and Lincoln 1988, Creswell and Plano Clark 
2007).  
 
Ontology is defined as the assumptions that we make about the nature of reality 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). The key ontological 
question is ‘what is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that 
can be known about it?’ Epistemology is the general set of assumptions about the 
best ways of enquiring into the nature of the world (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) state that it is related to ‘how we gain knowledge 
of what we know’. It involves the examination of relationship between the 
researcher and that being researched (Collis and Hussey 2003). The key 
epistemological questions are ‘What is the relationship of the researcher to that 
being researched and what can be known? Should the researcher remain 
independent of that being researched in an attempt to control for bias, or should 
the researcher interact with that being studied?’ 
 
Axiology is concerned with the assumptions related to the role of values in the 
research (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007) where values reflect the personal beliefs 
and feelings of the researcher (Bryman and Bell 2007). Axiology is related to the 
process of social enquiry and is greatly influenced by the role played by the 
researcher in all stages of research process (Collis and Hussey 2003). The key 
axiological question is ‘What is the role of values?’  
 
Methodology is related to the combination of techniques used to enquire into a 
specific situation (Lincoln and Guba 2000, Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). It focuses 
on the way knowledge is obtained or investigated. It refers to the approach adopted 
for the research. The key methodological question is ‘What is the process of 
research?’ In past literatures, two most common research methodologies to relate 
theory and reality are known as inductive and deductive approaches (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2002, Saunders et al. 2007). The inductive approach involves ‘theory 
building’ and begins with empirical observation, which leads to identification or 
development of the theoretical phenomenon (Bryman and Bell 2007). The 
deductive approach relates to ‘theory testing’ and is used to derive a set of 
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hypothesis (or relationships among dependent and independent variables) and test 
these to prove or disprove the hypothesis. Based on data collected, the theory is 
accepted, rejected or modified (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, Saunders et al. 2007, 
Bryman and Bell 2007). The inductive approach is commonly aligned to the 
research falling in constructivism/phenomenology paradigm, whereas, a deductive 
approach can be used to test the observed phenomenon under the positivism/post-
positivism paradigm (de Vaus, 2005).  This research follows the deductive research 
methodology to develop the hypotheses related to the relationship between 
capability, governance and buyer-supplier collaboration type. Table 4.1 
summarizes the philosophical assumptions related to post-positivism and 
constructivism.  
 
Table 4.1: Philosophical assumptions related to post-positivism and constructivism 




Ontology Singular reality 
(e.g., researchers reject or fail 
to reject hypotheses) 
Multiple realities 
(e.g., researchers provide quotes 
to illustrate different 
perspectives) 
Epistemology Distance and impartiality  
(e.g., researchers objectively 
collect data on instruments) 
Closeness  
(e.g., researchers visit 
participants at their sites to 
collect data) 
Axiology Unbiased  
(e.g., researchers use checks to 
eliminate bias) 
Biased 
(e.g., researchers actively talk 
about their bias and 
interpretations) 
Methodology Deductive 
(e.g., researchers test an a 
priori theory) 
Inductive  
(e.g., researchers start with 
participants’ views and build up 
to patterns, theories and 
generalisations) 
 
4.3 Research strategy 
Research strategy is defined as the systematic and orderly approach to collecting 
and analysing data, so that information can be obtained to understand the research 
problem (Jankowicz 2005). Saunders et al. (2007) propose that research strategy is 
general planning to answer the research questions. Research strategy depends on 
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the type of research questions, methodology and research objectives. Bryman and 
Bell (2007) classify the research strategy based on qualitative and quantitative 
research. In addition, Saunders et al. (2007) provide some examples of research 
strategies such as experiments, case study, survey, ethnography, action research 
and grounded theory. Moreover, Marshall and Rossman (1989) argue that research 
strategy is different from data collection techniques such as interviewing and 
participant observation.  
 
Qualitative research involves the constructivism paradigm and focuses on the 
generation of hypotheses or patterns, whereas quantitative research involves the 
positivism or post-positivism paradigm and focuses on testing of theory or 
hypothesis. In qualitative research, the intent is to learn participants’ views about a 
particular phenomenon. However, in quantitative research, the intent is to 
understand how data provided by participants fits an existing theory i.e. model, 
framework or explanation. The idea of combining the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to address the research problem has been floating in literature and it is 
argued that combining the two approaches has the potential to capture the benefits 
of qualitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques (Erickson and 
Kaplan 2000). However, the concerns over excessive resource requirement and 
time consumption is expressed as two main reasons behind the limited popularity 
of mixed methods research in management research (Buchanan 1992, Pawson and 
Tilly 1997). This research uses the survey-based study to investigate the research 
questions and examine the theoretical phenomenon.  
 
4.3.1 Survey research 
Survey research is one of the common research strategies in management with 
well-established protocols (Flynn et al. 1990). It involves the collection of data 
from a population, or some samples drawn from it, to assess the relative incidence, 
distribution and interrelationships of naturally occurring phenomena. Survey 
research entails the collection of data on a number of units and usually at a single 
point in time, with a view to systematically collecting a body of quantifiable data in 
respect of a number of variables, which are then examined to discern patterns of 
association (Bryman 1988, Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1993). 
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Past literature (Forza 2002, Malhotra and Grover 1998, Pinsonneault and Kraemer 
1993, Filippini 1997) often classifies survey research in three categories: 
exploratory, explanatory and descriptive. Exploratory survey research is involved 
at the early stages of the research when the objective is to gain preliminary insight 
on a topic; it provides the basis for a more in-depth survey (Malhotra and Grover 
1998). On the other hand, explanatory survey takes place when knowledge of a 
phenomenon is articulated in a theoretical form using well-defined concepts, 
models and propositions. It aims to find casual relationships among variables and 
test the adequacy of the concepts developed in relation to the phenomenon (Forza 
2002). Descriptive survey research is aimed at understanding the relevance of a 
certain phenomenon and describing the distribution of it in the population (Dublin 
1978, Wacker 1998). Explanatory survey research is the basis of this study to 
understand the relationship between capability, governance and collaboration. It 
relies on the structured measurement instrument to collect information. The key 
phases involved in developing the measurement instrument are identified as: (i) 
wording (the way questions are asked to collect the information), (ii) scaling 
(deciding on the scale on which the answers are placed), (iii) respondent 
identification (identifying appropriate responses for each question) and, (iv) rules 
of questionnaire design (putting together the questions that facilitate and motivate a 
response) (Forza 2002).        
 
Survey research has numerous advantages and it is appropriate for data collection 
to test the proposed hypotheses in this study. Surveys provide a low cost and less 
time consuming means for measuring different aspects of the research problem. 
Measures included in the survey can be designed to target specific factors or 
attributes which may not be directly observable (Boyer and Swink 2008). Data 
collection and analysis are simpler and easier in the survey as compared to the case 
study. Participants are not closely involved with the researchers and therefore 
researcher bias can be minimized in survey research. In most cases, it ensures 
precision, reliability, standard procedures, and testability (Meredith 1998). 
Furthermore, survey research may contribute to greater confidence in the 
generalisability of results (Jick 1979). It has been established as one of the most 
commonly used research strategies over the last three decades (Malhotra and 
 79!
Grover 1998, Flynn et al., 1990, Meredith et al., 1989, Meredith, 1998 Forza, 2002, 
Boyer and Swink, 2008).  
 
Despite having numerous advantages, survey research suffers with a few 
limitations. It is basically suitable for structured questions rather than general open 
questions, which undermines the in-depth analysis of the data. Other concerns 
related to survey research address the difficulties with respondents’ interpretations 
of measures, potential lack of knowledge and representations of the unit of analysis 
(Boyer and Swink 2008, Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Gable (1994) argues that 
often survey research provides only a ‘snapshot’ of the research issues at a certain 
point in time and as a result, provides little information on the underlying meaning 
of the data. Appropriate survey design and information gathering approaches can 
help to mitigate the risks involved in survey research (Boyer and Swink 2008, 
Gable 1994). A number of recent studies argue that survey research is the logically 
established methodology to understand the core issues and problems in the 
operations and SCM research areas, partly due to its ease of use and less expensive 
nature (Rungtusanatham et al., 2003; Giunipero et al. 2008). Survey research 
involves cross-sectional examination of numerous firms and therefore it is 
identified as the method of high external validity (Zikmund 2003).  
 
4.4 Research design  
Research design is the tool that relates the relevant conceptual problem with the 
practicable empirical research (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). It is a blue print of 
research dealing with at least four problems such as, what questions to study, what 
data are relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyse the result. Yin (2003) 
discusses that research design is a logical sequence that connects the empirical data 
to the study’s initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusion. Data 
collection techniques should support the research design to exploit the information 
required to understand the research problem. In this research, initially a preliminary 
study is conducted to explore the issues surrounding firm’s internal capability, 
governance and buyer - supplier collaboration in the supply chain. Attewell and 
Rule (1991) suggest that conducting preliminary study is helpful in getting close to 
the phenomenon, gathering insights or discoveries about causal links, motivations 
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and reasons why things happened. It can then be verified by more objective 
techniques such as the survey.  
 
Initially, qualitative data collection techniques are used to explore the information 
pertinent to the key themes of this study. The qualitative data collection technique 
typically involves the information collection through historical archive, participant 
observations, interviews or questionnaires (Eisenhardt 1989b). However, out of 
these, interview is one of the most popular data collection techniques in qualitative 
research.  
 
In the preliminary phase of this research semi-structured interview is conducted on 
one-to-one basis. Semi-structured interviews provide a middle ground between 
structured and unstructured interviews. They involve more focussed open-ended 
questions to enable the interviewees to expand on what they consider to be 
important and to frame those issues in their terms (Burgess 1982, Meredith et al. 
1989, Barnes 2001). Although semi-structured interviews provide an opportunity 
for the researcher to guide the conversation, it also provides the opportunity for the 
participant to freely express his views on the subject to be studied. Preliminary 
study involves the implementation of a number of predetermined questions asked 
in a systematic and consistent manner (Berg 2004). Further, codification of 
transcripts helps to formulate the key themes emerged. The reliability and validity 
of the qualitative data are enhanced by a well-designed research protocol (Yin 
2003). It contains the procedure and general rules that are used to indicate who and 
from where different sets of information are to be sought. The core of the protocol 
is the set of questions to be used in the interview (Voss et al. 2002). The 
preliminary study helps to understand the real-life perspective of the key 
phenomenon to be studied in this research. The questions asked during preliminary 
study to understand the buyer-supplier collaboration in aerospace sector is 
presented in appendix A.     
 
Questionnaire is one of the most commonly used techniques for data collection in 
survey research (Fowler 1993, Gable 1994). Questionnaire can be administered 
personally, by telephone, Internet /web or mailed to the respondent. Questionnaires 
distributed by mail or email is less expensive to administer than interviews or 
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telephone conversations and can provide privacy and anonymity to respondents 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, Saunders et al. 2007, Fowler 1993). It is more time 
efficient than interviewing, particularly at a distance because once properly 
designed, the survey can be sent to a large number of people with little extra effort. 
However, these surveys typically yield numerous unusable or incomplete responses 
and may require multiple mailings to obtain a high response rate to generalize the 
data gathered to the whole target population. It is generally agreed that 
questionnaires are best suited to asking specific rather than general questions, and 
for closed rather than open questions (Robson 1993, 2002). Questionnaires are 
designed to ask the questions clearly and it should be concisely presented to 
minimise the time taken to complete. Presentation and readability are the keys for 
successful data collection using the questionnaire technique. Long questionnaires 
affect the response rate and it is hard to maintain the attention till the end of the 
questionnaire (Forza 2002). Each data collection method has merits as well as 
shortcomings and the decision to choose a particular data collection technique 
depends on the need of the specific survey based on the time, cost and resource 
constraints. This study adopts the questionnaire-based technique to collect the 
relevant information pertinent to testing the hypotheses related to the relationship 
between supplier’s capability, governance and buyer-supplier collaboration type.  
 
Survey designs may be distinguished as cross-sectional or longitudinal, depending 
upon whether they exclude or include explicit attention to the time dimension. 
Cross-sectional design is most appropriate when the aim of the survey is to 
describe a population and test differences at one point of time (Pinsonnneault and 
Kraemer 1993). In contrast, longitudinal design is appropriate when the aim is to 
examine and understand the sources and consequences of a dynamic phenomenon 
that involves change over time. In this research, cross-sectional survey design is 
used to test the taxonomy or hypothesis developed to generalise the finding in the 
aerospace industry. Information is collected at one point of time from a number of 
respondents of the representative sample of the population. In this research 
perception about the buyer supplier collaboration, relationship and contractual 
agreement are important. The outcome of this research is dependent on how 
respondents perceive these behaviours. The survey developed in this research is 
explanatory in nature and cross-sectional in design. The aim of the data collection 
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in case of the explanatory survey is to test the hypothesised linkages among the 
concepts developed in relation to the phenomenon to be studied and of the validity 
boundary of the models (Forza 2002). Following sections further discuss the 
different attributes of the survey design process in context of this study.   
 
4.4.1 Unit of analysis 
“The unit of analysis refers to the level of data aggregation during subsequent 
analysis” (Flynn et al. 1990). The theoretical framework developed in chapter 3 is 
the basis of the unit of the analysis in this research. Flynn et al. (1990) argue that 
the level of analysis is important to understand the focus of the research and the 
type of data to be collected.  
 
In this research, the unit of analysis is buyer-supplier dyadic collaboration, more 
specific the collaboration between individual buyer and one of their specific 
suppliers. It is important to ensure that the level of analysis for data collection and 
interpreting the results are consistent (Dansereau and Markham 1997, Sanders and 
Premus 2005). This is critical in interpreting the analysis in the perspective of the 
theory developed and generalise the findings to the population. Literatures 
(Robinson 1950, Babbie 1990) suggest that if the unit of analysis for data collection 
and theory development in a study are different, it will cause methodological and 
ecological fallacy problems. More discussion of methodological problems 
associated with the level of analysis can be found in Boyer and Pagel (2000) and 
O’leary-kelly and Vokurka (1998).    
 
4.4.2 Sampling and Sample size 
Some of the key steps of survey research design involve population selection, 
sampling, and measurement instrument development. In survey research, 
Population refers to the entire group of people, firms, plants or things that the 
researcher wishes to investigate. A sample is the subset of the population and it 
comprises some members selected from the population.   ‘Sampling is the process 
of selecting a sufficient number of elements from the population so that by 
studying the sample, and understanding the properties or the characteristics of the 
sample objects, the researcher may be able to generalise it to the whole population’ 
(Forza 2002).. The external validity of the findings improves with more 
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representative sample. If a sample is not the true representation of the population, 
sampling errors occur, which excludes the possibility of generalising the results 
beyond the original sample (Forza 2002).  
 
Sampling techniques can be generally classified in terms of probabilistic and non-
probabilistic sampling. In probability sampling the chance of each case being 
selected from the population is known and is usually equal for all cases, whereas in 
non-probability sampling the chance of selection is unknown (Saunders et al. 
2007). In this study, probability sampling (random sampling) is used from a 
convenient sample of WEAF database. Random sampling allows control for the 
factors like firm size, sales output, which can affect the results. The sample is 
randomly selected from the member firm database of West of England Aerospace 
Forum (WEAF) operating in UK aerospace sector. It is considered as the 
systematic sampling approach and most appropriate for generalising the findings to 
the population.  
 
Deciding on the Sample size is other critical stage in the sampling process. It is 
associated to the significance level and the statistical power of the test, and further 
to the size of the relationship to be studied (Malhotra and Grover 1998). Bryman 
and Bell (2007) argue that the decision about the sample size depends on the 
compromise between the time and cost constraint and the need for precision. They 
further argue that in case of random sampling, the bigger the sample the more 
representative it is likely to be irrespective of the size of the population. Size of the 
sample is linked with the requirements of the statistical procedures used for 
measurement quality assessment and hypothesis testing (Forza 2002). As a result, it 
can affect the validity and reliability of research findings. Literatures (Malhotra and 
Grover 1998, Forza 2002) suggest that the study must be of adequate size so that 
the effect to be studied should be statistically recognisable. Some of the literatures 
argue that the decision on the appropriate sample size is quite subjective and it 
depends on the objective of the study, the nature of the resources available and the 
degree of the generalisability required.  
 
In this study the sample of firms is selected randomly from 850 SMEs in the 
aerospace sector. The sample includes the manufacturing firms, service providers 
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and firms, which involve in both manufacturing and providing related services. A 
response rate of 12-15% will be appropriate to generate adequate sample to 
perform the statistical testing. A number of pervious literatures in operations 
management has selected the sample size more than 100 firms and argues that level 
of statistical power and confidence required for such studies is acceptable. 
However, a number of techniques are used in this study to enhance the response 
rate, which is discussed later in section 4.5.  
 
4.4.3 Selection of potential respondents 
The identification of the potential respondents is important to get the answers of the 
questions being asked in the survey. A respondent should be one who understands 
the phenomena being studied and agrees to share the information. In case of 
questions related to the perception of the person, some form of triangulation such 
as the use of multiple respondents for the same question are required to reduce the 
common method/source variance i.e. potentially inflated empirical relationships 
which can occur when the data have been collected using the same method or have 
been provided by the same single source (Rungtusanatham et al. 2001). 
 
This research is based on questions pertaining to a firm’s capability and 
collaboration with the buying firms. Middle level managers/senior managers are 
identified as the key respondents in this study as they are expected to be most 
knowledgeable about the constructs of interest. The anonymity of the responses 
needs to be maintained during the research process to ensure that the responses are 
not biased towards portraying a particular image of the firm. In this study, 
respondents are informed that the responses will be treated with strictest 
confidence. This helps the respondents to freely express their views without the 
need to comply with the set of norms they may not see in the real practice. 
Moreover, multiple respondents are targeted within each firm to increase the 
validity and reliability of the information being collected (Rungtusanatham et al. 
2001). In this study the potential respondents are selected with the cooperation of 
West of England Aerospace Forum (WEAF). WEAF is a regional consortium of 
the companies operating in the aerospace sector in UK. The response to the 
questionnaire is a social exchange process and therefore collaborating with 
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companies and the governing organisations help to get the accurate and reliable 
information (Dillman 2007).  
 
4.4.4 Pilot study  
Pilot testing is considered as an integral part of questionnaire construction (Flynn et 
al.1990), necessary to maximise the reliability and validity of the survey and to 
minimise the measurement errors (De Vaus 2005). Initial semi-structured 
interviews are conducted with the senior managers of the organisations operating in 
aerospace sector to understand the real life issues surrounding capabilities, 
governance and buyer-supplier collaboration. The nature of the questions is open to 
give the executives the opportunity to speak about the key themes of the research 
based on their experience. Each interview lasted on average about an hour and half. 
The interviews helped to understand the theoretical constructs from a practical 
perspective and informed the survey instrument.  
 
The initial draft of the survey instrument is subjected to the pilot testing to 
refine/modify the questions, which are not clear to the respondents. The pilot test 
enables a ‘reality check’ of the questionnaire to ensure that questions are easily 
understood and the items measure what they are intended to measure (Malhotra and 
Grover 1998). Pre-testing included respondents from both academia and industry, 
and included questions regarding the clarity and content of the questions. The 
objective is to test whether the questionnaire accomplishes the study objectives 
(Dillman 2007). Flynn (1990) suggests that there is no need to select the 
respondents randomly for pilot testing, and a convenience sampling is acceptable. 
It is also important to determine if there is any systematic difference between the 
way researcher views specific measures and the respondents.  The questionnaires 
are looked at again after the pilot study based on the comments provided by the 
respondents to ensure the validity and reliability of the measures and make the 
questionnaire more user-friendly (Fowler 1993).  
 
In this study, a total of eleven pilot test interviews were conducted. Five interviews 
were conducted with the experts/managers from the aerospace industry and six 
interviews are conducted with the academicians who have previous experience in 
conducting empirical studies in operations management. Respondents were asked 
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to first complete the questionnaire and then answer a set of questions related to the 
structure of the questionnaire. In this study, pilot testing includes the questions 
related to design of the questionnaire, the logical sequencing of the questions, 
language, length of the questionnaire, time taken in completing the questionnaire 
and any aspect of the question that is objectionable. The questions asked during the 
pilot testing stage are included in appendix B. Participants are informed about the 
objective of the pilot testing and asked to critically review the questionnaire. They 
were asked to identify any aspects of the questionnaire that were unclear, 
confusing, ambiguous and hard to understand. Participants are asked to give the 
feedback on every aspect of the questionnaire that can negatively affect the 
responses to the questionnaire.  
 
 4.4.5 Survey layout and administration 
The survey layout and visual clarity of questions are important in improving survey 
response rates (Dillman 2007). In this study, the questionnaire is divided in 5 key 
sections followed by the cover letter. Some parts of the questions are written with 
bold font to specify the importance of the particular key words/terms. This makes it 
convenient to read and record the responses quickly. The cover letter of the 
questionnaire is included in Appendix C and the survey instrument in Appendix D. 
The measurement scale used to test the extent of agreement over the particular 
statement is consistent across the questionnaire. The questionnaire is marked with 
section headings to improve the ease of navigating and therefore hopefully ensure 
its completion. The presence of reverse scored questions also keeps the attention 
high while completing the questionnaire. The layout of the questionnaire is 
designed to make the respondent comfortable at the start by asking questions 
pertinent to the organisation background. The questionnaire is divided into 
following scetions; Section A – Background information: consists of questions 
related to the type and size of the organisation, expenditure and sales revenue, and 
the background information about the respondent like job title and working 
experience. 
Section B – Organisation’s capability: contains questions related to the core skills 
and capability of the organisation in the context of R&D capability, support 
services capability and production capability. 
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Section C – Operating environment: consists of questions related to the perception 
of the respondents about the nature of the operating environment in the industry. 
The questions are related to nature of the competition and technological uncertainty 
in the industry. 
Section D – Collaboration with strategic buyer: contains questions related to the 
collaborative arrangements with one of the major buyer of their products/services. 
Respondents are asked to focus on one of their key strategic buyers while 
answering the questions in this section. Questions related to the contractual 
agreement and the relationships with this buyer are included in this section.  
Section E – Collaboration performance: consists of questions related to the extent 
of involvement in key collaborative activities such as information sharing, 
collaborative product/service development and collaborative problem solving.  
 
Dillman (2007) suggests that for an effective survey administration researchers 
should; (a) make the questionnaire interesting to read, (b) reward the respondent 
either in terms of showing positive regard or offering tangible awards, (c) eliminate 
any direct monetary cost to respondents, (d) reduce the physical and mental efforts 
that are required in completing the questionnaire, (e) Identify the organisations that 
has legitimacy and build the exchange relationship with them. This study follows 
the guidelines provided by Dillman (2007) for questionnaire design and survey 
administration. Each questionnaire is accompanied by a cover letter (Appendix C), 
which details the aims and objectives of the study, and the potential benefits to the 
wider academic community and practice. The support of West of England 
Aerospace Forum (WEAF) was highlighted and logos from both the University of 
Bath and WEAF served to underline the authenticity of the research. Statements 
regarding confidentiality of responses were also included in the cover letter to give 
the confidence to the respondents.  
 
The cover letter clearly states that the respondents will receive a summary report of 
the findings of the study if they provide their email address at the end of the 
questionnaire. A lucky draw for the respondents are also planned to improve the 
response rate. Respondents are informed of this small incentive to show the 
gratitude towards their time for completing the survey. Apart from that, cover letter 
also include the statement that a pre-
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to ensure that there is no any direct monetary cost associated while responding to 
questionnaire. 1st class postage stamp is affixed with the reply envelop to add 
importance of quickly getting back the completed questionnaire. This also helps to 
increase the speed of responses and reduce the survey processing time. Dillman 
(2007) suggests that if the survey involves any direct cost to the respondents then 
the response rate will most likely to decline significantly. The approximate time 
required to complete the questionnaire is communicated with the respondents so 
that they are aware of the time investment needed. Each questionnaire is personally 
hand signed by the researcher to give importance to every respondent. The contact 
details of the researcher are given at the end of the cover letter so that the 
researcher is easily accessible to the respondents if they have any query or question 
related to the study.  
 
In this study, mixed mode of surveys is used. The questionnaire is designed in two 
formats: one for paper based survey and another for web-based survey. This helps 
to give an option to the respondents who wish to record their responses online. 
Mailed questionnaires have the following advantages: it can reduce the survey cost, 
respondents can complete it at their convenience, there is no time constraint, it can 
ensure anonymity, and it can reduce any potential interference by the researcher. 
The response rate could be enhanced by sending a reminder to all recipients, with 
an instruction to disregard it if they have already completed and returned the 
questionnaire (Flynn 1990). In this study, paper based questionnaire is printed on 
coloured paper in order to stand out from white paper (Dillman 2007).  
 
Dillman (2007) argues that mixed-mode surveys provide an opportunity to 
compensate for the weakness of each method such that telephone, face-to-face, web 
based and postal mode. Although mixing different modes of surveys may raise 
some difficult issues since there is a possibility that people may give different 
answers to different mode of surveys, using different mode to prompt the 
completion of the survey will improve the coverage of the survey and reduce the no 
response and any potential consequence of this are not apparent (Dillman 2007). 
The decision of combining two methods to conduct survey should consider the 
design specific aspects in the first mode that help the second mode to be successful. 
By introducing a web-based method as a second survey mode, it may be possible to 
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avoid the potential measurement differences that must be considered for the other 
mixed mode methods. Evidence exists that people prefer certain modes over 
another and it is useful to use mixed mode methods to encourage people who have 
not responded to one mode because they dislike it, may be receptive to a change in 
approach (Groves and Kahn 1979, Mooney et al. 1993 and Petrie et al. 1998). In 
this study the mixed-mode surveys are used to emphasize the importance of the 
study and increase the response rate.  
 
The West of England Aerospace Forum (WEAF) as sponsor of this research, 
helped in the distribution of questionnaires to its member companies. Previous 
studies (Forza 2002) show that prior communication about a survey to potential 
respondents is helpful in enhancing the response rate, upon distribution. 
Acknowledging this, information was sent to members of WEAF through the 
WEAF magazine ‘Air-Talk’. This medium was also used to remind respondents 
about the survey. The paper-based questionnaires along with the cover letter and 
stamped reply envelope are posted to the WEAF members in the annual special 
issue of the ‘Air-Talk’. The cover letter of the questionnaire includes the web 
address of the online questionnaire for those members who wish to complete it 
online. To enhance the response rate of the survey the web link of the survey is also 
posted at the official website of WEAF with an option to either record the 
responses online or download a ‘word’ copy. The completed ‘word’ copy of the 
questionnaire can be then sent back to the researcher through email or post.  
 
Follow-up email 
In this study, respondents who didn’t respond to the questionnaire even after 3 
weeks of first sending the questionnaires are reminded by the email. The web-link 
of the questionnaire and the ‘word’ file of the questionnaire both are sent in the 
follow up email. If requested the paper copy of the questionnaire is also sent to the 
member. Schaefer and Dillman (1998) explain that sending a follow up email to 
reinforce the reason for the survey improves the response rate. To increase the 
response rate in first follow up process, the relevance of the study and the related 
information about the survey are publicised through WEAF website and weekly 
newsletter. This reinforces the legitimacy of the survey and importance of their 
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responses in the study. The final follow-up email is sent to the WEAF members 
two weeks after sending out the first follow-up email.  
 
4.4.6 Handling response bias 
The questionnaire used in this research involved closed end questions and all 
respondents are given the same set of questions to answer. It eliminates the risk of 
response bias since each respondent gets the same standard questions based on the 
similar information. Distribution bias is minimised and the respondent has the 
freedom to complete the questionnaire at their convenience. Identifying the 
characteristics of non-respondents is impossible in cases where questionnaires are 
distributed anonymously (Flynn et al. 1990). An alternative method is to check for 
differences between the first wave of respondents and later returns (Armstrong and 
Overton 1977, Lambert and Harrington 1990). Non-respondents can limit the 
generalisability of findings by altering the sample size and therefore a number of 
techniques are used to enhance the response rate. Late responders are taken to 
represent assume the characteristics of non-responders. Comparisons of early and 
later responders are performed using t-tests. T-tests help to determine if there are 
statistically significant differences between the two groups of responses. No 
statistically significant differences among the variables were found in this study 
suggesting that non-response bias may not be a major concern (Sabherwal 1999). 
 
4.5 Response rate and respondent characteristics 
Participants’ responses in this study are collected both through paper and web 
based questionnaire. The mixed mode method of data collection helps to collect 
enough responses suitable for the statistical analysis. Questionnaires with missing 
data significantly reduce the number of usable data for the final statistical analysis 
to explore the possible relations between the different variables in the study. Flynn 
et al. (1990) reports that research published in the area of operations management 
are published with response rates as low as 10 – 20 % even with a non respondent 
bias checked. However, the issue of response rate is a bit trivial in the operations 
management area and many researchers find it hard to agree on a particular 
response rate percentage (Malhotra and Grover 1998). 
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In this study, survey is distributed to 850 member firms of WEAF that are 
operating in aerospace industry. Total 132 responses are collected and after further 
screening, out of those responses only 120 responses are finally used for the 
statistical analysis. This results in overall response rate of 14.1% for the survey in 
this study. The response rate achieved in this study is well aligned with the 
previous empirical studies in operations management (Flynn et al. 1990). The 
respondents represent a range of organisations, including manufacturers, service 
providers and firms involved in both manufacturing and service providing activities 
in the aerospace sector. The largest number of responses comes from the 
manufacturing firms (40%). Service providers represented 34.2% of all responses 
collected and 25.8% were defined as involved in both manufacturing and service 
activities. Table 4.2 presents the frequency and percentage of the type of the firms 
responded. 
 
Table 4.2: Type of firms responded 
 
The size of the firm is measured in terms of the number of employees in that firm. 
Most of firms responded have less than 50 employees. Out of 120, firms with 
employees below 50 are 59 (49.2 %). 20% of the firms responded has the size more 









Type of organisation Frequency Percentage 
1. Manufacturer 48 40.0 
2. Service provider 41 34.2 
3. Manufacturer – cum - service provider 31 25.8 
Total 120 100.0 
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Table 4.3: Size of the respondent firms 
 
The roles of respondents are important to capture the accurate information about 
the capability of the firm, governance mechanisms and collaboration with the 
buying firm. Sample of respondents include CEOs/chairmen (8.3%), General 
managers/managing directors (25%), Business development managers (15.8%), 
Senior managers (14.2%) and Managers (25%). 14 respondents (11.7%) have the 
job-titles, which don’t come under the above categories. Most of the respondents 
hold senior positions in their organisations, which is appropriate for this study. The 
frequency and percentage of respondents’ job-titles are presented in table 4.4.               
 
Table 4.4: Job-title of respondents 
 
Number of employees Frequency Percentage 
Below 50 59 49.2 
51 - 100 17 14.2 
101 - 150 6 5.0 
151 - 200 6 5.0 
201 - 250 5 4.2 
251 – 300 2 1.7 
301 – 350 1 0.8 
Over 350 24 20.0 
Total 120 100.0 
Job-title Frequency Percentage 
CEO/Chairman 10 8.3 
General manager/Managing director 30 25.0 
Business development manager 19 15.8 
Senior manager 17 14.2 
Manager 30 25.0 
Other 14 11.7 
Total 120 100.0 
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The working experience of respondents is also important to get the reliable 
information about the organisation. Respondents with long working experience can 
effectively comment on the collaborative arrangement with the buying organisation 
and buyer-supplier relationship. On average most of the respondents have working 
experience of more than 6 years in current organisation. 75 respondents (62.5%) 
have the working experience of more than 4 years. Moreover, the number of 
respondents with working experience of more than 10 years in the current 
organisation is 54, which constitutes 45 % of the sample.  
 
4.6 Operationalisation of variables 
Transforming the theoretical concepts into observable and measurable elements is 
one of the critical steps in survey research. The operationalisation process should 
include the specific observable elements of a construct and information about how 
it would be observed (Emory and Cooper 1991). Often this process involves a 
number of problems related to the alignment between theoretical concepts and the 
empirical measures, the choice between objective and perceptual questions, and the 
selection of one or more questions for the same construct. Adopting the operational 
definitions developed, used and tested in previous literatures can overcome these 
issues (Forza 2002). Literatures such that Malhotra and Grover (1998) and Hensley 
(1999) suggest that the operational definition of a construct involves people’s 
perceptions about the variables to be measured and it should include multiple 
elements to efficiently capture the people’s perception about the key themes of the 
research. However, in case of objective constructs, a single direct question would 
be appropriate. In this study, apart from using the previous literatures to develop 
the operational measures for constructs, practitioners’ perspective of the constructs 
are also sought to make the scale more robust.  
 
This section discusses the measures of variables presented in the theoretical 
framework.  It is useful to use summated scales whose reliability and validity have 
already been demonstrated in past (Flynn et al. 1990 and Forza 2002). All items 
used in the questionnaire are measured on the seven point likert scale and most of 
the questions asked are in terms of the degree of agreement or disagreement over a 
set of statements (1 represents strongly disagree and 7 represents strongly agree). 
The support for the use of likert scale in studies in the area of operations 
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management can be found in a number of literatures (Oh and Rhee 2008). Further, 
Curkovic et al. (2000) argue that seven point likert scale helps to reduce the 
attenuation problems encountered by range restriction as compared to five point 
scale. The following section discusses the measurement scales of independent, 
dependent and control variables of this study. 
 
Independent variables 
 One set of independent variable is discussed in the theoretical framework, which 
comes under the category of internal capabilities (R&D capability, production 
capability and support-services capability).  
 
R&D capability: Research and Development (R&D) capability refers to proven 
ability to involve in research and development (R&D) activities and consistently 
involve in applying this to enhance the performance of product and services. 
Measures for R&D capability are adopted from Oh and Rhee (2008) and Coombs 
and Bierly (2006), and adopted to fit the context of this research. R&D capability is 
measured on the basis of investment in R&D activities, amount of research outputs, 
ability to link research output with market requirements and ability to develop new 
components and products. Respondents are asked to show their level of agreement 
or disagreement over following six statements regarding R&D capability of the 
their organisation: (a) We consistently spend on research and development 
activities; (b) Our research outputs in terms of patents or research papers are 
consistent; (c) We have proven ability to link research and development activities 
with market requirement; (d) We have improved our market share due to our 
research output; (e) We have proven ability to apply our research to enhance the 
performance of product/services we offer; and, (f) We have proven ability to 
develop new products/services. 
 
Production capability: Production capability refers to firm’s proven ability to 
effectively provide quality product according to buyer specification at promised 
time and at low cost. Measurement items for production capability are adapted 
from Oh and Rhee (2008), White (1996) and Fawcett et al. (1997). Production 
capability is measured on the basis of supplier’s flexibility, dependability, speed 
and ability to provide quality products at low cost. Respondents are asked to record 
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the extent they agree or disagree with a range of statements regarding their ability 
to produce finished goods or components: (a) We consistently offer the products 
according to buyer’s specifications; (b) We have proven ability to reduce 
production cycle time; (c) We have proven ability to deliver products on-time; (d) 
We have proven ability to cope with uncertain demand; (e) We have low rate of 
product failure due to quality problems; and, (f) We consistently reduce production 
cost through continuous process improvement. 
 
Support-services capability: Support-services capability refers to firm’s proven 
ability to provide support services such as logistics support, IT support, technical 
support, maintenance and provide training for easy adaption of technology or 
product/services to buying organisation. It is measured on the basis of supplier 
proven ability to be flexible, dependable and quick in providing quality support 
services at promised time. Measures for support services are adapted from 
Parasuraman et al. (1994) and Lai (2004), and fine tuned in context of this study. 
Respondents are asked to show their level of agreement or disagreement over 
following six statements:  (a) We consistently provide customised support services 
according to individual buyer’s requirements; (b) We have proven ability to reduce 
waiting time for support services; (c) We have proven ability to provide support 
services at the promised time; (d) We have proven ability to provide wide ranges of 
support services such that maintenance, providing training to buyer personnel etc; 
(e) We have proven ability to deal with urgent support requests from buying firm, 
such that in-process product failure etc.; and, (f) We have proven ability to 
consistently provide quality support services.    
 
Dependent variables 
In the theoretical framework developed, two sets of dependent variables are 
presented; First, the governance mechanisms (contractual and relational) and 
second, buyer supplier collaboration (information sharing, collaborative product 
development and collaborative problem solving).  
 
Contractual governance: Contractual governance refers to the willingness to 
administer the inter-organisational exchange through written formal agreements or 
contracts. It shows the intent of the supplier to include the guidelines and possible 
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action plan of the exchange process in the form of the written agreement while 
working with the buyer. The items for contractual governance are adapted from 
Argyres and Mayer (2007), Mesquita and Brush (2008) and Lusch and Brown 
(1996). A six-item scale examines the design of contract, monitoring of contract 
and handling the unexpected events in context of buyer – supplier collaboration. 
Respondents are first asked to choose a key buyer with whom they have been 
involved in collaborative activities and then describe the level of details they 
incorporate in the written agreement while working with this key buyer. The scale 
is anchored from 1-‘not at all’ to 7-‘at a very great extent’ to measure this 
construct. Items include; (a) We outline the roles and responsibilities of each party 
in the formal written agreement; (b) We include the expected collaborative 
outcomes in the agreement while designing the contract; (c) We specify the 
procedures in the contract for monitoring the development in collaborative 
activities; (d) We outline the procedures in the contract for handling the complaints 
and disputes in collaborative activities; (e) We include the guidelines in the 
agreement regarding non-compliance and premature termination of the contract; 
and, (f) We outline the warranty policies in the contract. 
 
Relational governance: It refers to the willingness to administer the inter-
organisational exchange through trust and inter-firm relations. It shows the intent of 
the suppliers to involve in building relationship with the buying firm. Measures for 
relational governance are adapted from Mesquita and Brush (2008), Joshi and 
Campbell (2003) and Lusch and Brown (1996) and tuned in the context of this 
research. Measurement scale for relational governance build on items related to 
close interaction with buyer, informal communication and being flexible. 
Respondents again are asked to choose the same key buyer with whom they have 
been involved in collaborative activities and then describe the level of relationship 
with this buyer. The scale is anchored from 1-‘not at all’ to 7-‘at a very great 
extent’ to measure this construct. Eight items are used: (a) We actively promote 
close personal interaction at multiple levels with the buying firm; (b) We actively 
engage in informal communication with the buyer to work out the new deal; (c) We 
are willing to share important private information with the buyer if required beyond 
the formal agreement; (d) We work out the collaborative action plan based on 
buyer’s commitment; (e) We would rather make adjustments to cope with 
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unexpected circumstances than holding each other to the original agreement; (f) 
We are open to modify the agreement in transparent manner if unexpected events 
occur; (g) We make an effort to help our buyer during emergencies; and, (h) We 
are flexible in responding to buyer requests for any change in formal agreement.  
 
Buyer-supplier collaboration: The buyer-supplier collaboration is measured on the 
basis of the degree of information sharing, collaborative product/service 
development and collaborative problem solving. Measures for different types of 
collaboration are adapted from Oh and Rhee (2008), and Skjoett-Larsen et al. 
(2003).  Respondents are asked, to what extent they agree or disagree with a range 
of statement regarding the degree of information sharing, collaborative 
product/service development and collaborative problem solving, considering the 
same key buyer considered above. Measurement scale for information sharing is 
built on the following five items: (a) We regularly share product/service related 
information; (b) We regularly exchange price and market related information; (c) 
We regularly share process related information; (d) We regularly exchange 
forecasting related information; and, (e) We seldom exchange delivery scheduling 
information (reverse scored). 
 
Collaborative product/service development is measured on the basis of the five 
items scales developed in previous literatures. Respondents are asked to indicate 
their level of agreement or disagreement regarding the degree of collaborative 
product/service development with the key strategic buyer: (a) We share our skills to 
develop new products/services; (b) We work together from the early stage of 
project/concept development; (c) We share the cost of new product/service 
development; (d) We collaboratively take the risk to develop new 
products/services; and, (e) We seldom work together on new product/service 
development (reverse scored).  
 
Measurement scale for collaborative problem solving is developed on the basis of 
five items discussed in previous literatures. Respondents are asked to record their 
level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements: (a) We work 
together to solve product/service cost related problems; (b) We collaboratively 
solve quality related problems; (c) We collaboratively solve delivery schedule 
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related problems; (d) We work together on problems related to uncertain demand 




In this study, four control variables are included in the theoretical framework. 
These control variables can affect the relationship between capability, governance 
and buyer-supplier collaboration types.  
 
Size of the firm: The size of the firm can influence the economies of scale in 
manufacturing, market power and organisation access to the complementary 
resources (Venkatraman and Prescott 1990). The effect of firm size is controlled in 
this study while examining the relationship between capability, governance and 
buyer – supplier collaboration type. Nooteboom (2004) argues that while a small 
firm can protect its knowledge from spill over by keeping it more intact inside the 
boundary, a larger firm finds difficulty to do that. In this study, firm size is 
measured by the number of employees in the firm. 
 
Duration of working relationship: Relationship duration may impact the 
effectiveness of information sharing, collaborative product/service development 
and collaborative problem solving in buyer-supplier collaboration (Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993, Polonsky et al. 2008). The measurement scale of duration of 
working relationship consists only one item, which asks the respondents about the 
approximate number of years they have been engaged in the working relationship 
with the buying firm.          
 
Type of the firm: The type of the firm (manufacturer, service provider, 
manufacturer and service provider both) can influence the relationship between 
capability, governance and type of buyer-supplier collaboration. Two dummy 
control variables are used in this study to control the specific impact of the type of 





4.7 Reliability and validity 
The reliability and validity of survey instruments are critical issues of concern with 
this type of research (Meredith et al. 1989, Flynn et al. 1990). Reliability indicates 
dependability, stability, predictability, consistency and accuracy, and refers to the 
extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials 
(Kerlinger 1986, Carmines and Zeller 1979). There are a number of methods 
available to measure various aspects of reliability. One of the methods to test the 
reliability is to check whether a high degree of inter-correlation exist among the 
items that comprise the measure. The most widely accepted measure of internal 
consistency is Cronbach’s Alpha (Cronbach and Meehl 1955). Nunnally (1978) 
defines Alpha as the average of the correlation coefficient of each item with every 
other item. Alpha value of 0.70 is generally accepted in management research. 
However Nunally (1978) even suggest a somewhat lower threshold such as 0.60. In 
this study, cronbach’s alpha is used to evaluate the reliability of the constructs and 
consistency of the measurement scale. A value of more than 0.70 is acceptable in 
this study.  
 
Validity refers to the extent that the study explains the phenomenon, which it 
claims to explain (Flynn et al. 1990 and Hair et al. 2006). Three key categories of 
validity are identified as; content validity, predictive validity and construct validity.  
 
Content validity is the extent to which the scale truly measures the concept that it is 
intended to measure based on the content of items. The Delphi method is a very 
useful means for establishing the content validity of items (Pesch 1989). 
‘Evaluating the face value of the construct measures i.e. the measure ‘on its face’ 
seems like a good translation of the theoretical concept, can indirectly assess its 
content validity. It is the matter of judgement and must be assessed before data 
collection’ (Rungtusanatham 1998).  Content validity can be ensured by informed 
logical analysis, literature searches and expert opinion.    
 
Predictive (criterion-related) validity investigates the empirical relationships 
between the scores on a test instrument and an objective outcome. Two techniques 
such as simple correlation and canonical correlation are generally used to examine 
the predictive validity. The correlation coefficient between the predictor and the 
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outcome, and obtaining a high value is an indication that the measurement 
instrument has predictive (criterion related) validity (Flynn et al.1990). “When an 
instrument is intended to perform a prediction function, validity depends entirely 
on how well the instrument correlates with what it is intended to predict (a 
criterion)” (Nunnally 1978). 
 
Construct validity measures whether a scale is the appropriate operational 
definition of a construct. Factor analysis and nomological framework/network can 
be useful in establishing the construct validity of the survey research (Schwab 
1980, Flynn et al. 1990). Based on the nomological framework, the hypothesized 
linkages to other valid constructs can be empirically tested and the definition of the 
construct would be clarified. The hypotheses should be a logical outgrowth of the 
proposed linkages illustrated by the framework (Schwab 1980). Factor analysis 
helps in identifying the items of the construct, and suggests the possible deletion of 
the items and the places where items should be added. And therefore, helps in 
establishing construct validity of a previously developed summated scale (Flynn et 
al. 1990).  
 
Internal and external validity are also considered in this study. The measurement 
scales of different variables in this study are developed from previous literatures. 
This helps to improve the internal validity of the construct in this study. However, 
the external validity refers to the generalisability of the findings. Selecting the 
sample, which is true representation of the population, could ensure this. In this 
study, ensuring the validity and reliability takes place at various stages in the 
survey research including prior to data collection, within pilot testing and after data 
collection for hypothesis testing (Rungtusanatham and Choi 2000). Apart from this, 
errors in survey research are another area of concern. Forza (2002) identifies four 
types of error in survey design and suggest that these errors should be minimised. 
These errors are identified as sampling error, measurement error, statistical 
conclusion error and internal validity error. Malhotra and Grover (1998) further 
argue that failure in minimising these four errors can results in wrong conclusion 
and deviates from contribution to theory testing. A proper identification of the type 
and nature of information needed for the research can help in overcoming these 
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errors. In this study all possible measures are considered to minimise the survey 
errors and maximise the validity and reliability of survey research.   
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter discusses the research methodology adopted in this study. The 
research philosophy, research strategy and research design are discussed in context 
of the research problem addressed in this study. Buyer-supplier collaboration is the 
unit of analysis in this study. This study adopts the survey based research 
methodology to investigate the relationship between internal capability, governance 
and buyer-supplier collaboration.  Survey design procedures including sampling, 
pilot testing, questionnaire design and survey administration are discussed in this 
chapter. Respondent characteristics and response rate in context of this study are 
presented along with operationalisation of variables comprising the theoretical 
model discussed in previous chapter. Issues related to reliability and validity of the 





 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the statistical analysis of the data collected in this research. 
The statistical analysis is performed with the help of statistical software package 
‘PASW’ (formerly known as SPSS version 18). The hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 3 are tested in the perspective of the data collected from various 
participants in the aerospace industry. Prior to conducting any statistical analysis 
the data need to be tested for all the conditions (assumptions) for that analysis. 
These preliminary data preparation process is discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 
describes the exploratory factor analysis technique to decide the measurement 
scales for independent, dependent and control variables. Section 5.4 examines the 
bivariate correlations to estimate the possible relations between different variables 
in this study. The multiple mediation test (or, indirect effect) of contractual and 
relational governance on the relation between capability and buyer-supplier 
collaboration type is described in section 5.5. At the end, Section 5.6 summarises 
the chapter.             
 
5.2 Preliminary data analysis  
Some preliminary data analysis (or data preparation) is usually performed before 
conducting the tests of hypotheses to acquire knowledge of the characteristics and 
properties of the collected data (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001, Pallant 2007). This 
section discusses the preliminary data analysis for data collected in this study. 
Preliminary data analysis is important in terms of screening the data, examining the 
normality assumptions, preparing the data for statistical analysis, deciding whether 
to use parametric or non-parametric testing techniques, getting the feeling for the 
data and checking the assumptions underlying the statistical tests. Statistical 
procedures are significantly affected by violation of assumptions and examining the 
assumption prior to the test is critical in interpreting the final results. It involves 
examining the central tendencies, dispersions and frequency distributions (Emory 
and Cooper 1991).  Descriptive statistics help to understand the primary 
characteristics of the data collected.  
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Data analysis techniques for hypothesis testing can be grouped into two major 
classes: parametric and non-parametric testing (Forza 2002, Bryman and Bell 
2007). Parametric testing techniques are performed on the data derived from 
interval and ratio measurements when the distribution models are known, and as a 
result it is considered as a powerful method of analysis. Some of the assumptions 
for parametric tests are listed as follow: (i) the observations must be independent, 
that means the selection of any one case should not affect the chances for any other 
case to be selected in the sample, (ii) it should be drawn from normally distributed 
populations, (iii) these populations should have equal variance, and (iv) 
measurement scales should be at appropriate interval so that arithmetic operations 
can be used with them. Non-parametric tests are normally used with nominal and 
ordinal data (Hollander and Wolfe 1999) and have fewer and less stringent 
assumptions. It does not specify homogeneity of variance and normally distributed 
populations.  
 
Handling missing data 
Although, it is usually assumed that no sample data is missing when statistical 
models and procedures are used to analyse a random sample, it is rarely the case in 
practice (Anderson et al. 1983). Despite all efforts it is hard to guarantee any 
survey with no missing data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) stress on the importance 
of the pattern of missing data than the amount of it and suggest to test whether the 
pattern of missing data is random or not. Missing data can be described as missing 
completely at random (MCAR), Missing at random (MAR) and not missing at 
random (NMAR) (Hair et al. 2006, Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). MCAR means 
that the probability of an observation being missing is unrelated to the value of the 
observed or unobserved variables. In this type of missing data, analysis of only 
those variables with complete data gives valid and unbiased inferences. With 
MAR, the probability of an observation being missing is not related to the value of 
that variable after controlling for another variable. Whilst NMAR means that the 
probability of an observation being missing is related to the unseen observations 
themselves. In case of NMAR, the pattern of missing data is non-random, non-
ignorable and arises due to the variable in which data is missing.  
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If the data comes under NMAR category, the generalisability of findings is 
seriously compromised (Hair et al. 2006). In this case the only way to obtain an 
unbiased estimate of parameters is to model missingness in the model (Dunning 
and Freedman 2008). Some literatures (Forza 2002) suggest that if the number of 
cases of missing values is less than 5% of the sample then the observations with 
missing values could be dropped. 
 
To examine missing data, this study conducted listwise and pairwise deletion of 
cases or observations from the data set. It is suggested that if there are only a few 
missing observations, then pairwise deletion would be appropriate. However, in 
case of many missing observations, listwise deletion would be appropriate (Hair et 
al. 2006 and Howell 2010). Further, Anderson et al. (1983) suggest two broad 
strategies to handle missing data in the survey research: Deletion and estimation - 
“When data is missed randomly the estimates resulting from deletion strategy are 
generally unbiased but less efficient than when no data is missed. The other way is 
to estimates the missing observation and then proceeds with a statistical analysis of 
the data set as if it had been completed. The most common procedure for 
estimating randomly missing values is by expectation maximization (EM), 
regression or factor analysis performed on the variables”. 
 
A number of techniques are available to estimate missing data such as Maximum 
Likelihood (ML), Expectation – Maximization (EM), mean value replacement, 
regression and multiple data imputation (Forza 2002). For the purpose of this study 
the maximum likelihood technique is discussed, which is also the most commonly 
used techniques in management research. An Expectation Maximization (EM) 
analysis is used to estimate the means, correlations and covariance of the missing 
value. Listwise, pairwise and regression estimation depend on the assumption that 
the pattern of missing values does not depend on the data values. EM method 
assumes a distribution for the partially missing data and bases inferences on the 
maximum likelihood under that distribution. The purpose of multiple imputations is 
to generate possible values for missing values, thus creating several complete sets 
of data. Analytic procedures that work with multiple imputation datasets produce 
output for each complete datasets, plus pooled output that estimates what the 
results would have been if the original dataset had no missing values.   
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In this study the data is tested to examine the nature of the missing values. 
According to Hair et al. (2006), a dichotomised correlation technique is useful in 
checking whether the values are missing completely randomly. Building on this, 
the observed values in the data are replaced by 1 and the missing value by 0. The 
correlation technique is applied to each pair of variables in the framework and no 
significant correlation is found. This suggests that values are missing completely at 
random (MCAR). Little’s chi-sqaure statistic (Little and Rubin 1987) for testing 
whether values are missing completely at random (MCAR) is suggested by a 
number of literatures (Howell 2010). In this research, further to verify this results, 
the data is also subjected to Little’s chi square test and the significance level is 
found as 0.423 (p = 0.423) which is greater than 0.05. Therefore the null hypothesis 
is rejected and it is concluded that the values are missing completely at random.  
 
In this study the item deletion strategy in case of missing values is adopted from 
Hair et al. (2006). For independent variables, if in a particular case no values are 
observed for 2 or more items on the measurement scale, that case (observation) is 
deleted and dropped from further statistical analysis. However, in case of 
dependent variables, any missing items on the measurement scale are resulted in 
deletion of that observation from further analysis. After following this process, the 
sample size further reduced from 132 to 124.  Missing values in the data are further 
estimated by the most popular Expectation – Maximization (EM) method. This 
method is described as the simplest and appropriate for handling missing data 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). The detailed discussion of EM method and its 
solutions are provided by Schafer (1999) and Schafer and Olsen (1998). 
 
Treating Outliers 
After testing for missing values in the dataset and further estimating the missing 
values, the dataset is examined for outliers. Outliers are data that do not fit with the 
rest of sample data and appear to deviate from other members of the sample. The 
presence of outliers in the dataset is possible due to any error in data entry, non – 
treatment of missing values, misrepresentation of the population and presence of 
any exceptional or abnormal observations in the sample (Tabachnick and Fidell 
2001). Outliers can radically alter the outcome of analysis and can also affect the 
normality assumptions if parametric testing is intended.  
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Outliers are categorized as: univariate and multivariate. Univariate outliers are the 
observations, which are very far from the mean in the data. Normally, it is the case 
that has an unusual value for a single variable. The Box plot technique is one of the 
popular techniques to detect outliers. It uses the median and the lower and upper 
quartiles, normally defined as 25th and 75th percentiles. A box plot is constructed 
between the upper and lower quartiles with a solid line drawn across the box to 
locate the median. One way to identify univariate outliers is to convert all of the 
scores for a variable to standard scores with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 
1. Outliers are shown as the numbered cases beyond the rectangle or whiskers, 
which mark the smallest and largest observations that are not outliers. Normally 
values above the four standard deviations away from the mean are expected to be 
outliers and examined in this study (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Whether we 
include or exclude outliers from the data analysis depend on the reason why the 
case is an outlier and the purpose of the analysis. 
 
Multivariate outliers are different from univariate. It could be present in the dataset 
when several things for each participant are measured. Univariate outliers are 
values too far away from the mean whereas multivariate outliers represent a strange 
pattern of values in the sample data. Multivariate outliers are cases that have an 
unusual combination of values for a number of variables. The value for any of the 
individual variable may not be a univariate outlier, but may become outlier in 
combination with other variables. This is a case, which is not very common and 
occurs rarely. Detecting multivariate outliers is complex and measurement of 
Cook’s distance and Mahalanobis’ distance techniques are recognised as the 
effective techniques to identify the multivariate outliers. In this study the 
observations are also examined with the cook’s and Mahalanobis’ distance method 
for detecting multivariate outliers, and it is found that the distance was under the 
limit.  
 
After conducting the analysis for outliers, 4 outliers are identified and they are 
removed from the sample for any further statistical analysis. The sample size is 
further reduced to 120 after removing the outliers from the sample.   
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Test for normality assumptions 
The test for whether the pattern of data is normally distributed, is important for 
deciding between parametric and non-parametric statistical testing for further 
analysis. In this study, univariate analysis of all the dependent and independent 
variable are performed to check the normality of the data. The simplest way to test 
the normality is by visualizing the histogram of frequencies or by looking at the 
normal probability plot (normal Q – Q plot). In this study, the distribution of raw 
data for the independent and dependent variables are visualised by plotting the 
histogram of frequencies and normal probability plots. If the histogram plot 
matches the bell shaped curve of the normal distribution then it could be reasonably 
said that the dataset is normally distributed. In this study the histogram plots are not 
perfectly bell shaped and it seems to be skewed. This inference is also supported by 
the inspection of the normal probability plots. In these plots, the observed value for 
each score is plotted against the expected value from the normal distribution. A 
reasonably straight line could suggest a normal distribution, but in this case, the 
plots do not have a straight line, which is expected if the data is not normally 
distributed. The dataset in this study is found to be negatively skewed, where most 
of the scores are at the high end for the independent and dependent variables.   
 
To address the skewness, based on the transformation recommendation provided by 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2001) the raw scores for variables are transformed into the 
logarithmic scale. Visual inspection of the transformed data confirms a reasonably 
matching with the bell shaped curve of normal distribution. The normal probability 
plot further supports this inference. Reasonable straight-line plot for the 
transformed variables suggest that the transformed score is normally distributed. 
The box plot test for normality assumption is also conducted to confirm the normal 
distribution of the data. If most of the rectangle is on one side or the other of the 
mean line, this indicates the distribution is not normal. No any significant findings 
are reported which indicate that the distribution is significantly skewed.          
   
The skewness and kurtosis index are other measures for testing the normality 
distribution of the score. In this study, the skewness and kurtosis index of the 
transformed score for variables are also examined to test any significant deviations 
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from the normality. Skewness value provides an indication of the symmetry of 
distribution. On the other hand, Kurtosis index is the indicator of the peakedness 
/flatness of a distribution. A value between -1 and +1 is accepted for examining the 
normal distribution of the score (Hair et al. 2006). Table 5.1 shows the skewness 
and kurtosis index of each variable discussed in this study. It is evident from Table 
5.1 that all variables are in the range of -1 to +1 and therefore, the transformed 
score for variables are not significantly different from normal distribution.  
  
Table 5.1:Skewness and Kurtosis index of the variables 
Variables Skewness index Kurtosis index 
R&D capability -.594 -.758 
Production capability -.087 -.005 
Support capability -.084 -.512 
Contractual -.473 -.417 
Relational -.175 .202 
Information sharing -.476 -.307 
Collaboration product/service development -.696 .264 
Collaborative problem solving -.326 -.746 
   
 
5.3 Exploratory factor analysis 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique designed to reduce a large number of inter-
correlations among measures to a small number of interpretable dimensions. 
Conducting a factor analysis on a single summated scale ensures whether all items 
within the summated scale load on the same construct or whether the summated 
scale actually measures more than one construct (Flynn et al. 1990).  There are two 
main approaches to factor analysis – Exploratory and Confirmatory factor analysis. 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is often used at the early stage of the research to 
collect information about the inter-relationships among a set of variables. On the 
other hand, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is often used later in the research 
process to test or confirm specific theories related to the structure of the set of 
variables (Pallant 2007). A number of previous literatures have used both types of 
factor analyses in their research. For example, researchers such that Saraph et al. 
(1989) and Flynn et al. (1994) have used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to 
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check unidimensionality, while Ahire et al. (1996) use confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). However, literatures (Koufteros 1999, Forza 2002) argue that CFA is not a 
common practice in operations management and it is normally used in testing the 
separation across measures of different constructs. There is a substantial scepticism 
about the credibility of using a confirmatory factor analysis (Alwin 2000). It is 
often argued that if the researcher had the level of confidence necessary to conduct 
a confirmatory factor analysis, there would have been little need for the research in 
the first place. When the researcher is less than highly confident about how many 
factors are necessary and sufficient to describe the data, about which items define 
which factors, and about the pattern of association among the factors, exploratory 
factor analysis becomes the technique of preference (Alwin 2000). In this study, 
EFA is considered as the appropriate technique to explore the nature of 
measurement items in relation to the set of variables.  
 
There are conflicting views in management research regarding the appropriate level 
of sample size that is suitable for conducting factor analysis. Some authors suggest 
that it is not the overall sample size which is of concern. Stevens (1996) suggests 
that the sample size requirement for factor analysis has been reducing over the 
years and alternatively, KMO test (Kaiser 1974) of sample adequacy is being 
conducted more often. In this study the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Bartlett 1954) are used to 
indicate that the factor analysis is appropriate for the variables (Comrey and Lee 
1992, Pallant 2007). The KMO measure of sampling adequacy is an index for 
comparing the magnitude of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes 
of the partial correlation coefficients. In this study, the KMO index is 0.760 
(greater than 0.6) which indicates that the factor analysis is appropriate for the 
sample in this study (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).  Bartlett’s test of sphericity is 
used to test the null hypothesis that the variables in the population correlation 
matrix are not correlated. In this study the observed significance level for Bartlett’s 
test is 0.000 (p < 0.00), which is small enough to reject the null hypothesis and 
therefore the factor analysis for the data in this study could satisfactorily proceed. 
 
Factor extraction process involves determining the smallest number of factors that 
can be used to best represent the inter-relations among the set of variables (Pallant 
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2007). A number of factor extraction techniques such as Principal component 
analysis (PCA), unweighted least squares, generalised least squares, maximum 
likelihood (ML), principal axis factoring, alpha factoring, and image factoring  are 
discussed in the literatures. However, out of these,  the principal component and 
maximum likelihood extraction are the two most popular ones. Costello and 
Osborne (2005) argue that PCA is not a true method of factor analysis and there is 
disagreement among statistical theorists about when it should be used, even some 
argue for severely restricted use of it. A number of researchers such that Floyd and 
Widaman (1995), Bentler and Kano (1990), and Loehlin (1990) suggest that 
maximum likelihood is the best choice if data are relatively normally distributed. 
They have presented the argument that ‘ML allows for the computation of a wide 
range of indexes of the goodness of fit of the model, and permits statistical 
significance testing of factor loadings and correlations among factors, and the 
computation of confidence intervals’. However, if the condition of normality is 
severely violated, the ‘principal component analysis’ is recommended (Fabrigar et 
al. 1999). In this study as the data set satisfies the normally distributed assumption, 
the ML extraction technique is adopted for the factor analysis.  
 
Decision on how many factors to retain in factor analysis is critical for further 
analysis. One of the most commonly used techniques for retaining the factors is the 
eigen value rule, which states that the eigen value of factors greater than 1.0 should 
be retained (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Other alternative methods for factor 
retention are scree plot, Velicer’s MAP criteria and parallel analysis (Velicer and 
Jackson 1990). Costello and Osborne (2005) suggest that scree test is the best 
choice keeping in mind the simplicity and ease to use. The scree test involves 
examining the graph of the eigen values and looking for the natural bend or break 
point in the data where the curve flattens out. The number of data points above the 
break is usually the number of factors to retain (Costello and Osborne 2005). 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend that an exploratory approach with 
different numbers of factors should be adopted until a satisfactory solution 
conforming the theoretical understanding is found. In this study, factors having 
eigen values greater than one are retained. Scree plot is used to confirm the 
decision on the number of factors retained.   
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After the decision over how many factors to retain, the factor rotation technique is 
used to further simplify and clarify the data structure for interpretation. The 
rotation methods are grouped under two categories: Orthogonal and Oblique. 
Varimax, quartimax and equamax are commonly available orthogonal methods of 
rotation, whereas, direct oblimin, quartimin and promax are oblique rotation 
methods. Orthogonal rotations produce factors that are uncorrelated, however 
oblique rotation methods allow the factors to correlate (Tabachnick and Fidell 
2001, Hair et al. 2006).  Costello and Osborne (2005) further argue that using the 
orthogonal rotation results in a loss of valuable information if the factors are 
correlated and therefore oblique rotation should be used if factors are not 
independent of each other. This will theoretically produce a more accurate and 
perhaps more reproducible solution. In this study the variables in the conceptual 
framework are not likely to be completely independent with each other and 
therefore direct oblimin oblique rotation technique (Fabrigar et al. 1999) is used.  
 
The magnitudes of the factor loadings are checked to ensure their practical and 
statistical significance. All the items with loading scores more than 0.4 are 
extracted and retained for further analysis. Factors are also examined for the 
‘crossloading’ items (items that load at 0.32 or higher on two or more factors) 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Any item, which is cross-loaded on more than two 
factors with the loading higher than 0.32 are removed from the further analysis. In 
the cases where the items are weakly loaded (< 0.32) on one factor and highly 
loaded (> 0.50) on other factor, the items are dropped from the factors on which it 
is weakly loaded (Costello and Osborne 2005). Whenever an item is dropped, the 
factor analysis process is repeated to investigate that all the retained items are 
loading on only one factor and there is no any further issue of cross loading.  
 
The results of the factor analysis are presented in Table 5.2. After conducting the 
maximum likelihood extraction method and the oblique rotation, ten factors are 
finally extracted. The scree plot confirms the decision to retain 10 factors for the 
analysis and all of the 10 factors explained a total of 72.07 % of the variance. Eigen 
values of all the factors extracted are greater than 1. The factor loadings for each 
item are shown in Table 5.2. Factor loading scores of more than 0.4 are considered 
as the minimally acceptable score for practical significance (Carmines and Zeller 
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1990, Costello and Osborne 2005, Hair et al. 2006). In this study, all the items 
retained have the loading score more than 0.4.  
 
Validity and reliability 
All the constructs in the framework are subjected to a systemic assessment to test 
the validity and reliability. Items of each factor are examined in context of the 
conceptual framework to determine that the items loaded on the factor are 
theoretically consistent. No any case of conceptual inconsistency is found. The 
content validity of each scale was already examined during the pilot study stage. 
 
The internal consistency of the scale is important to ensure that the items that make 
up the scale ‘hang together’ (Pallant 2007). The internal consistency of variables is 
examined using reliability analysis of the scale through Cronbach alpha coefficients 
ranging between 0 and 1. As closer the coefficient is to 1.0 the greater the internal 
consistency of the items in the scale (Hair et al. 2006). George and Mallery (2003) 
provide the following rules of thumb for the value of Cronbach  alpha and strength 
of reliability:“ >0 .9 ( Excellent),  >0 .8(Good), > 0.7 (Acceptable), > 0.6 
(Questionable), > 0.5 (Poor) and < 0 .5 (Unacceptable)”.  Nunnally (1978) also 
suggests that the alpha value greater than 0.8 is the indicator that the construct 
reliability is stronger whereas a value of 0.7 is acceptable. The cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of each variable is shown in Table 5.3 - All the variables exceed the 0.7 
level. 
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Table 5.2: Factor Analysis 
 







Consistent spending on R&D .760    
Consistent research output .647    
Ability to link R&D with market .886    
Improvement in market share due to research output .855    
Ability to apply research to enhance product/service performance .733    
Ability to reduce production cycle time  .647   
Ability to deliver products on time  .588   
Ability to cope with uncertain demand  .594   
Low rate of product failure due to quality  .637   
Ability to reduce production cost through continuous improvement  .733   
Consistently provide customised support services   .794  
Ability to reduce waiting time for support services   .801  
Ability to provide support services at the promised time   .778  
Ability to provide wide range of support services   .641  
Ability to deal with urgent support requests   .745  
Ability to provide quality support services   .854  
Outline roles and responsibilities of each party in written agreement    .791 
Include expected collaborative outcomes in the written agreement    .753 
Specify the procedures for monitoring the development     .810 
Outline the procedures for handling the complaints and disputes    .919 















Actively involved in close personal interaction at multiple levels .598    
Actively engage in informal communication to work out the new deal .630    
Work out the collaborative action plan .493    
Make adjustments to cope with unexpected circumstances .834    
Open to modify the agreement in transparent manner .750    
Make an effort to help during emergencies .677    
Flexible in responding to requests for any change in the contract .604    
Regularly share product/service related information  .602   
Regularly exchange price and market related information  .606   
Regularly share process related information  .620   
Share our skills to develop new products/services   .603  
Work together from the early stage of project/concept development   .644  
Share the cost of new product/service development   .433  
Work together to solve product/service cost related problems    .793 
Collaboratively solve quality related problems    .845 
Collaboratively solve delivery schedule related problems    .704 
Work together on problems related to uncertain demand pattern    .634 
Seldom work together on product/service design problems (reversed score)    .447 
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Table 5.3: Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of variables 
Variables Number of items Cronbach’s alpha 
R&D capability 5 .925 
Production capability 5 .876 
Support capability 6 .920 
Contractual 5 .925 
Relational 7 .861 
Information sharing 3 .807 
Collaboration product/service development 3 .817 
Collaborative problem solving 5 .833 
 
5.4 Bivariate correlation 
Bivariate correlations are used to examine the nature of the relationship between 
variables in the theoretical framework. Pearson correlation (r) is the most 
commonly used bivariate correlation technique and it measures the association 
between two quantitative variables without distinction between the independent 
and dependent variables. The value of pearson correlation coefficients (r) exhibits 
between -1 and +1. Mertler and Vannatta (2005) provide a rule of thumb for 
interpreting the Pearson correlation value in terms of strength of relationship as: 
Weak relationship ( - 0.30 < r < + 0.30) , Moderate relationship (  - 0.70 < r < - 
0.30 or  + 0.30 < r < + 0.70) and strong relationship ( - 1.0 < r < - 0.70 or  + 0.70 < 
r < + 1.0) . Malhotra and Grover (1998) suggest that ‘r’ greater than 0.8 indicates 
that the variables are highly correlated and it suffers with multicollinearity issues.  
Table 5.4 shows the pearson correlation values of the bivariate correlation between 
variables in this study. The entire correlation index is below 0.69, which is under 
the limit of 0.8 for potential multicollinearity problem.     
 
From table 5.4, it is evident that the R&D capability has a significant moderate 
relationship (r = .49) with the collaborative product/service development, which is 
expected in the sense that suppliers with greater expertise in R&D tend to engage 
more in collaborative product/service development with the buying firm. As 
expected, significant relation is also found between R&D capability and 
information sharing. R&D capability is negatively correlated (r = -.37) with 
contractual governance and positively related to relational governance (r = .17). 
Support capability is weakly but positively related to the information sharing (r = 
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.23) and collaborative problem solving (r = .22). Moreover, support capability is 
negatively correlated to the R&D capability(r = -.25), but a weak positive 
correlation is found between support capability and contractual governance (r = 
.22). A weak relationship is evident between production capability and information 
sharing (r = .20). Further, relational governance and support capability are 
positively related to the production capability with the coefficient index .20 and .49 
respectively.  
 
No any significant correlation is found between contractual and relational 
governance. Different types of collaboration such as information sharing, 
collaborative product/service development and collaborative problem solving are 
moderately related to each other. This is expected because all different activities 
involved in different types of collaboration are not mutually exclusive. This 
argument is supported by the study conducted by Oh and Rhee (2008). 
Collaborative product development is moderate to strongly correlated with 
information sharing (r = .69). Similarly, collaborative problem solving has a 
moderate relationship with information sharing (r = .58) and collaborative product 
development (r = .44). All forms of buyer – supplier collaboration are weak to 
moderately related to both forms of governance i.e. contractual and relational 
governance. Information sharing has a weak to moderate correlation with 
contractual (r = .25) and relational (r = .43) governance respectively. Similarly, 
collaborative product development is positively related to contractual (r = .25) and 
relational (r = .37) governance. In addition, collaborative problem solving is found 
to be moderately correlated to the contractual (r = .32) and relational governance (r 
= .35).  Table 5.4 represents the Pearson index of different bivariate correlation             
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Table 5.4: Correlation matrix (Pearson Correlation index)  
Variables Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1  Contractual 4.53 1.00            
2  Relational 5.80 .09 1.00           
3  Information sharing 5.02 .25** .43** 1.00          
4  Collaborative product develop 4.90 .25** .37** .69** 1.00         
5  Collaborative problem solving 5.48 .32** .35** .58** .44** 1.00        
6  R&D capability 4.62 -.37** .17* .14* .49** .13* 1.00       
7  Support Capability 5.24 .22* .09 .23* .14* .22* -.25** 1.00      
8  Production capability 5.45 .06 .20* .20* .13* .19* -.04 .49** 1.00     
9 Firm size 3.09 -.46** -.01 -.06 -.10 -.04 .37** -.10 .11 1.00    
10 Relationship duration 3.85 -.11 .12 .10 .10 .12 .00 -.01 -.12 .09 1.00   
11 Firm – manufacturer .40 .20* .13 .10 .07 .02 -.17 .01 -.11 -.02 .12 1.00  
12 Firm – Service provider .34 -.19* -.13 -.09 -.10 .08 -.06 .04 .15 -.10 -.28** -.59** 1.00 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) (p < 0.01). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) (p < 0.05). 
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5.5 Multiple mediation effect 
This section discusses the statistical testing procedure for the multiple mediation 
effect of contractual and relational governance on the relation between supplier 
capability and type of the buyer-supplier collaboration. The hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter 3 are also investigated in this section.   
‘Mediation or an indirect effect is said to occur when the causal effect of an 
independent variable (X) on a dependent variable (Y) is transmitted by a mediator 
(M). In other words, X affects Y because X affects M, and M, in turn, affects Y’ 
(Preacher et al. 2007). Baron and Kenny (1986) explain that a variable may be 
called a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor 
and the criterion. Mediation effect and indirect effect are often used 
interchangeably. However, Holmbeck (1997) argues that the mediation effect is 
usually thought as the special case of indirect effects when there is only one 
intervening variable. The mediation effect suffers with the assumption that the 
‘total effect’ from X to Y needs to be present. However, in the assessment of 
indirect effects, it is quite possible to find that an indirect effect is significant even 
when there is no evidence for a significant total effect (Preacher and Hayes 2004). 
In this study, contractual and relational governance are hypothesised as mediating 
variables. It is expected that the effect of supplier capability on type of buyer–
supplier collaboration be transmitted via (mediated by) contractual and relational 
governance.   
Figure 5.1 explains the total effect, direct effect and indirect effects in the case of 
an independent variable X, dependent variable Y and two mediating variables M1 
and M2. X’s total effect on Y is denoted as ‘c’. This total effect interpreted as the 
expected amount by which two cases that differ by one unit on X are expected to 
differ on Y. This direct effect can be the combination of the other indirect effects 
(Hayes 2009).  In figure 5.1 (b) a1 is the coefficient for X in the model predicting 
M1 from X, and b1 is the coefficient in the model predicting Y from M1. Similarly, 
a2 is the coefficient for X in the model predicting M2 from X, and b2 is the 
coefficient in the model predicting Y from M2. c! is the coefficient in the model 
predicting Y from X. In the language of path analysis, c! quantifies the direct effect 
of X whereas the product of a1 and b1 quantifies the specific indirect effect of X on 
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Y through M1 and the product of a2 and b2 quantifies the specific indirect effect of 
X on Y through M2. The indirect effect is interpreted as the amount by which two 
cases who differ by one unit on X are expected to differ on Y through X’s effect on 
the mediator variables, which in turn affects Y. The direct effect is interpreted as 
the part of the total effect of X on Y that is independent of the pathway through M1 
and M2. In the multiple mediation model in figure 5.1 (b), the total effect is equal to 
the direct effect of X on Y plus the sum of the indirect effect through M1 and M2 
and it could be represented as, c = c! + a1b1 + a2b2. the total indirect effect is the 












(b) Multiple Mediation effect 
Figure 5.1: A multiple mediation model (a) Illustration of a direct effect (b) 
Illustration of a multiple mediation effect (adopted from Preacher and Hayes 
2008a). 
Although, causal steps approach, proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) is one of 
the most widely used method for testing hypotheses about intervening variables 












Previous simulation studies (Fritz and MacKinnon 2007, MacKinnon et al. 2002) 
conclude that the causal steps approach is weakest among the methods for testing 
intervening variable effects and it is not favourable to use for detecting the 
intervening effects. Another criticism of the causal approach is that it is not based 
on the quantification of the very thing it is attempting to test i.e. the intervening 
effect. The existence of an indirect effect is tested logically by the outcome of a set 
of hypothesis tests. Hayes (2009) argues that the inferences about the indirect 
effects should be based on the product of its quantified constituents parts (i.e. based 
on the values of a’s and b’s of the mediation model). He further argues that it 
makes more sense to minimize the number of tests one must conduct to support a 
claim and therefore, the causal steps approach is not the most appropriate approach 
for the intervening variables tests. 
 
5.5.1 Bootstrapping 
Modern approaches to test intervening variable effects that are based on the product 
of the coefficients are Sobel test (Sobel 1982, 1986) and bootstrapping (Lockwood 
and MacKinnon 1998). It is suggested that the sobel test also has its flaws. First, it 
is based on the assumption that the sampling distribution of the indirect effects 
should be normal, but in practice, the sampling distribution of products of the 
coefficients (i.e. a1b1 or a2b2) tends to be asymmetric with non zero values for 
skewness and kurtosis index (Bollen and Stine 1990, Stone and Sobel 1990). 
Second, Sobel test assumptions are less likely to be satisfied for small to moderated 
sized samples (Preacher and Hayes 2008b). Third, in contrast to the Sobel test, 
bootstrapping doesn’t use the standard error to interpret the results and avoids the 
controversy behind estimating the standard errors of the indirect effect.  
It is acknowledged that the bootstrapping doesn’t assume normality for the 
sampling distribution and are known to be more powerful than the sobel test 
(Hayes 2009). Previous empirical research (Fritz and MacKinnon 2007, 
MacKinnon et al. 2002, "#$%&''('!!"#$%&#)**+) shows that bootstrapping tends to 
have greater power and is more appropriate for controlling statistical errors. It is 
also argued that bootstrapping can produce more accurate results in case of 
mediation analysis and should be used for estimating and testing hypotheses related 
to mediation effect (Efron Tibshirani 1998, Good 2001, Lunneborg 2000, Mooney 
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and Duval 1993, Rodgers 1999, Bollen and Stine 1990, Lockwood and MacKinnon 
1998). In this study bootstrapping technique is used to test the hypothesised 
multiple mediation / indirect effects of contractual and relational governance on the 
relationship between capability and collaboration. 
The bootstrapping process involves an empirical representation of the sampling 
distribution of the indirect effects (i.e. product of the a and b paths) by taking a new 
sample from the available sample and estimating the indirect effects (Preacher and 
Hayes 2008b). The bootstrapping process yields a percentile-based bootstrap 
confidence interval. However, more accurate confidence intervals can be derived 
through the process of bias correction or bias correction and acceleration (Stine 
1989, Lunneborg 2000, Preacher and Hayes 2008a, MacKinnon et al. 2004). In this 
study the bias correction confidence interval is used. The null hypothesis of no 
indirect effects is examined by determining whether zero is between the lower and 
upper bound of the confidence interval. The indirect effect exists if zero is not 
inside the confidence interval. Literatures such as MacKinnon et al. (2004), Hayes 
(2009), and Williams and MacKinnon (2008) conclude that the bootstrapping is 
more robust than the Sobel test and the causal steps method to test intervening 
variable effects. In this research, the multiple mediation macros created and 
validated by Preacher and Hayes (2008a) for SPSS/PASW are used to test the 
indirect effects of governance on the relationship between capability and 
collaboration. These macros have been effectively used in a number of previous 
studies (Roelofs et al. 2008, Danaher et al. 2008, Buffardi and Campbell 2008, 
Ruva and McEvoy 2008).  
The guidelines provided by Hayes (2009) regarding bootstrapping are adopted in 
this study. The analysis is conducted with 5000 bootstrap samples to assess the 
indirect effects. The control variables considered for bootstrapping are firm size, 
relationship duration, type of the firm and the remaining independent variables. 
The bias corrected 95% confidence intervals are estimated for the significant 
statistical indirect effects. To test hypotheses, the point estimates of the indirect 
effects are only significant in the case where zero is not contained in the confidence 
intervals. Following sections discuss the testing of the multiple mediation 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3.  
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5.5.2 Supplier capability and information sharing  
Hypotheses 1a, 4a and 7a state that the contractual and relational governance 
mediate the relationship between supplier capability (R&D: Hypothesis 1a, 
production: Hypothesis 4a, and support: Hypothesis 7a), and information sharing in 
buyer-supplier collaboration. This asserts that supplier capabilities are related to  
information sharing through the intervening variables: contractual and relational 
governance. However, hypotheses 1b, 4b and 7b state that the relational 
governance will be more effective in mediating the capability and information 
sharing relationship. The regression results for the hypotheses 1, 4 and 7 are 
presented in table 5.5 and 5.6. In model 1 in table 5.5, Contractual governance is 
regressed on R&D, production and support capability, whereas in model 2, 
Information sharing is regressed on R&D, production, support and contractual 
governance in step 2 and 3. Similarly, Table 5.6 presents two regression models for 
relational governance and information sharing. In this section, the indirect effects 
of supplier capabilities on information sharing are also bootstrapped using the 
multiple mediation macro described in Preacher and Hayes (2008a). In case of 
causal steps method, the interpretation of the output is based on the significance of 
‘a’ and ‘b’ paths. However, in bootstrapping analysis the emphasis is on the 
direction and size of the indirect effects. The detailed output of the ‘indirect’ macro 
for the dependent variable ‘information sharing’ and independent variables R&D, 
production, and support services capabilities are presented in table 5.7. The 
bootstrap analysis is superior than the causal steps method (Preacher and Hayes 
2008a) and therefore, the results of bootstrap analysis is considered in this research 
to test the multiple mediation effect of contractual and relational governance on the 
relationship between supplier capability and Buyer-supplier collaboration.   
 
R&D capability and Information sharing 
In bootstrap analysis for the independent variable - R&D capability, the effects of 
production and support capabilities are controlled. Table 5.7 shows that in case of 
R&D capability, the specific indirect effects through contractual and relational 
governance on information sharing are significant with the point estimate (a*b) of -
0.0310 and 0.0592 respectively. The total indirect effect through contractual and 
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relational governance is significant with the point estimate of 0.0282 and the 95% 
CI of 0.0404 to 0.1227. As a result, based on the principles of product-of-
coefficient strategy, R&D capability has significant indirect effect on information 
sharing through contractual and relational governance. In relation to the link 
between R&D capability and information sharing, contractual and relational 
governance both have a mediating effect indicating support for Hypothesis 1a. 
Examining the pairwise contrast of mediating variables is important to understand 
the significant difference between the indirect effects of the mediating variables. 
The pairwise contrast of the indirect effects through contractual and relational is 
conducted and It is found that zero is not contained in the BC 95% CI {-0.1921, -
0.0184} for contrast. Therefore two indirect effects can be distinguished in terms of 
the magnitude. The specific indirect effect through relational governance is larger 
than the contractual governance. Therefore, relational governance has stronger 
mediating effect on the relationship between R&D capability and information 
sharing. This supports the arguments proposed in hypothesis 1b.  
 
Production capability and Information sharing 
Hypothesis 4 asserts that contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier production capability and information sharing (4a), 
and the individual effect of relational governance is stronger than contractual (4b).  
Table 5.7 shows the results for these hypotheses. The total indirect effect of 
production capability through both contractual and relational governance is 
significant with the point estimate of 0.1132 and CI of 0.0063 to 0.2490. The BC 
95% CI for the specific indirect effect through contractual is -0.0285 to 0.0957. As 
zero is contained in this interval, the specific indirect effect through contractual is 
not significant. However, the specific indirect effect through relational governance 
is significant with the point estimate of 0.0989 and CI of 0.0147 to 0.2079. These 
bootstrap findings satisfy the criteria for the multiple mediation effects and 
therefore, production capability has a significant indirect effect on information 
sharing through contractual and relational governance. However, contractual 
governance doesn’t contribute to this indirect effect. This provides support for 
Hypothesis 4a.        
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Further the analysis of pairwise contrast of the indirect effects  through contractual 
and relational governance is conducted. The confidence interval (CI) value of 
contrast is found to be in the range of -0.1842 and -0.0009, which ensures that the 
magnitude of the indirect effects is significantly distinguishable. In this particular 
case, the indirect effect through relational governance is larger than contractual. 
Therefore, relational governance is more influential in the indirect effect of 
production capability on information sharing. This indicates full support for 
Hypothesis 4b. 
 
Support services capability and Information sharing 
Hypothesis 7 asserts that contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier support capability and information sharing (7a), and 
the individual effect of relational governance is stronger than contractual (7b).   
Results related to Hypothesis 7 are presented in table 5.7. 
The total indirect effect of support capability on information sharing through both 
contractual and relational governance is significant with point estimate of 0.0525 
and CI of 0.0894 to 0.1429. The specific indirect effect through contractual is also 
significant since the CI {0.0030, 0.1251} doesn’t contain zero. The point estimate 
of the indirect effect through contractual is 0.0461. The specific indirect effect 
through relational is not significant with point estimate of 0.0064 and BC 95%CI of 
-0.1127 to 0.0938. Based on the indirect effect criteria of product of coefficients, 
the support capability has a significant indirect effect on information sharing jointly 
through contractual and relational governance. In this case, relational governance 
has no significant contribution to the total indirect effect. Bootstrap findings 
provide evidence in support of hypothesis 7a that states that the contractual and 
relational governance mediate the relationship between supplier support capability 
and information sharing.        
Further the magnitude of the indirect effects through contractual and relational 
governance is examined by pairwise contrast of the indirect effects. It is found that 
zero is contained in the confidence interval {-0.0728, 0.1673}for contrast and 
therefore the two indirect effects cannot be distinguished in terms of the magnitude, 
 125!
despite the fact that one is significantly different from zero and other is not. 
Preacher and Hayes (2008a) note that such apparent paradoxes can occur when one 
of the specific indirect effects involved in the contrast is not sufficiently far from 
zero. They argue that such paradoxes result from conducting multiple statistical 
tests that differ in power. Therefore, no evidence is found to support Hypothesis 7b.     
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Table 5.5: Regression results for mediating effect of contractual governance on capability – information sharing relationship   
 Model 1 – Contractual Governance Model 2 – Information Sharing  
      
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 B t B t B t B t B t 
Firm size -.05 -2.01* -.04 -1.98* -.03 -.33 -.02 -.25 -.01 -.12 
Duration of relationship -.02 -.22 -.02 -.21 .06 .75 .05 .65 .04 .39 
Manufacturer .03 .42 .01 .11 .05 .62 .02 .28 .02 .26 
Service provider -.10 -1.42 -.09 -1.12 -.04 -.44 -.04 -.41 -.01 -.14 
           
R&D capability   -.18 -2.57*   .14 2.03* .09 1.30 
Production capability   .10 1.12   .17 2.35* .12 1.50 
Support capability   .27 3.37**   .15 2.14* .11 1.47 
           
Contractual governance         .19 2.38* 
           
!R2  .07  .15**  .05  .10*  .02* 
Overall R2  .07  .22  .05  .15  .17 
Adjusted R2  .03  .18  .02  .11  .13 
*p<.05, **p<.01           
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            Table 5.6: Regression results for mediating effect of relational governance on capability – information sharing relationship 
 Model 1 – Relational Governance Model 2 – Information Sharing  
      
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 B t B t B t B t B t 
Firm size -.03 -.37 -.02 -.23 -.03 -.33 -.02 -.25 -.01 -.12 
Duration of relationship .04 .46 .01 .13 .06 .75 .05 .65 .02 .25 
Manufacturer .02 .22 .04 .48 .05 .62 .02 .28 .01 .11 
Service provider -.05 -.59 -.04 -.50 -.04 -.44 -.04 -.41 -.02 -.26 
           
R&D capability   .12 2.02*   .14 2.03* .09 1.28 
Production capability   .18 2.82**   .17 2.35* .13 1.61 
Support capability   .05 .62   .15 2.14* .11 1.37 
           
Relational governance         .55 6.01** 
           
!R2  .04  .14*  .05  .10*  .11** 
Overall R2  .04  .18  .05  .15  .26 
Adjusted R2  .01  .14  .02  .11  .21 
*p<.05, **p<.01           
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Table 5.7: Summary of the bootstrapping results for multiple mediation effect on 
capability - information sharing relationship (5000 bootstrap samples) 
Bootstrapping 









(a*b) Lower Upper 
Contractual -.0310* -.0891 -.0003 





.0282* .0404 .1227 
Contractual .0143 -.0285 .0957 
 






.1132* .0063 .2490 
Contractual .0461* .0030 .1251 
 






.0525* .0894 .1429 
(*Significant point estimate, p<0.05) (BC – Bias corrected, CI – confidence 
interval)
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5.5.3 Supplier capability and collaborative product/service development 
In this section, hypotheses related to the multiple mediation effect of contractual 
and relational governance on the relationship between supplier capability and 
collaborative product/service development (CPD) are investigated.  
Hypotheses 2a, 5a and 8a state that the contractual and relational governance 
mediate the relationship between supplier capability (R&D: Hypothesis 2a, 
production: Hypothesis 5a, and support: Hypothesis 8a), and collaborative 
product/service development in buyer-supplier collaboration. This asserts that 
supplier capabilities are related to the collaborative product/service development 
through the intervening variables contractual and relational governance. However, 
hypotheses 2b, 5b and 8b state that the relational governance will be more effective 
in mediating the capability and CPD relationship. The regression results for the 
hypotheses 2, 5 and 8 are presented in table 5.8 and 5.9. In model 1 in table 5.8, 
Contractual governance is regressed on R&D, production and support capability, 
whereas in model 2, CPD is regressed on R&D, production, support and 
contractual governance in step 2 and 3. Similarly, Table 5.9 presents two regression 
models for relational governance and CPD. The result of bootstrap analysis is 
considered in this research to test the multiple mediation effect of contractual and 
relational governance on the relationship between supplier capability and CPD. The 
summary result of the bootstrapping analysis for the dependent variable CPD and 
independent variables R&D, production, and support services capabilities are 
presented in table 5.10.  
 
R&D capability and Collaborative product/service development 
Table 5.10 shows that in case of R&D capability, the specific indirect effects 
through contractual and relational governance on CPD are significant with the 
point estimate (a*b) of -0.0310 and 0.0635 and CI of {-0.0739, -0.0021} and 
{0.0022, 0.1490} respectively. The total indirect effect through contractual and 
relational governance is also significant with the point estimate of 0.0325 and the 
95% CI of 0.0295 to 0.1279.  As a result, based on the principles of product-of-
coefficient strategy, R&D capability is found to have significant indirect effect on 
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CPD through contractual and relational governance. In relation to the link between 
R&D capability and CPD, contractual and relational governance both have the 
mediating effect. This provides support for hypothesis 2a. 
The pair-wise contrast of indirect effects through contractual and relational is 
conducted and it is found that zero is not contained in the BC 95% CI {-0.1801, -
0.0142} for contrast. Therefore two indirect effects can be distinguished in terms of 
the magnitude. The specific indirect effect through relational is larger than the 
contractual governance. Therefore, the relational governance has more specific 
contribution in the total indirect effect. This fully supports the hypothesis 2b. 
 
Production capability and Collaborative product/service development 
According to table 5.10, the total indirect effect of production capability through 
both contractual and relational governance is significant with the point estimate of 
0.1006 and CI of 0.0034 to 0.2389. The BC 95% CI for the specific indirect effect 
through contractual is -0.0244 to 0.0940. As zero is contained in this interval, the 
specific indirect effect through contractual is not significant. However, the specific 
indirect effect through relational governance is significant with the point estimate 
of 0.0875 and CI of 0.0132 to 0.1907. These bootstrap findings satisfy the criteria 
for multiple mediation effects and therefore, production capability has a significant 
indirect effect on CPD through contractual and relational governance. This 
supports the arguments proposed in hypothesis 5a. 
Moreover, based on the pairwise contrast of the indirect effects through contractual 
and relational governance, the confidence interval (CI) value of contrast is found to 
be in the range of -0.1759 and -0.0027. As zero is not the part of confidence 
interval, the magnitude of indirect effects is significantly distinguishable. In this 
particular case, the indirect effect through relational governance is larger than 
contractual. However, the specific indirect effect of contractual governance is not 
found to be significant. Therefore, relational governance is more influential in 
administering the indirect effect of production capability on CPD. This fully 
supports the argument proposed in hypothesis 5b.        
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Support services capability and Collaborative product/service development 
Table 5.10 shows that the total indirect effect of support capability on CPD through 
contractual and relational governance is not significant since its confidence interval 
{-0.0925, 0.1299} contains zero. Similarly, the specific indirect effects through 
contractual is also not significant. However, the specific indirect effect through 
relational governance is significant with the point estimate of 0.0061 and CI of 
0.0891 to 0.1151. Based on the indirect effect criteria of product of coefficients, the 
support capability has no significant indirect effect on CPD jointly through 
contractual and relational governance. Although, the relational governance is only 
specific mediator of the support capability and CPD relationship, the magnitude is 
so small that it is not able to make any significant contribution to total indirect 
effect. Hence in this case, bootstrap findings provide no evidence to support 
Hypothesis 8a, which states that, the contractual and relational governance mediate 
the relationship between supplier support capability and CPD.        
Further the magnitude of the indirect effects through contractual and relational 
governance is examined by the pairwise contrast of the indirect effects. It is found 
that zero is contained in the confidence interval {-0.0752, 0.1627} for contrast 
testing, indicating that the magnitude of these indirect effects could not be 
distinguished. Therefore, no support has been found for Hypothesis 8b. 
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Table 5.8: Regression results for mediating effect of contractual governance on capability – CPD relationship 
 Model 1 – Contractual Governance Model 2 – Collaborative Product Development  
      
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 B t B t B t B t B t 
Firm size -.05 -2.01* -.04 -1.98* -.06 -.75 -.04 -.52 -.02 -.24 
Duration of relationship -.02 -.22 -.02 -.21 .07 .88 .08 .92 .09 1.07 
Manufacturer .03 .42 .01 .11 .09 1.05 .05 .62 .03 .45 
Service provider -.10 -1.42 -.09 -1.12 -.07 -.79 -.06 -.71 -.03 -.46 
           
R&D capability   -.18 -2.57*   .17 2.12* .14 1.81 
Production capability   .10 1.12   .16 2.05* .11 1.37 
Support capability   .27 3.37**   .19 2.37* .15 1.91* 
           
Contractual governance         .17 2.10* 
           
!R2  .07  .15**  .05  .11*  .03* 
Overall R2  .07  .22  .05  .16  .18 
Adjusted R2  .03  .18  .02  .12  .14 
*p<.05, **p<.01           




Table 5.9: Regression results for mediating effect of relational governance on capability – CPD relationship  
 Model 1 – Relational Governance Model 2 – Collaborative Product Development  
      
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 B t B t B t B t " t 
Firm size -.03 -.37 -.02 -.23 -.06 -.75 -.04 -.52 -.01 -.15 
Duration of relationship .04 .46 .01 .13 .07 .88 .08 .92 .02 .21 
Manufacturer .02 .22 .04 .48 .09 1.05 .05 .62 .02 -.23 
Service provider -.05 -.59 -.04 -.50 -.07 -.79 -.06 -.71 -.01 -.17 
           
R&D capability   .12 2.02*   .17 2.12* .13 1.76 
Production capability   .18 2.82**   .16 2.05* .11 1.35 
Support capability   .05 .62   .19 2.37* .12 1.48 
           
Relational governance         .50 5.53** 
           
!R2  .04  .14*  .05  .11*  .09** 
Overall R2  .04  .18  .05  .16  .23 
Adjusted R2  .01  .14  .02  .12  .18 
*p<.05, **p<.01           
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Table 5.10: Summary of the bootstrapping results for multiple mediation effect on 
capability - CPD relationship (5000 bootstrap sample)
Bootstrapping 






(a*b) Lower Upper 
Contractual -.0310* -.0739 -.0021 




effect .0325* .0295 .1279 
Contractual .0131 -.0244 .0940 
Relational .0875* .0132 .1907 2. Production 
capability 
Total indirect 
effect .1006* .0034 .2389 
Contractual .0419 -.0055 .1186 
Relational .0061* .0891 .1151 3. Support 
capability 
Total indirect 
effect .0470 -.0925 .1299 




 5.5.4 Supplier capability and collaborative problem solving  
In this section, hypotheses related to the multiple mediation effect of contractual 
and relational governance on the relationship between supplier capability and 
collaborative problem solving (CPS) is investigated.  
Hypotheses 3a, 6a and 9a state that the contractual and relational governance 
mediate the relationship between supplier capability (R&D: Hypothesis 3a, 
production: Hypothesis 6a, and support: Hypothesis 9a), and collaborative problem 
solving (CPS) in buyer-supplier collaboration. This asserts that supplier capabilities 
are related to CPS through the intervening variables contractual and relational 
governance. However, hypotheses 3b, 6b and 9b state that the relational 
governance will be more effective in mediating the capability and collaborative 
problem solving relationship. The regression results for the hypotheses 3, 6 and 9 
are presented in table 5.11 and 5.12. In model 1 in table 5.11, Contractual 
governance is regressed on R&D, production and support capability, whereas in 
model 2, CPS is regressed on R&D, production, support and contractual 
governance in step 2 and 3. Similarly, Table 5.12 presents two regression models 
for relational governance and CPS. The result of bootstrap analysis is considered in 
this research to test the multiple mediation effect of contractual and relational 
governance on the relationship between supplier capability and CPS. The summary 
result of the bootstrapping analysis for the dependent variable CPS and 
independent variables R&D, production, and support services capabilities are 
presented in table 5.13.  
   
R&D capability and Collaborative problem solving 
In case of R&D capability, the specific indirect effects through contractual and 
relational governance on CPS are significant with the point estimate (a*b) of -
0.0582 and 0.0609 and CIs of {-0.0578, -0.0107} and {0.0053, 0.1383} 
respectively, since zero is not contained in CI. The magnitude of total indirect 
effect through contractual and relational is small (a*b = 0.0027), but significant 
with CI of 0.0157 to 0.1328. As a result, based on the principles of product-of-
coefficient strategy, R&D capability is found to have significant indirect effect on 
 136!
CPS through contractual and relational governance. Hence, it could be interpreted 
that contractual and relational governance both has the mediating effects on the 
relation between R&D capability and CPS. This supports the arguments proposed 
in hypothesis 3a. 
The pair-wise contrast of indirect effects through contractual and relational is 
conducted and the results indicate that zero is not contained in the BC 95% CI {-
0.1532, -0.0074} for contrast testing.  Hence, two indirect effects can be 
distinguished in terms of the magnitude. It is found that the magnitude of the 
specific indirect effect through relational is slightly larger than the contractual 
governance. It means that the specific mediation effect of relational governance has 
more contribution in the multiple mediation effect. Therefore, the bootstrap 
estimates fully support the hypothesis 3b. 
 
Production capability and Collaborative problem solving 
According to Table 5.13, the total indirect effect of production capability through 
both contractual and relational governance is significant with the point estimate of 
0.1036 and CI of 0.0040 to 0.2347. The BC 95% CI for the specific indirect effect 
through contractual is -0.0125 to 0.0732. As zero is contained in this interval, the 
specific indirect effect through contractual is not significant. However, the specific 
indirect effect through relational governance is significant with the point estimate 
of 0.0890 and CI of 0.0110 to 0.2093. These bootstrap findings satisfy the criteria 
of product of coefficient strategy and therefore, production capability has a 
significant indirect effect on CPS jointly through contractual and relational 
governance. This provides evidence to support hypothesis 6a. 
Moreover, based on the pairwise contrast testing of the indirect effects through 
contractual and relational governance, the confidence interval (CI) value of contrast 
is found to be in the range of -0.2017 and -0.0069. As zero is not the part of 
confidence interval, the magnitude of indirect effects is significantly 
distinguishable. In this particular case, the indirect effect through relational 
governance is larger than contractual. The specific indirect effect of contractual 
governance is not found to be significant. Therefore, relational governance is 
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contributing more in the joint multiple mediation effect on the relation between 
production capability and CPS. This fully supports the argument proposed in 
Hypothesis 6b.        
 
Support services capability and Collaborative problem solving 
In  bootstrap analysis for support capability, the effects of R&D and production 
capabilities are controlled. The total indirect effect of support capability on CPS 
through contractual and relational governance is significant since zero is not in its 
confidence interval {0.1022, 0.1158}. The point estimate of the total indirect effect 
is 0.0563. The specific indirect effect through contractual significant with point 
estimate of 0.0504 and CI of 0.0132 to 0.0809. However, the specific indirect 
effect through relational governance is not significant with the CI of -0.1007 to 
0.0916. Based on the indirect effect criteria of product of coefficients, the support 
capability has significant indirect effect on CPS through contractual and relational 
governance. This fully supports the argument proposed in Hypothesis 9a. 
 Contractual governance is only specific mediator of the support capability and 
CPS relationship. Further the magnitude of the indirect effects through contractual 
and relational governance is examined by the pairwise contrast testing of indirect 
effects. Zero is not contained in the confidence interval {0.0821, 0.1209}, 
indicating that the magnitude of contractual governance is larger than for relational 
governance. Therefore, in this particular case contractual governance is more 
influential in mediating the indirect effect of support capability on CPS. Hence in 





Table 5.11: Regression results for mediating effect of contractual governance on capability – CPS relationship  
 Model 1 – Contractual Governance Model 2 – Collaborative Problem Solving  
      
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 B t B t B t B t B t 
Firm size -.05 -2.01* -.04 -1.98* -.03 -.31 -.03 -.33 -.01 -.14 
Duration of relationship -.02 -.22 -.02 -.21 .02 .23 .01 .13 .01        .11 
Manufacturer .03 .42 .01 .11 .04 .43 .06 .71 .06 .75 
Service provider -.10 -1.42 -.09 -1.12 .07 .87 .07      .85 .08 1.12 
           
R&D capability   -.18 -2.57*   .15 1.87* .08 1.03 
Production capability   .10 1.12   .20 2.48* .11 1.41 
Support capability   .27 3.37**   .16 1.95* .09 1.32 
           
Contractual governance         .21 2.46* 
           
!R2  .07  .15**  .04  .12*  .03* 
Overall R2  .07  .22  .04  .16  .19 
Adjusted R2  .03  .18  .01  .12  .15 
*p<.05, **p<.01           





Table 5.12: Regression results for mediating effect of relational governance on capability – CPS relationship   
 Model 1 – Relational Governance Model 2 – Collaborative Problem Solving  
      
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 B t B t B t B t B t 
Firm size -.03 -.37 -.02 -.23 -.03 -.31 -.03 -.33 -.04 -.41 
Duration of relationship .04 .46 .01 .13 .02 .23 .01 .13 .02 .21 
Manufacturer .02 .22 .04 .48 .04 .43 .06 .71 .03 .32 
Service provider -.05 -.59 -.04 -.50 .07 .87 .07      .85 .09 1.04 
           
R&D capability   .12 2.02*   .15 1.87* .10 1.25 
Production capability   .18 2.82**   .20 2.48* .13 1.62 
Support capability   .05 .62   .16 1.95* .19 2.37* 
           
Relational governance         .46 5.12** 
           
!R2  .04  .14*  .04  .12*  .05** 
Overall R2  .04  .18  .04  .16  .21 
Adjusted R2  .01  .14  .01  .12  .16 
*p<.05, **p<.01           
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Table 5.13: Summary of the bootstrapping results for multiple mediation effect on 
capability – CPS relationship (5000 bootstrap samples) 
Bootstrapping 









Contractual -.0582* -.0578 -.0107 
Relational .0609* .0053 .1383 1. R&D 
capability 
Total indirect 
effect .0027* .0157 .1328 
Contractual .0146 -.0125 .0732 
Relational .0890* .0110 .2093 2. Production 
capability 
Total indirect 
effect .1036* .0040 .2347 
Contractual .0504* .0132 .0809 
Relational .0059 -.1007 .0916 3. Support 
capability 
Total indirect 
effect .0563* .1022 .1158 




5.6 Summary  
The chapter has outlined the statistical analysis of the data collected for the purpose 
of this study.  Initially the data are subjected to a number of preliminary analyses to 
examine the assumptions related to the statistical testing. The exploratory factor 
analysis is conducted to remove the less important items in the constructs of the 
theoretical framework. The Pearson correlation coefficient is used to find out the 
bivariate correlation between different variables. The validity and reliability of the 
measures are also examined in this chapter. The hypotheses discussed in chapter 3 
are thoroughly investigated in this chapter. Bootstrapping based multiple mediation 
analysis is used to  examine the multiple mediation effect of contractual and 
relational governance on the relationship between supplier capabilities and 
Collaboration types. The summary results of the hypotheses are presented in Table 
5.14. 
 
      Table 5.14: "#$$%&'!&()#*+)!,-!.'/,+.()() 








Previous studies have concluded that supplier capabilities can influence the 
decision to engage in particular forms of buyer-supplier collaboration (Oh and 
Rhee 2008, Li et al. 2010). Similarly, it has been suggested that suppliers with 
specific inter-firm transaction governance can more effectively monitor these 
collaborative arrangements - and efficiently share resources, knowledge, etc. 
(Mayer and Salomon 2006, Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009, Liu et al. 2010). Given 
that theory suggests that the decision to adopt a particular form of governance 
structure depends on the balance between safeguarding firm capabilities and the 
intensity of collaborative engagement, this study sets out to establish the specific 
interactions between governance mix (i.e. contractual and relational governance), 
specific types of collaborative arrangement (information sharing - IS, collaborative 
product/service development – CPD and, collaborative problem solving - CPS) and 
capabilities possessed by the supplier (R&D, production and support). Developed 
hypotheses are based on the multiple mediation effect of contractual and relational 
governance on the relation between capability and collaboration type. The 












Figure 6.1: Theoretical model 
 
















H1, H4, H7 
H2, H5, H8 
H3, H6, H9 
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Discussion on findings of the study is structured in following sections: section 6.2 
discusses the relationship between supplier R&D capability and Buyer-supplier 
collaboration (BSC). Section 6.3 discusses the relationship between production 
capability and BSC. Section 6.4 discusses the relationship between supplier support 
capability and BSC. Further, section 6.5 presents the effect of control variables 
such that firm size, relationship duration and type of the firm on the research 
findings. At the end, section 6.6 summarises the chapter.  
 
6.2 R&D capability and Collaboration 
Hypotheses related to multiple mediation effect (indirect effect) of contractual and 
relational governance on the relationship between R&D capability and Buyer-
supplier collaboration (BSC) type (IS - Hypothesis 1, CPD - Hypothesis 2, and 
CPS - hypothesis 3) are discussed in this section. Contractual and relational 
governance are hypothesised as the multiple mediators with relational governance 
have more influential effect on the relationship between R&D capability and BSC. 
In this study, R&D capability refers to the consistent spending on R&D related 
activities, consistent research output, ability to link the R&D activities with the 
market requirements and proven ability to develop new products and services. 
Contractual and relational governance focuses on administering the collaboration 
process with formal written agreements or informal relationships.  
Information sharing is a common theme in the supply chain literature with more 
specific observations suggesting that inter-firm governance structure is the 
influencing factor in determining the degree of communication between buyer and 
supplier (Zirpoli and Caputo 2002). Support for hypothesis 1a (i.e. contractual and 
relational governance mediate the relationship between R&D capability and 
information sharing) is broadly consistent with this conclusion. This finding is also 
consistent with the previous studies of Poppo and Zenger  (2002), Das and Teng 
(2000), Lee and Cavusgil (2006) and Liu et al. (2009). The process of aligning 
supplier R&D capability with market requirements necessitates access to relevant 
information from the buying organisation. Examining the specific indirect effects 
of contractual and relational governance, it is found that the relational governance 
effect is larger than that of contractual governance (hypothesis 1b). This provides 
supports for the argument that buyer-supplier relationship has more influential 
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effect in mediating the relationship between R&D capability and IS. This finding 
also seems to be consistent with the nature of the capability: given that R&D is 
largely embedded in the tacit knowledge of supplier’s engineers and scientists, it is 
likely that the most effective information sharing would be through personal 
interactions at multiple levels of the organisation. This also echoes Dyer and 
Singh’s (1998) argument that relationship based inter-firm collaboration tends to 
improve tacit information sharing. The preference of relational governance over 
contractual governance in presence of knowledge intensive R&D capability is 
consistent with the study of Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009) and Li et al. (2010). 
Despite the slightly stronger emphasis on informal interactions in information 
sharing, it is important to note that the findings indicate the importance of both 
formal and informal interactions between buyer and supplier in the information 
sharing process. This inference is aligned with the argument proposed by Poppo 
and Zenger (2001), which conclude that contractual and relational both serve 
different purpose in the collaborative arrangement. Relational governance 
facilitates the process of collaboration across the organisation, it seems likely that 
contractual governance - with its emphasis on protecting intellectual property, 
scheduling regular meetings, mandating exchange protocols, etc. - provide the 
context for relationships to develop. To offer an analogy, it is not the commercial 
terms, confidentiality agreements, web format, etc of an on-line dating service that 
makes people fall in love, but if these things are inappropriate no relationships 
would emerge. Therefore, in the context of information sharing informal 
communication with the buyer is more important than holding each other on 
contractual terms specially when the communication is related to the R&D 
activities of the supplier. For an example in the aerospace industry, suppliers 
involved in developing and manufacturing a flexible robot system such as a snake 
arm robot have skills in specialised technology, which contribute towards its R&D 
capability. Designing and manufacturing a robot is a complex process and it 
involves a close interaction with customers (buyers) to understand the requirement 
and provide the customised solution in due time. Early stage information sharing 
related to the robot is important to understand the customer requirement due to high 
investment cost and customised nature of the product.  
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While in this study, contractual and relational governance are taken as independent 
variables, prior studies such as Poppo and Zenger (2002), Liu et al. (2009), Hoetker 
and Mellewigt (2009) and Li et al. (2010) have explored the relation between 
contractual and relational governance. Most of the studies seem to infer the 
relationship between contractual and relational governance as complementary. 
Findings of this study also support the argument that both forms of governance 
mechanism are needed for effective exchange of resources in BSC, and therefore 
partially support the complementarity of contractual and relational governance. The 
mix of contractual and relational governance is required for effective information 
sharing. When contracts codify each party’s rights, duties, obligations, and 
responsibilities and specify goals (Reuer and Arin !o, 2007), they create formal 
operating procedures that required for communication of knowledge. Thus, 
contracts may facilitate the development of buyer-supplier relation because 
contracts constitute an important platform for communication, a requisite 
byproduct is information exchange, especially codifiable information and routines 
that support the use of contracts (Li et al. 2010). 
Similarly, empirical results in this research find support for the multiple mediation 
effect of the contractual and relational governance on the relationship between 
supplier R&D capability and CPD (hypothesis 2a). The specific indirect effects 
through contractual and relational governance are significant, indicating that both 
are separately influencing CPD activities (in the presence of R&D capability). As 
per information sharing, the pair wise comparison of both specific indirect effects 
show that the specific indirect effect through relational governance is larger than 
contractual (hypothesis 2b). . In other words, suppliers with greater R&D capability 
prefer more ‘relational’ inter-firm guiding mechanisms for CPD-related activities – 
including sharing skills to develop new products/services, working together at the 
early stage of project development, sharing the costs of new product/ service 
development, etc. That said, like information sharing, both mechanisms were 
central to effective management of the CPD activities. This finding is consistent 
with the study of Carson et al. (2006), which argue that formal and relational 
contracts each have advantages and disadvantages in specific situations and are not 
simply substitutes. They have considered the interorganizational relationships 
involving R&D for new-product development to support their arguments.   
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Technology intensive industry like aerospace heavily relies on the R&D capability 
of the supplier (Mayer 2006). For R&D in a relatively specialized product area, 
such as the aerospace industry, smaller suppliers as compared to the larger firms 
have limited market options and therefore have an incentive to leverage their R&D 
as widely as possible. Although suppliers with relevant R&D experience could 
better preserve the value of R&D investment, if the relationship with the buyer did 
not work out or if the buyer behaves opportunistically, many suppliers had limited 
options. Thus, the supplier firms had to engage in what might be described as a 
governance ‘balancing act’: motivated to share knowledge and more general know-
how (enabled by relational governance), but also needing to avoid too much 
exposure to other parties (contractual governance giving a clearer delineation of the 
relevant property rights and a mechanism for enforcing those rights: Pisano 1990). 
The CPD process involves integration of know-how across different stages of the 
product development and knowledge exchange between buyer and supplier. 
Although relational governance would be appropriate to enhance the knowledge 
sharing process, it would be challenging to decide whether supplier transfers the 
information more than what is needed. Therefore, the mix of governance including 
the contractual aspect needs to be considered while deciding the boundary of the 
knowledge exchange.  
This finding is also consistent with the study of (Olander et al. 2010), which 
indicates that both contractual and relational governance mechanisms play a role in 
buyer–supplier R&D collaboration but their relative importance varies according to 
the collaboration phase. However, both types of mechanisms should be considered 
simultaneously throughout the collaboration process.!This sentiment is also evident 
in Oxley (1997), which argues that if the prescribed activities are not adequately 
monitored or enforced due to some gaps in specification, the possibility of moral 
hazard arises on either side of the transaction. For example, supplier with R&D 
capability may later find a better partner and so may deliver less or inferior 
knowledge to its partner than promised in the original agreement. On the other 
hand the recipient firm may use or modify the knowledge in ways that were not 
intended in the contract and which are injurious to the supplier. These types of 
problem are rooted in the need to transfer/share poorly defined tacit "know-how." 
However, tacit knowledge sharing is difficult without intimate personal contact and 
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participation. If buyer and supplier attempt to contract for the right to use an asset 
embodying significant tacit know-how, it would be challenging to adequately 
specifying the asset and associated property or usage rights to be transferred in a 
contract since the contracted assets do not exist at the time the contract is written 
and therefore the innovation process will become highly uncertain. Even designing 
a contract is more difficult to specify for a novel technology since the buyer and 
supplier share less of the tacit know – how associated with its application that is 
usual for more routine technology transfers. Repeated consultation with the buyer 
reduces the adverse effects of the resource sharing because of improved 
information developed over the course of previous consultations and relationship. 
In CPD related activities supplier and buyer may agree on certain level of aims and 
objectives in different stages of product development. Being flexible in making 
adjustments to cope with unexpected circumstances is important for smooth flow of 
the development process. Relational governance encourages the development of 
shared vision and goals between buyers and suppliers with a degree of confidence 
against opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, relational governance is more suited for 
the supplier with R&D capability to engage in CPD activities.   
The finding partially supports the arguments proposed in Li et al. (2010) that 
formal contracts may complement the use of relational mechanisms in promoting 
knowledge acquisition. The presence of contractual governance can also strengthen 
the knowledge exchange between buyer and supplier. As reported by Li et al. 
(2010), more formalized contracts that specify the technologies underlying the task 
may also require information or the right to monitor the use of the technology. 
More complete and customized contracts often require reports with performance 
measurements (Barthe "lemy and Que"lin 2006). The specification of performance 
metrics is a form of symbolic communication and further increases the level of 
explicit knowledge exchange between parties when they implement collaborative 
activities (Grant 1996). Contracts provide a template for coordinating the transfer 
of knowledge, which the firm can then apply in interactions with more distant 
suppliers, and it can provide formal specification and assurance, complementing 
the informal specification of shared goals and informal assurance of trust. In these 
ways, contracts reduce cognitive and coordination barriers and thus strengthen the 
impact of relational governance.   
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Collaborative problem solving (CPS) activities involve jointly working on 
problems related to cost, quality, design, delivery schedule and uncertain demand 
of the products. Here, the research findings support hypothesis 3a (i.e. contractual 
and relational governance mediate the relationship between R&D capability and 
CPS). The specific indirect effects of R&D capability through contractual and 
relational governance both are significant, which indicates that contractual and 
relational both have individual effect on the R&D – CPS relationship. It is also 
proposed that the relational governance will have stronger mediating effect in case 
of CPS. Interestingly, the contractual and relational governance are found to be 
equally influential (negligibly inclined towards relational governance) in mediating 
the R&D – CPS relationship (hypothesis 3b). Unlike Hypotheses 1b and 2b, the 
differential specific indirect effect through relational governance was only 
negligibly more influential than contractual governance. This could be understood 
in terms of the nature and duration of the activities involved in CPS. Complex 
problems related with product quality, delivery schedule etc., which need more 
engagement with the buyers to understand the problem and effectively working on 
long term solutions, may need a greater level of relationship with buyer. However 
problems, which are not in need of much resource commitment and are more 
generic in nature, may not need efforts to build higher level of relationship. As with 
discussions of CPD above, it seems logical that suppliers with greater R&D 
capability would be more willing to develop innovative problem solutions jointly 
with buyer. The broader scope of joint problem solving could help explain the 
more balanced findings with respect to governance: particular form of governance 
depends on the knowledge and previous experience of the supplier in dealing with 
the specific problem. For example, suppliers with R&D capability may be good at 
developing products or services and longer term relationships will be important in 
understanding product/service problems but when faced with short term or one off 
problems suppliers needed to be careful in safeguarding their expertise with proper 
contractual agreements. At the same time, cooperation –when for a short period - 
demands a level of mutual understanding and relationship. Moreover, suppliers 
with R&D capability may be good at developing the products or services but 
getting engaged in market or quality related problems might not be their priority. 
Further, the supplier’s competitive position also affects the decision whether to 
commercialize its R&D skills through a cooperative arrangement or by its own 
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through a contractual agreement. The findings related to R&D – CPS relationship 
could be better understood in the context of aerospace industry. Companies in 
technology intensive industry can encounter generic (short term) as well as more 
complex problems, which may need help from specialist on longer-term basis. 
Although, contractual and relational both form of governance is important, 
relational governance may have a slight edge in the collaboration process. 
Relational governance involves the strengthening of ties between the exchange 
partners (e.g., manufacturer- supplier) and therefore promotes effective CPS (Dyer 
1996, Dyer and Nobeka 2000). Shared goals in joint problem solving can 
harmonize individual self-interests and cast a forward-thinking orientation onto the 
exchange relationship. As a result of this commitment to cooperate, parties share 
necessary and valuable information, in the form of both explicit and tacit 
knowledge (Inkpen and Tsang 2005).  
In summary, this research emphasises the role of contractual and relational 
governance in linking the R&D capability with the collaboration type. Across all 
three types of collaboration, there was evidence to support the argument that both 
forms of governance are required in buyer-supplier exchange. However, relational 
governance has been found to be more influential in almost all the three types of 
buyer – supplier collaboration process, especially when supplier has the R&D 
capability. This is consistent with studies of Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009) and Li 
et al. (2010).   
6.3 Production capability and collaboration 
This section discusses the findings for the hypotheses related to the multiple 
mediation effect (indirect effect) of contractual and relational governance on the 
relationship between production capability and BSC type (IS - Hypothesis 4, CPD - 
Hypothesis 5, and CPS - Hypothesis 6). First, contractual and relational governance 
are proposed to mediate the relationship between production capability and BSC 
types (hypothesis 4a). Second, relational governance is hypothesised to have more 
influential in mediating the production capability – BSC relationship (hypothesis 
4b).  
Production capability refers to supplier proven ability to provide the products 
according to the customer (buyer) specifications at desired time, low cost and with 
 150!
desired quality. Research findings suggest that the production capability has an 
indirect effect on information sharing jointly through contractual and relational 
governance. In other words, both contractual and relational governance are jointly 
effective in sharing the product and market related information. However, on 
analysing the pair wise indirect effects of contractual and relational governance, it 
is found that specific indirect effect of relational governance is larger than 
contractual. Findings further support the arguments proposed by Li et al. (2010) 
and Poppo and Zenger (2001, 2002) that contractual and relational governance 
works together to support the exchange process in collaboration activities. The 
frequent consultation with buying organisation seems to be logical in 
understanding the product specifications and market related information. Although, 
formal contract might be the necessity to decide on the lot size and cost of the 
products being delivered, buyer-supplier relationship is important for long-term 
informal information sharing for mutual benefits. Moreover, in absence of 
improper informal communication between buyer and supplier, it would be 
difficult to understand the uncertain demand pattern, which can further affect the 
inventory level of the supplier and as a result may increase the product cost. In this 
scenario, buyers may be willing to share real time demand information with the 
supplier if they have the confidence that the information will not be misused and 
exploited. This confidence can only be built through long-term relationship. 
Informal interaction at multiple levels will assist in communicating the real –time 
demand forecasting data with the supplier. The intention of supplier to be flexible 
and not holding the buyer on contractual terms is important to maintain the 
undisrupted flow of information for long-term business benefits. For instance, 
manufacturing most of the components/equipments/parts in aerospace industry 
involve huge investment and therefore feasibility of the project needs to be 
understood in advance before engaging in the manufacturing process. This process 
involves communicating with the buyer on informal basis and building the 
relationship to understand the ‘nitty-gritty’ of the project such as the delivery 
schedule, quality desired etc. In this context relationship comes first to the 
contractual agreement to generate business and sort out the liability involved in the 
project.   
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Similarly, support for hypothesis 5 (i.e. hypothesis 5a: contractual and relational 
governance mediate the relationship between supplier production capability and 
CPD, and hypothesis 5b: the effect of relational governance is stronger) is found in 
the empirical research. The key activities involved in CPD process are to share the 
skills and knowledge in jointly developing the products. On analysing the pair wise 
indirect effects of contractual and relational governance, it is observed that the 
relational governance is more influential in administering the total indirect effect of 
production capability on CPD. The finding is consistent with previous studies 
(Dyer and Singh 1998) that conclude that relational governance is important to 
create value from joint capabilities and develop the sources of competitive 
advantage. It seems logical that knowledge exchange process is more effective 
when it is governed by informal relationship between buyer and supplier. Firms 
having greater level of confidence over the intent of other party will promote 
greater level of knowledge exchange in long run for mutual benefits. This is also 
echoed in the philosophy of ‘guest engineer’, where buyer and supplier work 
together at early stage of product development to achieve the desired quality of the 
product. In absence of good relationship between buyer and supplier it may not be 
possible to send engineers at their site to help in improving the production process. 
Moreover, relational experience perhaps enables them to specify contingencies 
more effectively by providing informal means to resolve disputes (Santoro and 
Mcgill 2005).  
Although contractual governance can mitigate the risk of exploitation by buying 
organisation, previous studies (McEvily and Marcus 2005, Dyer and Hatch 2006, 
Nielsen 2010) argue that the extent of involvement in multiple activities in CPD 
would raise the difficulty to effectively specify the contractual terms. Increase in 
the number of products or technologies included in a contract, or increase in the 
geographic scope of the transaction, will inevitably increase the difficulty and cost 
of monitoring activities. This further indicates that relational governance would be 
more appropriate for CPD in presence of production capability. Suppliers with 
production capabilities may need to involve in a mixture of process design and 
production activities with the customer (buyer). These different "transaction types," 
which include design activities are most likely to involve the creation or significant 
modification of technology, so raising the difficulty of adequate specification of 
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contractual terms. Increase in the number of products or technologies included in a 
contract, or increases in the geographic scope of the transaction, will inevitably 
increase the difficulty and cost of monitoring activities. Building on transaction 
cost economy (TCE), if a contract is used to govern a project involving multiple 
firms such that buyer and supplier, monitoring costs will increase with the number 
of partners involved, as assigning accountability for pay-off relevant actions taken 
by multiple partners under uncertainty is problematic. In terms of relational 
governance, suppliers can better evaluate the buying firm’s skills, judge its 
readiness in to perform the product development tasks, assess its ability to work on 
the project, and make adjustments when necessary. Therefore, building a 
relationship with the buying organisation to explore the opportunities to combine 
the resources/skills better equips the firm for CPD. Thus suppliers need to promote 
the informal interaction with the buying firm for CPD (in presence of production 
capability). For instance, suppliers dealing with production of mould tools and 
technical injection moulding for aerospace industry can engage in close 
relationship with buyer which can help in selection of the correct material, tooling 
and processes to produce the cost effective moulding solutions. Even developing or 
acquiring the relevant technology with the help of buyer to reduce the 
manufacturing cost is essential to cope with the current environment of faster 
cycles in technology change. Delivering the customised solution in a timely fashion 
needs to understand the buyer demand effectively and therefore, considerable 
investment in relationship development is necessary. Relational governance 
mechanisms effectively manage alliances rich in knowledge assets, but cannot be 
deployed simply at will. Rather, they depend on the existence of trust and social 
identification, which develop only as firms interact over time (Macaulay 1963, 
Uzzi 1997, Kale et al. 2000). Contractual governance mechanisms, in contrast, rely 
much less on prior interactions. Thus, early alliances between two firms should 
involve primarily physical assets, amenable to governance via contractual 
mechanisms, rather than knowledge assets, which the partners are ill-equipped to 
govern. These early alliances allow the firms to develop trust and social 
identification, making relational governance mechanisms more feasible. Later 
alliances can build on this to incorporate increasing amounts of knowledge assets. 
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Findings related to the indirect effect of production capability on CPS supports the 
hypothesis 6 (i.e. hypothesis 6a: contractual and relational governance mediate the 
relationship between supplier production capability and CPS, and hypothesis 6b: 
the effect of relational governance is more influential. Findings suggest that both 
contractual and relational governance have multiple mediation effect on production 
– CPS relationship. This finding is consistent with the study of Caniels et al. 
(2012), which clearly illustrates that relational governance is only beneficial for 
project outcomes when it is accompanied by contractual control. At the initial stage 
of collaboration, the governance mechanism that creates positive beliefs can foster 
the development of trust between collaborative partners (Inkpen and Currall 2004). 
As organisations start learning about each other, they rely more on the inter-firm 
relations than merely on the contracts. Interestingly, similar to hypotheses 4b and 
5b, on analysing the pair-wise indirect effects of contractual and relational 
governance, it is found that relational governance is more influential in 
administering the total indirect effects. It seems logical that relation between buyer 
and supplier is important to share the informal information in anticipation of the 
problem related to product and market, and then working together to minimising 
the impact of the problem on the organisations (in presence of production 
capability). In absence of informal interaction between buyer and supplier it may 
not be feasible to take the advice of the supplier whenever needed. In CPS, the 
focus is on solving problems in the present without examining the appropriateness 
of current and future learning behaviours.  Both organizations introduce only 
selected company-specific (or project-specific) knowledge to the relationship and 
the main outcome is transfer of complementary, mainly explicit knowledge suitable 
for that particular problem (Nielsen 2010).  
Supplier with a greater production capability can be helpful in understanding the 
problems related to product quality and cost, and supplier expertise in production 
process may help to minimise the cost and improve the quality. Suppliers will be 
more willing to help the buyer in uncertain market condition if the inter-firm 
collaboration is based relationship rather than holding each other on the contractual 
terms. For example, if there is an urgent request for goods by the buyer in case they 
run out of their stock, supplier with good relationship can help in either fulfilling 
the urgent order form their stock or improve their production output to cope with 
the urgent request. This inference is further echoed in the Just – in – time (JIT) 
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principle, which is inclined towards promoting good relationship between buyer 
and supplier. It is natural to expect that supplier’s increased production capability 
will positively impact CPS in presence of inter-firm relationship. Co-specialised 
assets, mutual trust and common language for technical issues can be developed 
through long-term repetitive transaction and working closely with the supplier (Oh 
and Rhee 2008). For example, suppliers with superior production capability shift 
from build-to-print to design for manufacture (DfM) approach to take cost out at 
the early stage of the process. This could be done with the help of buyer by 
involving in relationship based exchange process. Even the informal relation 
beyond the project is important to continue seeking the future business. Moreover, 
as the lead time for designing and building some equipment like gas turbines etc, in 
the aerospace industry is very long i.e. years, the demand for the equipment is 
poorly managed. Better relations with buyers can help to manage the demand 
related problems since building relations is a people-based activity and cannot be 
controlled by contracts.  
 
In summary, although there is a strong evidence for mediating effect of both 
contractual and relational governance in three types of collaboration, the relational 
governance seems to have more influential effect in guiding the relationship 
between production capability and types of collaboration. Continuing the stream of 
TCE research, findings are consistent with the study of Goo et al. (2009) which 
argue that trust based on inter-firm relationship is important in constraining 
opportunism under both (contractual and relational) forms of contracting and it 
facilitates information sharing, harmonious conflict resolution, and mutual 
dependence (Gregory 2011). Findings also support the argument that firms can 
benefit by purposefully combining formal and informal governance mechanisms. 
For example, a combination of contractual and social mechanisms is more effective 
for managing conflict (Dyer and Singh, 1998), and the simultaneous use of 
relational norms and customized contracts enhances exchange performance (Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). Firms get advantages of specifying formal arrangements and 
using plural approaches (i.e., both contracts and relational mechanisms) to absorb 
greater knowledge beyond the firm boundary (Li et al. 2010).  
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6.4 Support capability and collaboration 
This section discusses the findings for the hypotheses related to the multiple 
mediation effect (indirect effect) of contractual and relational governance on the 
relationship between support capability and BSC type (IS - Hypothesis 7, CPD - 
Hypothesis 8, and CPS - hypothesis 9). Contractual and relational governance are 
proposed to mediate the relationship between support capability and BSC types. It 
is also proposed that relational governance has more influential effect in mediating 
the support capability – BSC relationship.  
The supplier support capability includes activities related to maintenance or 
providing technical support activities to the buyer. Contractual and relational 
governance focuses on the intent of the supplier to administer the collaboration 
process with formal written agreements or buyer-supplier relationships. Full 
support in favour of hypothesis 7a (i.e. Contractual and relational governance 
mediate the relationship between supplier support capability and Information 
sharing with the buyer) is evident in the research findings. The total indirect effect 
through both contractual and relational governance is significant. Further the 
specific indirect effect through contractual is only significant (Contrary to 
hypothesis 7b). In the broad sense of the nature of support capability, if buyer is 
willing to collaborate for long term then a certain level of informal interaction is 
needed to facilitate the frequent information sharing. Given that the nature of 
information sharing related to product or market, both contractual and relational 
governance can be jointly effective. However, the extent of informal interaction 
depends on the duration of collaboration and type of the support activity required 
by the buyer. Supplier support capability can be viewed in terms of generic or 
functional capability and innovative support capability. Some of the support 
activity such that regular maintenance may not need a long - term engagement with 
the buyer and cost of those services would be the market winner criteria. In this 
scenario, contractual governance will be more appropriate in information exchange. 
However, in case of complex problems innovative support skills are required to 
think about ‘out-of-box’ solution. In this scenario, more interaction with the buyer 
is required to work together on the support activities.  
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In the case of small and medium-sized suppliers most of the support activities may 
include a limited engagement with buyer with a very limited level of resources 
commitment from the buyer. The contractual governance seems to be more 
appropriate in this limited interaction period to avoid any fear of opportunistic 
behaviour. Often buyers may be willing to hire the supplier with appropriate 
support capability when the need arises and therefore, in most of the cases, the 
supplier may not require real time information sharing. The required information 
can well be shared under the guidelines of the contractual agreement. The formal 
agreement may safeguard the buyer from sharing information at the desired level. 
Even monitoring the expected outcome can be more effective in presence of 
contractual agreement. Contractual governance provides the safeguards against the 
opportunistic behaviour in exploiting the information shared in the short-term 
interaction. Formal written contracts can provide a ‘legal safety net’ in lieu of over 
reliance on mutual trust and commitment (Goo et al. 2009). This finding is 
consistent with the study of Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009), which reports that 
relational governance could be a expensive approach to coordinate physical 
resources and contractual governance mechanism provide effective and efficient 
governance and coordination of these assets.  
Contrary to initial expectation, hypothesis 8 (i.e. hypothesis 8a: Contractual and 
relational governance mediate the relationship between supplier support capability 
and CPD, and hypothesis 8b: the effect of relational governance is more influential) 
is not supported by the research findings. The total indirect effect through 
contractual and relational governance on the relation between support capability 
and CPD is not significant. However, the specific indirect effect through relational 
governance is significant. This result can be understood in the context of the nature 
of the support capability and the type of collaborative activities involved in CPD. 
The activities involved in jointly working on developing product and services may 
not be of much interest to the suppliers with support capabilities. Activities related 
to maintenance and providing IT support are not closely related to the knowledge 
sharing activities in the CPD process. If the need arises to get any information or 
advice from suppliers proficient at providing technical support, the buyer 
organisation can seek their help on an informal basis. However, this ad hoc 
assistance can only be feasible when buyer builds a strong relationship with the 
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supplier. The expertise of the supplier having support capability is more related to 
the activities at the later stage of the product life cycle. However the activities 
involved in new product development are more important at the early stages. It 
seems logical that there is a slight mismatch between the skills possessed by 
suppliers and the skills desired in CPD. In this scenario, the relational governance 
may be helpful in just informally exploring the potential contribution supplier 
could make, if any, in the CPD process. For functional support services capability, 
there may be a number of competitors available in the market and therefore 
suppliers involved in functional support services tend to involve in contractual 
agreement with the buyer in collaboration activities. However, suppliers with 
innovative support services capability tend to engage in long-term relationships in 
activities related to CPD.  Suppliers with innovative support capability need to 
commit more resources in collaborative activities. Suppliers engaging in support 
activities in product development generally agree to do contract-based research and 
development and share the incentives with the buyer, and look for a win-win 
agreement. Suppliers in aerospace industry identify the importance of sharing the 
part of intellectual property (IP) that is regulated by contracts, and meet the 
managers of the buying firm frequently even if they don’t have anything specific to 
discuss. Moreover, suppliers in aerospace industry understand that the relationship 
with manufacturers is essential in a globally uncertain business environment to 
ensure growth long-term.  Strong relationships with manufacturers provide an 
optimal technical support during the process of concept development to the 
production, especially in the marketplace where short delivery lead-time and 
quality products are essential for the business. 
Empirical findings fully support argument proposed in hypothesis 9a (i.e. 
contractual and relational governance mediate the relationship between supplier 
support capability and CPS). However no support has been found for hypothesis 9b 
(i.e. the effect of relational governance is more effective in mediating the support 
capability – CPS relationship). The multiple mediation effect through both 
contractual and relational governance is significant. However, the contractual 
governance has stronger indirect effect than relational. The finding is consistent 
with the study of Cai et al. (2009), which argues that legal contract serves as an 
important foundation of joint problem solving. The nature of support capability and 
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the type of activities involved in CPS seem to be congruent in the sense that most 
of the problem solving activities after the sale of the product would be effectively 
carried out by the supplier with better experience in providing support services. 
The short-term problems could be more contractual in nature in which buyer may 
not be willing to commit any resource sharing for the suppliers. The new trend of 
providing the product with the life - time support services is increasing in 
aerospace industry. Most of the suppliers in aerospace industry are selling their 
products with a long-term commitment of full time maintenance and support after 
sales. The increased competition in the market creates the instability of future 
business for suppliers dealing with support services. In this case more and more 
suppliers are inclined to engage in collaborative arrangements based on the 
contractual agreement. It is also convenient for buying organisation not to worry 
about the support services and choose the supplier based on better services at lower 
cost, since the problem solving activities demand a low level of interaction between 
supplier and buyer. Moreover, supplier with greater support capability will have 
more power to influence the contracting terms or negotiate on the service price. If 
the existing volume with the present buyer (customer) is large, supplier can make 
an effort to keep getting the business by providing some extra services or discount 
on services provided. On the other hand, support services in case of emergency 
situations like in-process breakdown can demand for premium price. In this case, 
contractual agreement is important to decide the roles and responsibilities of 
supplier and buyer, and the level of resource commitment both need to put in. With 
a greater support capability and contractual governance, suppliers not only 
diversify the risks but also strengthen the bargaining power.  In CPS, the focus 
could be on short-term profit maximization, and therefore a carefully drafted 
license agreement in order to manage (control) the flow of proprietary knowledge 
is more appropriate (Nielsen 2010). 
For instance, suppliers involved in providing specialised services in information 
and communication technology for Commercial-off-the- Shelf (COTS) products 
agree that every project or programme starts with a period of informal discussion 
and research which may last for up to a year before signing a formal agreement. 
Supplier with greater support capability extends the relationship to understand the 
scope and availability of the services tailored to the customers’ individual 
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requirements and service level expectations. This pro-active support services help 
to drive down the cost of support through identifying and rectifying any problems 
encountered during implementation process. Even suppliers involved in providing 
technical support for concept design to comprehensive end-to-end testing for 
hardware and software product for aerospace company tends to incorporate an 
annual review process in-place to handle possible risk of intellectual loss during the 
collaboration process. For example, the concept of Power-by-the-hour (PbtH) has 
radically changed the business model in the aerospace industry. In the past, 
contracts didn’t cover the spare components needed to maintain equipment such as 
the turbine through its working life, and the general approach adopted by the 
industry was ‘the more spares the better!’ In current changed business scenario, 
suppliers involved in providing lifetime support tends to incorporate the terms and 
conditions in the contractual agreement and provide an on-site support staff to the 
customer (buyer). The degree of contractual completeness depends on firm’s desire 
to minimize the costs associated with contractual exchange (Crocker and Reynolds 
1993). The legal and economic consequences of violating a contract make it 
difficult for partners to take advantage of each other and thereby improve the 
stability of the collaboration (Lusch and Brown 1996). Contractual agreement will 
make it possible to negotiate the terms and conditions of the problem solving 
activities. In current presence of market uncertainty, stronger support capability 
may even help in crafting better ex ante contracts to clearly define the roles and 
responsibilities of each party, specify the resources to be exchanged, identify 
appropriate milestones, stipulate monitoring mechanisms and introduce appropriate 
pecuniary incentives. Increased uncertainty even reduces the level of relationship 
and supplier capability may become less relevant for the collaborative arrangement 
with buyer (Oh and Rhee 2008). Buying firms tend to less engage in collaborative 
problem solving with suppliers not stronger in the support capability and even tend 
to invest less in them when the market uncertainty is higher (Balakrishnan and 
Wernerfelt 1986, Bensaou and Anderson 1999). Buyers are less willing to share 
information with suppliers on informal basis, which have weaker capabilities to 
solve problems caused by higher technological uncertainty. Although, contractual 
governance will have an influential mediating effects between support capability 
and CPS relationship, a minimal level of relationship is required to get the business 
(contract) from the buyer. The nature of resources exchanged in the CPS could be 
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of physical nature such as providing spare parts for maintenance, and therefore 
contractual governance could be more suitable for mediating the relationship. The 
findings are consistent with prior studies, which argue that for physical assets, 
relational governance mechanisms will be more time-consuming and often costly 
than the contractual mechanisms (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). Furthermore, there 
is less need to—and less value in—developing coordinating routines, a common 
language or a sense of social cohesion when coordinating the use of physical 
assets. The transfer of physical assets makes it possible to transfer the fruits of 
productive knowledge between firms without requiring the receiving firm to master 
that knowledge (Demsetz 1988).  
 
In summary, except in the case of CPD, both contractual and relational governance 
have mediating effect on the relation between support capability and collaboration 
type. However, contractual governance seems to have stronger effect on this 
mediation. The findings are consistent with the argument proposed by Das and 
Teng (1998), and Poppo and Zenger (2002), which argue that a mix of formal and 
relational mechanisms may be necessary to manage the exchange of resources in 
buyer-supplier collaboration. 
 
6.5 Control variables  
In this study four types of control variables are identified and examined during 
empirical analysis process. These four variables are: firm size, relationship duration 
and two dummy variables for type of the firm (manufacturer and service provider).  
Firm size is measured in terms of the number of employees in the firm. It is 
observed that the firm size is significantly and negatively related to the contractual 
governance. This indicates that bigger firms will tend to force contractual based 
inter-firm transaction with the customer (buyer) in the supply chain. The reason 
may be understood in the context of the power of the parties in the collaborative 
arrangement. Bigger firms may have more power to enforce the contractual based 
governance in collaborative arrangement. However, smaller firms tend to engage in 
collaborative arrangement with lower level of contractual agreement and prefer to 
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work out the deal.  Previous research suggests that firm size affects the 
organizational behaviour (Scherer, 1980; Miles, 1980) in general and 
organizational boundary decisions in particular. However the effect of firm size is 
not very certain. Moreover, firm size also has positive effect on the R&D 
capability. This indicates that bigger firms tend to have greater level of R&D 
capability as compared to smaller firms. Larger firms may have more resources to 
invest in developing the internal capabilities. Theoretically, the effect of firm size 
on R&D capability is unclear (Pisano 1990).  However, larger firms will have an 
advantage of economies of scale on buying the resources for equipment for 
research purposes. No any significant relation of firm sixe with other capabilities is 
found. This reinforces the fact that increasing firm size also adds up to the 
complexity of administrative processes and therefore can negatively impact the 
capability development process.  
Duration of relationship is measured in terms of the time period since the supplier 
is working together with the buyer. It is observed in the findings that relationship 
duration has a positive and significant effect on the relational governance. This 
indicates that suppliers having longer relationship duration with the buying 
organisation tend to engage in relation-based governance for inter-firm transaction. 
Buyer and suppliers who have no mutual experience of working together, have no 
information that would discount the presumption of opportunism that is associated 
with asset specialization, while buyer and suppliers with this experience share an 
anchoring point for expectations about behaviour (Santoro and Mcgill 2005).  
In terms of the relation with the type of the firm, manufacturing firms are found to 
have a positive and significant relation with the contractual governance. However, 
service providers are negatively related to the contractual governance. This finding 
can be understood in context of the type of the activities manufacturers and service 
providers involved in. In case of manufacturing related activities contractual 
governance may influence the buyer supplier transaction process. On the other 
hand, a greater level of interaction with buying organisation is needed for suppliers 





Chapter 6 focuses on interpreting the findings of the empirical study in context of 
the research questions and the hypotheses proposed in relation to this study. This 
research emphasises that the governance mechanism (contractual and relational) 
acts as a ‘bridge’ between the supplier capabilities (which is internal to the firm and 
inside the firm boundary) and buyer – supplier collaboration (which is external to 
the firm boundary). Engaging in collaborative arrangement with the buyer need to 
be built up through the formal agreement about the extent of the resource 
commitment and the personal informal interaction at multiple level of the firm. The 
Empirical findings related to the indirect effect of supplier capabilities on BSC 
types fully support the hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Support in favour of 
hypotheses 7a and 9a has been found. However, hypotheses 7b, 8a, 8b and 9b are 
rejected. In most of the cases, the argument that both contractual and relational 
governance mediate the relation between capability-collaboration is supported. The 
exception is found in the case of support capability – CPD relationship where the 
multiple mediation effect is not significant. However, the specific indirect effect of 
contractual and relational governance varies across the relationship between 
supplier capabilities and BSC types. The summary results of the specific indirect 
effects through contractual and relational governance are found in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Comparison of the specific indirect effect of contractual and relational 








R&D R>C R>C R>C 










Support services - - C>R 
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In case of R&D and production capability, relational governance has stronger effect 
than the contractual governance. However, a mix result of preference over 
relational and contractual governance is found in case of support capability. 
Contractual governance seems to be more influential in mediating the support – IS 
and support – CPS relationship. Similar to prior work, the finding supports the 
argument that relational and contractual governance mechanisms often co-occur. 
Each has distinct limitations, making the optimal combination of governance 
mechanisms highly dependent on the nature of exchange resources and content of 







CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The chapter aims to conclude the study by summarising the key objectives of 
research and, contribution made in theoretical and practical context. The study 
explores the relation between capability, governance and buyer-supplier 
collaboration type. The supplier perspective on buyer-supplier collaboration is 
considered in this study to examine the indirect effect of supplier capabilities 
(R&D, production and support) on different dimensions of BSC (information 
sharing, CPD and CPS) through contractual and relational governance.  
The chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 discusses the academic 
contribution of this study; the practical implication of the study is presented in 
section 7.3; potential limitations of this study is discussed in section 7.4; section 
7.5 discusses the future research direction; and at the end, section 7.6 presents the 
concluding remarks related to this study.   
7.2 Academic contribution 
The study investigates the relationship between supplier capability, inter-firm 
governance mechanism and buyer-supplier collaboration (BSC). The buyer-
supplier dyad is considered as the unit of analysis in this research.  An integrative 
framework of capability, governance and collaboration has developed to 
understand the importance of capability-governance alignment in BSC. The 
framework is developed on the argument that the type of resources/capabilities 
(Physical or knowledge) involved in collaboration, affects the governance 
mechanism for the exchange process (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). Contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms differ in their ability to support the 
coordination of inter-firm activities in presence of different capabilities (Li et al. 
2010). Although, previous studies discuss the importance of contractual and 
relational governance in effective exchange of resources in inter-firm collaboration, 
limited attempt has been made to include the supplier capability in this discussion 
(Oh and Rhee 2008). The primary contribution of this study is to empirically 
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examine the inter-relation between supplier capabilities, governance mechanisms 
and buyer-supplier collaboration types.   
Studies related to understanding the impact of BSC on firm performance are 
abundant in literature, but the effect of firm capability on BSC has not gained much 
attention (Oh and Rhee 2008). Moreover, studies that discuss the existence of BSC 
do not provide a comprehensive view of heterogeneous types of collaboration 
(Giunipero et al. 2008). A generic approach to collaboration is used, which is not 
very informative in understanding the different types of activities involved in 
collaboration. A coherent classification of collaboration is required to understand 
the relationship between capabilities and BSC types (Crute et al. 2008). 
Understanding BSC in the perspective of the nature of the activities involved rather 
than in a generic sense can help to focus on the particular activities interest to 
suppliers. For the purpose of this study, BSC is categorised as collaborative 
information sharing, collaborative product development (CPD) and collaborative 
problem solving (CPS). These three categories of BSC are based on the purpose, 
nature, time scale and the type of resources involved in the exchange process. The 
collaboration types selected in this research are comprehensive to cover the most 
critical activities in BSC and provide a snapshot of the variety of activities involved 
in BSC. This research contributes in providing the supplier perspective of 
collaboration.  
The holistic view of capabilities across the product lifecycle is considered while 
selecting the three functional capabilities of the supplier (R&D, production and 
support services capabilities) in this study. R&D capability is most important at the 
early stages of product design and development, production capability is important 
while working on transforming raw materials into the final product, and support 
capability may be more important in providing IT support, technical support etc. 
after the sale of the product (Chen and Chen 2003, Jacobides and Winter 2005).  
Unique nature of these capabilities and varying mix of physical and knowledge 
resources in the exchange process are influential in deciding the appropriate form 
of governance mechanism (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). This study provides 
support for the argument in literature that the type of resources/assets involved in 
the exchange process is important to choose a particular form of governance 
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mechanism in the inter-firm collaboration. Resources/assets shared in different 
types of collaboration such as IS, CPD and CPS are different and therefore, the 
governance mechanism to deal with those transactions may vary.  
The empirical analysis of the relationship between supplier capability, governance 
and buyer-supplier collaboration highlights the importance of contractual and 
relational governance in collaborative activities. In examining the multiple 
mediation effect of contractual and relational governance on the relationship 
between capability and collaboration, the results show that both forms of 
governance mechanisms are important in exchange process. Both serves different 
purpose in collaboration exchange and cannot take the role of other (Liu et al. 
2009). This research contributes in providing the empirical evidence in partial 
support of the assertion that both contractual and relational form of governance act 
as complementary rather than substitutes in BSC (Poppo and Zenger 2002, Li et al. 
2010). Contracts without informal relationship and relationships without a formal 
agreement are not sustainable in managing physical and knowledge resource 
sharing in collaboration. If the roles and responsibilities of buyer and supplier are 
formalized ex ante through contracts, it can narrow the scope of ex post actions. 
Contracts can provide a formal framework to make collaborative decision and 
decide the boundary of the collaborative activities. However, relational governance 
promotes the parties to be proactive in value creation in BSC beyond what a 
contract has specified. Relational governance has its limit on safeguarding against 
opportunist behaviour (Lee and Cavusgil 2006). For instance, too much trust is as 
bad as too little trust, because one firm’s high level of trust will lower its 
commitment to monitoring and may even make it easy to be exploited by a partner. 
Moreover, it is also less viable to constrain opportunism through social sanctions 
than contractual punishments. An individual party may loose its economic benefits 
as outlined in the contract if it plans to pursue only its private gains at the expense 
of collective gains in collaboration (Liu et al. 2009). On the other hand, contracts 
may lack flexibility especially in unforeseen circumstances and in this case 
relational governance will be helpful in being adaptive to changing environments 
due to their flexibility. Relational governance promotes open communication and, 
therefore dealing with unforeseen problems in future could be easier. Caniels et al. 
(2012) also clearly illustrate that relational governance is only beneficial for project 
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outcomes when it is accompanied by contractual control. This study supports the 
argument that formal (contractual) and informal (relational) governance mechanism 
mutually redress reach other’s deficiency and reinforce each other’s function when 
they come into play together (Granovetter 1985, Liu et al. 2009, Li et al. 2010).  
Although this research offers empirical insights into the complementarity view of 
governance, it also demonstrates that the degree of indirect effect of contractual 
and relational governance varies in presence of particular supplier capability 
(R&D, production or support services). Relational governance has stronger 
mediating effect in most of cases except the support capability – IS and support 
capability – CPS relationships. Contractual governance seems to be more 
influential in mediating the support – IS and support – CPS relationship. This 
research contributes in providing the empirical analysis for understanding the 
relative effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in the capability - 
collaboration relationship. Findings of this study support the arguments proposed in 
literature (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009, Li et al. 2010) that the superiority of one 
governance mechanism over other in inter-firm exchange depends on the degree of 
physical assets (which are easy to codify and transmit across the firm boundary) 
and knowledge assets (which are based on intangible know-how and skills, and 
difficult to transfer) in the firm capability. The importance of relational governance 
in most of cases in this study also supports the arguments that the physical assets 
are more suited to contractual governance, whereas knowledge assets are best 
suited to relational governance in exchange process.  
This study identifies the importance of alignment between inter-firm governance 
mechanisms, internal capability and the types of collaboration between supplier 
and buyer. This will help to understand why firms prefer to choose contractual or 
relational governance in presence of various sets of capabilities. Certain capability 
can demand more safeguards for spillover due to heavy commitment of resources it 
may need. The alignment of capability and governance should be such that it 
effectively safeguards the intellectual property rights (IPR) as well as promote 
efficient sharing of the resources to work together on collaborative projects (Zhou 
et al. 2008). This study helps to understand the rationale behind the alignment of 
capability with particular governance mechanism in order to achieve greater 
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performance in collaboration. This study helps in understanding the role of 
contractual and relational governance in the relationship between supplier’s 
capability and type of collaboration.  
This study combines the arguments of two-prominent theories in management 
research, Resource Based View (RBV) and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to 
provide a holistic view in explaining the inter-relation between capability, 
governance and buyer-supplier collaboration. RBV focuses on internal capability 
of the firm, while TCE provides useful insight in inter-firm transaction process. 
TCE fundamentally understands the characteristics of transactional exchange and 
while explaining, it typically holds firm capability constant. Therefore, TCE is not 
able to explain how differing firm capabilities influence governance. Moreover, 
although RBV provides insights into firm capabilities, which can generate value, 
little attention has been devoted to understand how capabilities impact governance. 
This study considers both RBV and TCE to understand the effect of supplier 
capability on types of BSC through contractual and relational governance. It argues 
that although the capability of the supplier is important for the competitive 
advantage, the decision on inter-firm governance mechanism in the perspective of 
the capability of the supplier is equally important to enjoy the benefits of 
collaboration. The arguments proposed in this study demonstrate the relevance of 
combining postulates of RBV and TCE to understand BSC.  Combining RBV and 
TCE to explain the phenomenon of collaboration has been supported by the studies 
of McIvor (2009), Meyer et al. (2009), Gulbrandsen et al. (2009) and Argyres and 
Zenger (2012).   
This study supports the argument that RBV complements TCE to understand the 
exchange process in inter-firm alliance (Meyer et al. (2009). TCE has long 
recognized a variety of sources of asset specificity, but most studies have not 
distinguished between them when predicting the appropriate governance response. 
As transaction cost research moves from studying industries dominated by physical 
assets, e.g., coal (Joskow 1987) and shoe manufacturing (Masten and Snyder 
1993), to high-technology, knowledge-intensive settings, e.g., technology transfer 
alliances (Oxley 1999), it will become increasingly important to understand the 
impact of the resource type on the governance mechanism. The study supports the 
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arguments proposed by Argyres and Zenger (2012) that the RBV and TCE are in 
fact so intertwined dynamically that treating them as independent in explaining the 
exchanges beyond firm boundary is fundamentally misleading. The finding of this 
study provides support for the ongoing argument of extended-RBV (Lewis et al. 
2010) and note that the importance of inter-firm relation cannot be overlooked 
while discussing the competitive advantage in Buyer-supplier collaboration.  
This research also makes contribution in demonstrating the multiple mediation 
analysis technique in the operations management area. Despite the superiority of 
bootstrapping based multiple mediation analysis over casual steps approach and 
sobel test, it is under-utilised in the operations management area. Although, causal 
steps approach (Baron and Kenny 1986) is one of the most widely used method for 
testing hypotheses about intervening variables effects, it has often been criticized 
for detecting the intervening effects (Fritz and MacKinnon 2007, MacKinnon et al. 
2002). The causal approach is not based on the quantification of the very thing it is 
attempting to test i.e. the intervening effect. Moreover, Sobel test assumptions are 
less likely to be satisfied for small to moderated sized samples (Preacher and Hayes 
2008b). In contrast to the Sobel test, bootstrapping doesn’t use the standard error to 
interpret the results and avoids the controversy behind estimating the standard 
errors of the indirect effect. Bootstrapping also doesn’t assume normality for the 
sampling distribution and are known to be more powerful than the sobel test 
(Hayes 2009). In this study bootstrapping technique is used to test the hypothesised 
multiple mediation/indirect effects of contractual and relational governance on the 
relationship between capability and collaboration. The multiple mediation analysis 
technique used in this study is more robust than the most popular method of casual 
steps or sobel test and therefore, the findings of this study can be interpreted with 
more confidence.  
7.3 Practical implications 
BSC is increasingly becoming critical in maintaining the competitive advantage in 
the market. This study can pave the way to understand a number of practical issues 
in managing the supply chain collaboration. While the benefits of collaboration 
have been widely discussed in business community, the understanding of how to 
effectively manage the collaborative arrangement is still developing.  
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This study provides key insight in linking the capability with the inter-firm 
governance mechanism in the context of different types of collaboration.  It is 
found that the exchange between buyer and supplier depends on the type of 
resources involved in collaboration. Capabilities, which are deeply embedded in the 
personnel of suppliers, need a greater level of interaction at multiple levels with the 
buying firm for effective sharing. Findings of this study support that the 
information and knowledge are more effectively shared between buyer and supplier 
through relational governance. The level of trust and relationship between buyer 
and supplier are important factors in deciding the sharing process. Contractual 
governance is more effective whenever there is a need to impose safeguard 
measures to protect the intellectual property against opportunistic behaviour. This 
study helps in improving the practical understanding of using contractual and 
relational governance together in improving BSC performance. The study 
demonstrates that both contractual and relational governance are important in 
managing different types of BSC. Managers should understand the nature of both 
contractual and relational governance and appropriately manage the resources to 
engage in formal and informal interactions with the buyer/supplier. This study also 
provides empirical support for the relative importance of one governance 
mechanism over another in presence of particular supplier capability and 
collaboration type. Both buyer and supplier need to be committed in designing and 
exercising the optimal governance structure in BSC. This study is important for 
practitioners in terms of providing the relative importance of contractual and 
relational governance in the particular setting of capability-collaboration 
arrangement.  
Another lesson learned from this study is that the alignment between capability and 
governance mechanism is critical to enjoy the benefits of buyer-supplier 
collaboration and to protect the skills/knowledge intact wherever necessary. In 
absence of proper understanding of the nature of capability and the effective inter-
firm exchange process particularly suited for those capabilities, it would be 
challenging for managers to realise the potential benefits of collaboration. Results 
of this study help to understand the linkage between capability (R&D, production 
and support) and collaboration types (Information sharing, CPD and CPS) in 
exchange process. It may be possible that investment on relation specific resources 
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may not be beneficial if only the physical resources are involved in the exchange 
process (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). The allocation of resources to facilitate 
collaboration could be better managed with the knowledge of right alignment of 
capability and governance. Managers can make better decisions on the extent of 
formal and informal interactions with suppliers or buyers in light of the finding of 
this study. Both physical and knowledge based resources may contribute to the 
collaboration’s goals (de Figueiredo and Teece 1996) and therefore, both forms of 
governance mechanism are important. However, when asset types are mixed, the 
partners will have to choose suboptimal governance arrangements. If the alliance 
can be narrowed to either predominantly physical assets or predominantly 
knowledge assets, managers can employ the optimal amount of governance 
mechanism for the predominant asset type, with fewer repercussions in the 
management of the other assets. In many cases, however, managers must choose 
the level of relational governance mechanism they use, given the mix of assets 
required by the alliance’s goals, either under-supporting knowledge assets or 
inefficiently governing physical assets (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). 
This study builds on the supplier perspective of collaboration. The suppliers 
perspective is important because the understanding of collaborative activity directly 
affects the quality of collaboration and overall outcomes. Just as supplier 
knowledge and satisfaction can improve with capability and governance alignment, 
it can also deteriorate with non-alignment. Thus, it is advantageous for buyers, to 
view the collaboration through the supplier’s lens. This perspective helps buyers 
identify supplier needs and brings buyers and suppliers closer to each other. When 
a buyer provides better information to suppliers, the result will be increased 
participation of supplier in collaboration. This, in turn, will help buyers to achieve 
their goals for collaboration. 
Although, the study explores the supplier perspective of the collaboration, the 
practical implication of this study would be beneficial to both suppliers and buyers. 
For suppliers, the study is important to understand the nature of the relationship 
between capability and different forms of collaboration. Although, the contractual 
and relational governance both are important in effectively sharing the resources 
and information in collaborative arrangement, this study can help the managers at 
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supplier site to understand the preference of one over another in presence of 
particular assets and capability. This decision also needs to be understood in the 
perspective of number of competitors in the market and the position of supplier in 
the business. Suppliers with higher position in the market will have more power to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of the agreement with buyer. However, supplier 
not at top position may be more willing to work out the deal with supplier for 
mutual benefits.  
This study may help the managers at buying organisations in terms of 
understanding the behaviour of supplier in different combinations of capability and 
collaboration activities. By understanding the supplier preference over particular 
form of exchange process in collaboration, buyer will be more open towards that 
exchange process and can better prepare to deal with the supplier in collaboration. 
The aim of buyer-supplier collaboration is to work together for mutual benefits and 
if both parties have better understanding about the relation between capability, 
inter-firm governance and BSC, they can effectively manage the collaboration.  
Moreover, the aerospace industry is a technology-intensive industry and supplier’s 
involvement in collaborative projects is invaluable for the buyer. Understanding the 
preferences of suppliers about the exchange process, the buyer can effectively 
utilise the specialised assets of suppliers. The findings in this study can be looked 
in the context of dyadic relation between buyer and supplier. If a complex supply 
chain is assumed as a network of multiple buyer-supplier dyadic collaborative 
arrangements, the practical implications of this study can be carefully extended to 
the supply chain as a whole.  
7.4 Research limitations 
Although, a number of academic and practical contribution have been realised in 
this study, this section discusses the possible limitations in interpreting the findings 
of this study.  
First of all, limitations of cross sectional studies are also applicable in this research. 
The relationship between capability, governance and collaboration is discussed 
based on the experience of the managers at one particular time when the data is 
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collected. It may be possible that the relationship may change over a period of time. 
The dynamics of relationship over a period is not considered in this research. A 
longitudinal data set can be useful in incorporating the development of relationship 
in this study. 
This study is limited to the aerospace industry in the UK region and therefore, 
findings cannot be generalised to other industries and in different geographical 
region. The economic and institutional conditions such as market size, legal system 
in the country, economic development, market uncertainty, nature of competition 
etc. can change the operating environment in which buyers and suppliers work. 
This study also did not investigate the possible asymmetry in bargaining power 
structure in the supply chain members. Due to different goals and asymmetric 
power positions between buyers and suppliers, one partner can control the 
governance mechanism and force its decision on other. Developing the particular 
form of governance mechanism may involve some direct and indirect cost and 
therefore determining the optimal level can also be influenced by the economic 
condition of the buyer and supplier. This issue is also not considered in this study.   
Survey research is used as the primary method of data collection in this study. 
Survey research is criticised with the problem of appropriate sample size, response 
rate etc. and therefore the common limitations of survey research also apply to this 
study. However, the response rate for this study is at the respectable level normally 
found in the operations management area. Qualitative research method like case 
study could have provided the in-depth study of the capability, governance and 
collaboration phenomenon. In addition, the survey research in this study has used 
closed questions where there was little freedom to record any specific event or 
factor which might have more influential effect on the relationship between 
supplier capability and collaboration type. This could have been avoided by using a 
mixed method strategy for data collection, which includes both qualitative and 
quantitative form of data collection techniques. However, mixed mode of data 
collection is a time consuming process.    
Limited theoretical guidance has been available in this area to understand the 
dynamics of capability and governance mechanism in different types of buyer-
supplier collaboration. This study is limited to only three types of capabilities 
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(R&D, production and support services) and three types of collaboration (IS, CPD 
and CPS). The list of capabilities and collaboration type in real life is not limited to 
only the capabilities, governance and collaboration type discussed in this research. 
Other factors like operating conditions in the industry, product complexity etc. 
could be influential in deciding the dynamics of the capability-governance-
collaboration model. Future research should be developed on the foundation of this 
study to explore the other potential moderating/mediating variables for the 
capability-governance-collaboration framework. For example, the sheer size of a 
project can influence firm’s governance choice, which is not considered in this 
research. 
In addition, the multiple mediation model discussed in this study assumes that one 
mediator variable does not affect other. However, in practice the contractual 
governance and relational governance mechanisms seem to have some 
interconnection based on the fact that practitioners argue that either both work 
parallel or one follows other. In this research, for the analysis purpose both are 
treated independent to each other and further research could be conducted to test 
the interrelation between the contractual and relational governance. Even the 
moderated mediation and mediated moderation models suggested by (Preacher and 
Hayes 2008a) could be further explored to see the combined results of mediation 
and moderation effects. Although, the bootstrapping technique adopted in this 
study, benefits with a number of advantages, it also suffers with some minor 
limitations (Preacher and Hayes 2008b). The accuracy of bootstrap confidence 
intervals depends on the number of re-samples and re-sampling is a time 
consuming process. However, in today’s age of fast computers, the processing time 
can be significantly reduced.  
The data limitation could raise some concerns regarding the generalisability of 
findings of this study. In relation to the sample size of the analysis, of course bigger 
sample size can give more confidence towards generalising the findings of this 
study. However, sample size should be seen in the context of the focus of this 
research, which is limited to only aerospace industry. In addition the information 
desired in this research requires the responses from senior managers in the small 
and medium sized firms. Therefore, the sample size is enough to offer insights in 
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the capability-governance-collaboration relationship in aerospace sector. Data at 
cross-sector level could give more insight in understanding and comparing the 
similar relationship in different industries.  
7.5 Future research direction 
This research has investigated the relationship between capability, governance and 
buyer-supplier collaboration from the suppliers’ perspective and highlighted the 
importance of alignment between capability and governance mechanism in BSC. 
There are limited previous literatures available which considered these three 
components together to provide a holistic view of buyer-supplier collaboration. 
Therefore, this study provides the foundation for future research in the area of BSC 
in order to better understand the factors, which affects the collaboration 
performance.  
There is a number of potential ways in which this study can be further extended in 
future. First of all, in this study only three functional capabilities (R&D, production 
and support services) are considered for the analysis. The list of capabilities 
identified in this study is not comprehensive and further research is required to first 
to identify the key capabilities of suppliers and then investigate the impact of these 
capabilities on the BSC phenomenon. Future research should explore the nature 
and characteristics of some of the capabilities like absorptive capability, learning 
capability, alignment capability, green capability etc., and investigate the 
relationship with governance and buyer supplier collaboration performance. In 
addition, the list of buyer – supplier collaboration type is also not complete and 
therefore, future research is required to understand the different types of 
collaboration activities buyer and suppliers are engaged in. The multiple 
combinations of capabilities and collaboration types will develop an interesting 
area of research to understand the impact of firm specific capabilities on the BSC. 
In-depth study to explore the supplier’s view of different forms of collaboration 
will be worthwhile to understand the bottom up view of collaboration. This would 
be helpful to align the collaboration objectives of buyer and supplier in BSC. In 
future, research thinking also needs to be developed on the firm - boundary specific 
capabilities and boundary spanning capabilities. The dynamics between boundary 
specific and boundary spanning capabilities in BSC will be interesting to explore. 
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Future research could also works towards findings various mediating and 
moderating variables, which affect the relationship between capability, governance 
and collaboration. Technological uncertainty in the market and nature of 
competition could influence the choice of governance mechanism in inter-firm 
exchange process. Product and process complexity, cost involved in maintaining 
the formal and informal relationship, negotiation power etc. could also affect the 
capability, governance and collaboration relationship. Future research should 
expand on theses themes to understand the various factors, which can play the 
decisive role in adopting a particular form of governance.  
This study only considers the measurement of supplier capabilities at a particular 
time. However, in real life capabilities evolve over time. The cross sectional nature 
of the data can limit the understanding of the phenomenon, which changes over 
time. Future research should incorporate the longitudinal data set to understand the 
dynamics of the relationship between capabilities, governance and collaboration. 
In-depth case studies could be useful in understanding the development and 
changes in capabilities, type of the governance mechanism and type of 
collaboration between buyer and supplier.  
This research highlights the importance of contractual and relational governance in 
the perspective of BSC and explains that both forms of governance are important in 
administering the exchange process in BSC. However, the relative effect of 
contractual and relational varies for multiple combinations of capability and 
collaboration types. These findings could be further examined for other 
combinations of capabilities and collaboration relationships. Future work could 
also be extended to explore the questions like which forms of governance comes 
first in developing the multiple types of buyer-supplier collaboration? Does inter-
firm relationship build on the successful completion of contract or vice versa? 
Further work should also be conducted to comprehensively understand the inter-
relation between contractual and relational governance. Zheng et al. (2008) also 
argue that different development characteristics of relational and contractual 
mechanisms suggest that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent 
patterns and concludes with suggestions for more longitudinal studies. 
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This study is limited to the aerospace industry only and therefore similar study in 
other industries can be conducted in future to identify any particular trend of 
relationship among capability, governance and collaboration in different industries. 
The comparative study of different industries such that automobile, retail etc. in 
terms of exploring the relationship-trend would be interesting to see. Research can 
also be extended to other geographical regions across the globe in similar industry. 
Comparative study on the basis of geographical region can be interesting to 
understand any location, tradition or culture specific factors affecting the 
capability-governance-collaboration relationship. For example, a culture that is 
heavily inward-focused could lead to an arrogance that may lead to development of 
more contractual based governance. In increasing dominance of international 
collaboration, location of the organisation can make some interesting impact on the 
capability-governance-collaboration model.  
In this study, only the dyadic collaborative arrangement between buyer and 
supplier is explored. It would be interesting to further see studies, which discuss the 
supply chain or supply network level collaboration in the similar problem context. 
Moreover, the data is collected from only one side of the dyadic collaboration i.e. 
suppliers, which may not be able to give the complete picture of collaboration. 
Future research should incorporate the perspective of both buyer and supplier to 
provide the complete picture of capability-governance-collaboration model. This 
will provide the opportunity to understand the both side of story and then do the 
comparative analysis. However, this will involve a significant resource 
commitment in data collection process. Moreover the characteristics of the firm can 
also affect the nature of relationship between capability, governance and 
collaboration. The difference between a long established firm and the new entrants 
in market is not considered in this study. Both types of firms may have different 
attitude towards collaboration and boundary decisions for governance. For 
example, new entrants may have lower barriers to integration into product markets. 
Future research should also build on these themes to understand the firm specific 
factors in collaboration. Similarly, the type of the firm (manufacturer, service 
provider and manufacturer-cum-service provider) can have impact on the relation 
between capability, governance and collaboration type. Future research can explore 
theses issues.   
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In terms of research framework, a multiple mediation model for the relationship 
between capability, governance and collaboration is developed and bootstrapping 
based analysis technique is used in this study. As discussed above, a number of 
factors related to market uncertainty, competition, firm characteristic, location, 
culture etc. could affect the relationship between capability, governance and 
collaboration and make the theoretical framework complex. Different types of 
capabilities and collaboration can further enhance the complexity of the model. In 
future, moderated mediation and mediated moderation models could be developed 
to investigate these complex natures of relationships. Findings of such mediation 
and moderation effects will be interesting to see in future. 
7.6 Final remarks 
This study focuses on understanding the relationship between capability, 
governance and buyer-supplier collaboration from suppliers’ perspective. The 
concept of resource based view of the firm and transaction cost economics are 
combined to develop the theoretical framework and explain the capability-
governance-collaboration model. The study supports the argument that although 
the capability of the firm is important, inter-firm governance mechanism is equally 
important to perform in collaboration. The study provides empirical evidence to 
partially support the complementary nature of contractual and relational 
governance (i.e. both are needed together). The study also adds support for the 
ongoing argument of extended resource based view, which emphasises on both the 
firm’s capability and inter-firm relationship to develop sources for sustainable 
competitive advantage. The findings of this research suggest that practitioners 
should align governance mechanism with the capabilities firm possess. Bearing in 
mind the limited empirical research available in combining the capability, 
governance and collaboration phenomenon, this study is important in paving the 
way for further comprehensive research in buyer-supplier collaboration. Hopefully, 
this study will stimulate more research in similar area, not only with dyadic 
perspectives of buyer and supplier but adopting similar themes at more broader 
level, such as the supply chain or network level.     
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‘Understanding buyer-supplier collaboration in UK aerospace industry’ 
 
A set of questions for semi-structured interview is developed for preliminary study. 
Brief interview of about 1 hour at the firm site is conducted to explore the issues 
related to supply chain collaboration in aerospace industry. Recommended 
participants are directors, managers or senior mangers having the background in 
strategy development, operations management, product development, supplier 
development, project management or supply chain management. 
 
Section A: Internal firm focus:  
 
1. Please briefly describe the nature of your business. What are your core 
products and services? 
 
2. Describe your most important internal capabilities & resources in the firm 
(e.g. process technology, R&D, core knowledge, supply & distribution etc). 
How are they valuable, and to what extent sustainable?   
 
3. Have you seen a shift towards greater demand for supply chain 
collaboration over past few years or so? If so, what impact has this had on 
your business? 
 
Section B: External to the firm focus: 
 
4. Describe your position in the supply chain? (Use figure as guide, but amend 






5. Please briefly describe your main/primary customers. What are their core 
products and services? How long are you in business with them?  
 
6. Please briefly describe the most important external/shared resources and 
capabilities (e.g. physical assets, knowledge, technology, information, 
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supplier networks etc.) for your business, which you think lie in the inter-
firm collaboration. How are they valuable, and to what extent sustainable?   
 
7. Please briefly describe the inter-firm collaborative activities (e.g. R&D, 
Sharing of Information, and Sharing of resources) involved in your 
business?  
 
8. Please briefly describe your understanding of the type of inter-firm 
collaboration in supply chain?  
 
9. How is the supply chain collaboration administered? (Contractual, 
relational or both) 
 
10. Describe the future direction of supply chain collaboration? What are the 





APPENDIX B: Questionnaire for pre- testing the survey 
instrument 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the relationship between organisational 
capability and collaboration performance. The purpose of pre-testing the survey 
instrument is to examine, that the questions and items included in the survey are 
easily understandable and consistent with the aim of the study. Interviewees are 
asked to critically review the survey instrument and provide feedback on 
everything that can negatively affect the answering of questions. They can identify 
any aspects of the questionnaire that are unclear, confusing, ambiguous and hard to 
understand etc. The following questions are considered while pilot testing the 
survey instrument: 
 
1. Are the instructions and the aims of the study clear enough to answer the 
questions asked in the survey? 
 
2. Are the questions clear and easily understandable? 
 
3. Are there any problems in understanding what kind of answers are expected, or 
in providing answers to the questions posed? 
 
4. Are the structure (eg. sequence of questions) and design (eg. font size, spacing 
between sentences etc.) of the questionnaire logical? 
 
5. Is the questionnaire easy to complete? If not what are the things that are unclear 
or out of respondents’ range of knowledge and/or responsibility?   
 
6. Is the language used in the questionnaire free from jargons, slangs and 
abbreviation? Is the language and terminologies used in the questionnaire 
appropriate for the target respondents? 
 
7. Is there any question, which the respondent objects to answer?  
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8. Is the length of the questionnaire appropriate?  
 
9. How long do you take to fill the complete questionnaire? 
 
10. Is each respondent likely to read and answer each question? Can I eliminate 
some of the questions? 
 
11. Are the items consistent with the questions asked? Can I ask some questions 
differently for better response? 
 
12. Are there any elements of the questionnaire, which you think should be 
changed, deleted or modified?   
 
13. Are the questions straightforward to understand? 
 
14. Please provide any suggestion that helps to improve the questionnaire and 
response rate. Is there anything, which you don’t like about the questionnaire?   
 
15. Finally, please provide your overall reaction to the questionnaire. Please try to 
be specific whenever appropriate. !!
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APPENDIX C: Survey Cover Letter!
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